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INTRODUCTION
In the preface to "Studies in Logical Theory" by John 
Dewey, published with the cooperation of the members and fellows 
of the department of philosophy at the University of Chicago, there 
is this tribute to William James: "For both inspiration and the
forging of tools with which the writers have worked there is a pre­
eminent obligation on the part of all of us to William James, of 
Harvard University, who we hope, will accept this acknowledgment 
and this book aa unworthy tokens of a regard and an admiration that 
are coequal."
In writing these words Dewey spoke for a largergroup of 
thinkers than himself and his colleagues at the University of Chi­
cago. The vigor and sanity of the view of life which James called 
pragmatic, together with his own irresistible charm as a teacher, 
made devotees of his students. American scholarship is still under 
his spell. Many a teacher in the departments of education and lit­
erature, as well as in philosophy, has the portrait of James above 
his desk and ends a discussion by pointing to it and saying "As 
William James so ably said -."
It is no wonder that men continue to study the writings 
of James, for aside from his unquestioned literary ability, his 
philosophy makes certain promises which cannot be ignored. It prom­
ises to walk with feet upon the earth, like ordinary science, and 
honest common sense, and yet promises to preserve the supreme val­
ues of life, truth, beauty, freedom, the worth of effort, individu­
ality, and the social values which weigh 30 heavily on the side of 
happiness. Objective idealism claims to preserve these values, to 
be sure, but does so by forsaking the earth of experience for the
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cloud world of the transcendental. Materialistic philosophies keep 
upon the earth, but to most men's eyes, blight the face of earth 
until i18 values give place to a very desert of matter. Pragmatism 
as taught by James, offers to mediate between these extremes. For 
the purposes of this study I shall assume that the promises which 
pragmatism makes are worth while, and that its method of radical 
empiricism, of keeping to the earth of experience like any science, 
is as proper for philosophy as for science. But it will appear in 
the course of the study that from failure to grasp the underlying 
principle, and as a consequence making false assumptions, James did 
not succeed in establishing pragmatism as a philosophy. That, others 
have done, notably Professor Dewey, now of Columbia University,while 
if pragmatism had to stand as James left it, in spite of its beauty 
and worth, it would fall apart from logical unsoundness.
The rock upon which pragmatism must rest is a theory of 
consciousness. All other problems prove subordinate to that and 
that, accordingly, must be fully understood. To understand the 
meaning of consciousness for consistent pragmatists and then to ap­
ply this as the critical test to the philosophy of James is the end 
I propose.
Many of the titles of his essays show that James himself 
felt that the problem of knowledge is central. There occur such 
titles as "The Function of Cognition," "The Relation between Knower 
and Known," "Ths Compounding of Consciousness," "The Continuity of 
Experience," "Does Consciousness Exist?," "A World of Pure Experi­
ence," "How Two Minds Can Know One Thing," "La Notion de Conscience," 
"Is Radical Empiricism Sol ipsistic?" "Percept and Concept - The Im­
port of Concepts," "Percept and Concept - The Abuse of Concepts,"
"Percept and Concept - Some Corollaries." The essays so entitled, 
and others not so transparently named, deal directly with this prob­
lem of knowledge.
But although James struggled with the problem thus per­
sistently he missed the silken thread which could deliver him from 
the maze of dualism. There have been historically two escapes of­
fered from the dilemma which arose as soon as men took for granted 
-that mind and matter are the ultimate factors of all experience. The 
logical methods of escape have been drawing to agreement in one par­
ticular, namely, that the chasm between the two cannot be bridged, 
it must be annihilated, and some have accepted one horn, that all is 
matter, others the other horn, that all is mind. Neither proceeding 
satisfies the pragmatist who declares that the problem is incorrectly 
stated. He believes that in the sense intended by the historical 
statement there is no more a problem of matter and mind, than of 
organisms and life, of living organisms and growth, or of sticky fly­
paper and adhesiveness. Just as life, growth and adhesiveness are 
respectively names for certain characteristic modes of behavior of 
organisms and of flypaper, so mind is a name for a characteristic 
way in which objects control certain organisms. Consciousness is 
behavior, but behavior, of course, of a certain kind and thereby 
hangs a tale. For to 3ay that "consciousness is behavior" in no 
way distinguishes it from growth which is also a typical form of 
organic behavior. When one realizes the years of careful observa­
tion and study which scientists like Dr. Mendel of Yale, are giving 
to the definition of growth, he wishes for equal scientific justice 
in the study of the type of behavior represented by consciousness. 
Pragmatism claims, that thanks to the painstaking experimentation
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which has taken place in the 
science, it has been able to 
Which sets it apart from all 
describes it.
fields of biological and psychological 
formulate a definition of consciousness 
other types of behavior and adequately
But James put himself on record as saying that pragmatism 
is "a new name for some old ways of thinking" and with these words 
j put himself outside of the significant pragmatic teaching. For in 
j so far as a writer calling himself a pragmatist fails to maintain 
consistently that consciousness is a mode of behavior characterized 
by anticipation of consequences, he is discovered upon analysis 
to be offering nothing new and to be making no distinct contribution 
; to philosophical thought. If he calls himself a pragmatist, yet 
does not hold to this revolutionary view of consciousness, he is 
hardly building himself a monument "more lasting than bronze." He 
may live in the fame of his inspiring personality, and because of 
the courage and salutary vigor of his moral attitude, but as a prag­
matist, "the place thereof shall know him no more."
I know that there is a tradition that "pragmatism" is no 
more a name for a single, consistent philosophy of life than is 
"romanticism" but that each is a portmanteau term for a group of 
more or less parallel but independent interests. Yet in the case 
of romanticism, scientific criticism is less and less content with 
this loose classification and we have many attempts to find the com­
mon drift of all romanticism. In a similar way it is possible that 
the "humanism" and the "voluntarism" of Schiller, the "radical em- 
iricism" and "meliorism" of James, in so far as they can be main­
tained, are one with the "functionalism" of Dewey in more than the 
name "pragmatism."
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Would it be too much to assume dogmatically at the outset 
that because all pragmatists make avowal of keeping within experi­
ence for the interpretation of philosophical problems, they are 
bound to come to terms with the problem of knowledge? I think not. 
For the word "experience" does not yield itself to our understand­
ing until we know the conditions and the laws under which all ex­
perience takes place, in other words until we fairly face the prob­
lem of knowledge.
James, calling himself a pragmatist, tried to interpret 
man’s relation to his universe in experiential terms. But because 
he lacked the fruitful pragmatic understanding of all experience 
as behavior guided by anticipation of consequences, and fell back 
upon the older static conceptions of experience, the richness of 
the world seemed somehow to overflow his epistemological measure­
ments and he was forced to bring in a non-experiential "more," to 
do justice to the facts. Thus from this failure to find an adequate 
interpretation of knowledge or experience, for our present purpose 
the words are interchangeable, come the incoherences and the actual 
contradictions which mar his philosophy. Seeing, therefore, as we 
can, the cause of his philosophical shortcomings his work may be 
judged by a standard which is internal to it. We need not go to 
other philosophies for an external standard to be employed like a 
Procrustean bed. But we shall need to fully understand the signi­
ficance of pragmatism's new and radical definition of consciousness 
as that is the internal principle for lack of which, in spite of 
his genius and honesty of purpose, James failed to establish his 
pragmatism.
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That James defined philosophy as an "unusually obstinate 
attempt to think clearly" justifies us, if further justification 
is needed, in trying to reduce his system to consistency. In doing 
so we do him most honor. It is difficult to be a pathfinder and 
yet never to double on one's trail. Those who look for consistency 
in James are often disappointed. Those who go to him for sugges­
tions are richly rewarded. The breadth of his interests, the open­
ness of his mind, assure us that a critical study of his philosophy^ 
although it results in a revaluation of his position, cannot dim 
his fame.
Following my thesis, I maintain that in so far as James 
missed the functional interpretation of consciousness he was not a 
pragmatist. I believe that it will appear that he occupied the more 
lonely position of a transitional thinker working independently and 
with great purpose to free himself from harmful conventions of 
thought and to formulate new truths. For the position which he 
called pragmatic, and identified at times with a method, which is 
only the method of science introduced into philosophy, and at times 
with a theory of truth, which of itself fell into contradiction for 
lack of a more fundamental principle to which it is only a corol­
lary, is hardly more than an attitude of expectancy. It is the hush 
before the dawn. In the writings of Dewey we first find the con­
sistent principle upon which pragmatism stands or falls. It is a 
matter for regret that James did not understand Dewey's position 
better, since, had he done so, with his gift of eloquence and ar­
resting simplicity of phrase, he might have ushered in a philosophic 
era of beneficent promise. But because he failed to understand
Deway’s position I shall when speaking of James as a pragmatist 
find it necessary to contrast him in that role with the consistent 
pragmatist. This is suspiciously like the distinction "between a 
Methodist and a strict Methodist and it is partly out of deference 
to his classification of himself that I shall retain the distinction. 
Also it is true that the radical empiricism which he favored, his 
denial of an absolute standard of truth, his meliorism in ethical 
matters, instead of absolute optimism or pessimism, his doctrine 
of novelty, his defense of freedom and particularly his insistance 
on the continuity of experience are characteristics of "consistent" 
pragmatism. It is not too much to say that in intention and sympa­
thy James was pragmatic and,therefore, and because of his great abili­
ty, it has easily happened that the popular verdict has been that 
he is the one, great pragmatist.
Yet how very far James came from recognizing that con­
sciousness is a mode of behavior, an illustration which he used in 
an article published as late as 1908, and republished in 1909, may 
sufficiently show. James wrote: "As a case analogous to that of a 
godless universe, I thought of what I called an 'automatic sweet- 
hear%* meaning a soulless body which should be absolutely indis­
tinguishable from a spiritually animated maiden laughing, talking, 
blushing, nursing us and performing all feminine offices as tact­
fully and sweetly as if a soul were in her. Would anyone regard her 
as a full equivalent? Certainly not, and why? Because, framed as 
we are, our egoism craves above all things inward sympathy and recog­
nition, love and admiration. The outward treatment is valued mainly 
as an expression, as a manifestation of the accompanying conscious­
8ness believed in. Pragmatically, then, belief in the automatic 
sweetheart would not work. and in point of fact no one treats it 
as a serious hypothesis." ("The Meaning of Truth," p.189,footnote)
Yet to qualify as a pragmatist, this is the serious hypo­
thesis which it was of supreme importance for James to hold. This 
may, I know, sound preposterous to all non-pragmatists, but I beg 
for the statement a judicial hearing before final condemnation ie 
pronounced. Because the position of pragmatism is so new and so 
strange to all older habits of thought, precisely because pragma­
tism is not a new name for old ways of thinking, men have found it 
hard to listen to its statements with openness of mind and suspense 
of judgment.
Let us, then, examine the illustration. James meant by 
it that consciousness is more than behavior. He said that it is 
the inward state of which behavior is a manifestation. But although 
James called the behavior in question that of an "automatic sweet­
heart" he was careful not to make it equivalent to the mechanical 
behavior of a jointed doll run by an elaborate set of springs and 
wheels. On the contrary, the soulless body was to be "absolutely 
indistinguishable from a spiritually animated maiden." She was to 
behave by "laughing, talking, blushing,nursing us and performing 
all feminine offices as tactfully and sweetly as if a soul were in 
her." Such behavior is at once removed from the level of mechanical 
response. Ho wax doll, however perfect, could be tactful. for that 
at once involves a consideration of how actions will affect others 
even before those actions are performed. It means selecting one 
possible course of action as against another by weighing the conse­
quences of each. It is responding to the future as a present stimu­
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lus. Now, although we can speak of a mechanical doll as controlled 
by the whole universe up to date, to trespass beyond the limits of 
the present moment into a control exercised upon the doll by the 
future - is to talk nonsense. In that difference of control lies 
the difference between mechanical and conscious behavior.
Then, there arises a further question: granted that there 
is this difference of control and that conscious behavior means that 
the future is acting as a present stimulus, (as we have seen in the 
case of tactfulness) are you not still bound to say that the future 
acts on a thing called the mind which in turn causes the appropriate 
action? Have you not still a problem with three terms to solve, 
and one of them an unknown, namely, as first term future consequen­
ces and as second term behavior adjusted to them,and finally as a 
third term an "inward state?" This is, of course, where James stood 
and our analysis does not seem thus far to have advanced us much.
The method for approaching this problem is, I believe, 
to see just how much is involved in our known terras and what there 
is left for the unknown term, in this case consciousness as an in­
ward state, to do. But this will take us on a somewhat long excur­
sion into the heart of pragmatic theory, and we may lose sight for 
a time of the "automatic sweetheart." In the end, however, we shall 
return to her, and, I hope with a fuller appreciation of that tact­
ful and well-behaved maiden's worth and satisfactoriness even for 
an egoism which "craves above all things inward sympathy and recog­
nition, love and admiration."
The first term of the problem to be solved is "future 
consequences." Where do we find "future consequences?" According
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to our coEEon speech they are qualities of objects. le speak of 
threatening skies, of dangerous animals, of comfortable-looking 
chairs, of appeasing gestures, of knives which will cut, of fires 
which are hot or will burn, and of friends who are trustworthy. That 
these qualities of objects have to do with consequences which we 
are to expect if we act in certain ways, is, I take it, too simple 
to need explanation. That they are actually qualities of the ob­
jects as much as red, or square, or hard, or thin may be qualities 
of objects is a further point which I need not establish by argu­
ment. By way of warning I must mention at this point that the prag­
matist starts without certain idealistic assumptions in regard to 
objects. An absolute idealist would be forced thus early to recog­
nize that the qualities of objects are sense impressions to be held 
together only by means of some transcendental agency, equivalent 
to the "transcendental unity of apperception;" or, to recognize that 
they are intellectual relations, resolving themselves into an in­
finite regress of self destruction since nowhere are there terms, 
or if not disparate sense impressions or relations, at least Fich- 
taan judgments with subjects sundered from predicates, by unsolvable 
differences. The pragmatist says more simply: I have in my experi­
ence certain things called objects. I find that these objects have 
certain qualities and that every quality in turn appears upon inves­
tigation to be nothing but a forecast of the consequences which a 
response to that object will produce. He recognizes, in other words, 
that objects resolve themselves into relations, but that these re­
lations are functional instead of intellectual and so escape destruc­
tion and contradiction and the need of an absolute to render them
p ossi ole.
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It is not, then, merely the threatening quality of the 
sky which is an anticipation of consequences, hut the blackness 
must itself yield to the same analysis. For it will not help the 
pragmatist to prove his contention in regard to consciousness if 
only certain qualities of the object are forecasts of the conse­
quences, which a response to that object will produce, and other 
qualities have no functional significance. To repeat, unless the 
pragmatist can show that every quality of the object functions in 
the conscious relation by revealing to the organism before an action 
takes place what the results of that action will be - it must forego 
its present boast of solving the old problem of knowledge in a new 
and adequate manner.
We see at once that for the purposes of our analysis there 
are two kindsof qualities: those simple qualities which are easily 
convertible into their functional equivalents, such as hot into 
will-burn, sharp into will-cut and heavy into will-resist-foree, 
and those other qualities not so easily convertible for which col­
ors may serve as examples.
An analysis of hot will yield the suggestion we need.
If we observe the dog before the open grate fire, we find that he 
early learns to keep at a certain distance. It is not enough 
to eay that hot means for the dog "will-burn." It means also "will- 
warm." His selection of a certain place on the hearth-rug is a 
nice adjustment to these meanings of th9 quality of hotness. At 
first, as is often the case with young dogs, he may with difficulty 
have been induced to face the heat, It was only "will-burn" to 
him but later the other meaning "will-warm" became part of hotness.
Sup p 0 3 8 we take the dog as he appears to the young child 
in the house. How does the concept "dog" grow? Evidently from
a series of adventures of dog and child. From thing-which-will- 
make-a noise, thing-which-will-knock-one-over, thing-which -will- 
lick-one's-face, thing-which-will-retrieve-a-ball, thing-which-will- 
be-warm-and-soft-to-the-touch, and thing-which-will-bite, there 
grows the idea "dog." But "dog" is not equivalent to thing-which- 
will-lick-one's-face, as hot is equivalent to that-which-will-burn, 
and to that-which-will-warm for the reason that dog means so much 
more than a stimulus to one or two simple responses. "Dog" is a 
forecast of many possible consequences. It is the multiplicity of 
the consequences which may come from the object "dog" which finally 
enables the child to separate dog from any one or two of them. At 
the sight of a strange dog, in proportion to his experience, the 
child is prepared for either friendly or unfriendly behavior, and 
for the various degrees and manifestations of friendliness or un­
friendliness which come within the range of "dog." And so instead 
of lacking functional significance it is precisely because the con­
cept "dog" is so full of it that it is so impossible to specify a 
particular functional equivalent for it. That is possible only in 
the concrete, for then it is evident that the dog becomes a parti­
cular clue to the behavior of the child on each particular occasion, 
low he is the-thing-which-will-draw-the-child-on-his sled, now the 
thing-which-will-bark-at-a-hoop, now the thing-which-will-beg-for- 
food, now the thing-which-will-swira-for-a-stick, but as this is not 
a treatise on dogs I need not elaborate further the wonderful wealth 
of "future-consequences" revealed in each dog.
- 12-
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The case of color is in no way different from the case of 
dog. Take yellow. It cannot at once and in general be put into 
functional terms, for the reason that it is a concept into the mak­
ing of which have passed many cases of anticipation of consequences, 
fere yellow always a quality of butter, and only of butter, we 
should not hesitate to describe it functionally a3 that which-can- 
be-spread-upon-bread, as sharp is that which-will-cut. But yellow 
is a quality shared by gold, by sunflowers, by certain vases, apples, 
winter sunsets, covers of books, sunlight, window-shades, outsides 
of houses, wall paper, ladies' dresses and all carrots. Indeed 
where can we stop in the enumeration? Since enumeration does not 
profit we must return to individual cases where yellow is experi­
enced. Again we may begin with the child in his growing acquain­
tance with yellow. He meets the quality first, say, in a soft- 
boiled egg. There is nothing yet to separate the color yellow from 
soft-boiled egg. Yellow means some-thing-to-be-eaten but is not 
different or distinct from this something-to-be-eaten which is egg. 
The difference between yellow and soft-boiled egg begins to appear 
when the child's busy spoon finds the butter plate instead of his 
egg-cup. The difference grows as he bites the skin of an orange 
or eagerly tastes a yellow rosebud. Because of his errors a wealth 
of meanings begins to gather about the quality yellow. No longer 
is yellow merely eomething-to-be-eaten for a3 the child adventures 
further with his universe new meanings of yellow accrue to the old. 
He learns to hoard or to spend the yellow which is gold, to look 
for fragrance where the yellow is a quality of a rose, or to ex­
perience a queer sinking of the heart when the yellow in question 
is a quality which means a university examination book.
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More than this, the yellow acquires a standing of its own 
because of the many services it performs and i3 easily distinguished 
from the other equally individuated qualities which added to it 
make up the objects. Hence it comes about that the child, now ripe 
with experience, may enter a library and run his eyes over the 
bookshelves and 3ay, "Red,yellow,blue,green and black books" and 
this is possible because the separate colors have achieved a stand­
ing for behavior as clues for many possible actions. In this parti­
cular case, and meaning i3 , of course, always particular and rela­
tive to purpose, the youth may be looking for a brown book and red, 
yellow, blue, green and black function only as thi'ngs-to-be-neglec- 
ted. He spies the brown book at last, and the brownness of it may 
mean only, the-book-to-be-taken, or that-which-will-give-you-what- 
you-want. He may of course dwell upon the brownness of the book 
as an interesting color-to-be-studied-for-its-own-sake. But then 
he only rehearses with other counters, the tale which we have al­
ready told in regard to yellow and in regard to dog. Discussing 
"brown" and describing "brown" can mean only enumerating the con­
nections which "brown" establishes with possible modes of conduct.
It is because of andin proportion to its richness of association 
with anticipation that "brown" stands out as something in itself 
and is often mistaken for an ultimate.
I realize that in this discussion I have said nothing of 
the physical and physiological side of color. It is not because 
I ignore this aspect, but because I assume that it belongs to 
physics and to physiology to discuss the differences in the wave 
lengths of yeRow light and of red light and the changes in the
-
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optic nerve when responding to these mechanical stimuli. I am keep­
ing purposely away from the mechanism of seeing that I may discuss 
with less complication the meaning of seeing. My effort is to ex­
plain what the pragmatist means when he says that consciousness means 
that objects are exercising a certain control over behavior which is 
more than mechanical. They control behavior by their qualities,and 
every quality of an object is nothing more than a forecast of possi­
ble action. The qualities of objects are the avenues through which 
the future sheds its light upon the present. It is through them 
that the paths for advancing to the goals of our desires are lighted, 
and education, which is learning more about objects, means making 
the light more steady and ample in that it opens new avenues.
In the problem which we are attempting to solve, there are 
three factors, the first, future consequences, the second, behavior 
adjusted to them, and the third, the unknown term, which James called 
an "inward state." Let me remind you that this is a problem in 
simple addition and that we are to question the right of the third 
term to a place in the series, if the sum of the first two is fully 
equal to what we mean by consciousness. If A+B+X»2, and A»l, and 
Bsl, it is obvious that X=0.
The examination of the "A" of our problem has yielded 
significant data. "Future consequences" in the first place are 
objective. They are the present qualities of objects to which we 
can point and say "this" is what I mean. And every quality is a 
forecast of possible action which we can express as the formula 
that sharp=will-cut, hot=will-burn, or yellow=will-do-so-and-so.
This guidance may be faulty, but that is a further story about
16-
which center the long chapters of error and of truth. The second 
factor, the "B" of our problem is the behavior of the organism in 
response to the qualities of objects. This is the topic upon which 
Dewey has done his ablest work. In the appendix I give a resume 
of some of his most significant articles which should be helpful in 
elucidating this aspect of the problem. Because it is so large a 
problem and opens up the whole field of psychology, my own account 
can aim only at suggest i ve ness by the examination of a concrete in­
stance.
Conscious behavior begins when mechanical behavior is 
insufficient. There are things which are not capable of conscious 
behavior and they, a3 we say, "suffer the consequences" which the 
conscious organism may avoid. The violet growing in the long grass 
is crushed by the heedless feet of a cow, the meadow lark resting 
beside it flies away fore-seeing the cow's approach. The glowing 
horseshoe on the blacksmith's anvil does not shrink from the re­
peated blows of the hammer, but the little boy watching the hammer­
ing shrinks from the noise and puts his hands to his ears, even be­
fore the blows fall, shielding himself through antic ipation.
These examples may serve to suggest also when it i3 that 
mechanical behavior is insufficient and conscious behavior enters. 
Let us imagine that this boy has never entered a blacksmith's shop 
before and is not prepared for the deafening clatter of the hammer 
on the anvil. At the first blow the noise goes through him and he 
jumps "as if shot." This is a mechanical response on the very 
point of yielding to a conscious response. The boy is so organized 
that a violent mechanical stimulus, in this case sound waves strik-
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in g the ear, makes his body react, as involuntarily as the same 
blow makes the horseshoe react by bounding from its place. It is 
a literal statement to say that the noise goes through him; there 
is a mechanical tightening of the muscles of the arms and hands, 
the muscles of the face contract, the breathing and the heart-beat 
change, and in this fashion the blow passes through the entire or­
ganism. But bscuase the boy is a nervous organism, as the horseshoe 
is not, a second blow from the blacksmith’s hammer will not find 
him as the first blow findshim, but as the first blow leaves him.
The paths for response are open, which means that the second blow 
even before it strikes the ear is exercising a control. The boy 
is responding to the future, he anticipates the deafening clatter; 
he is conscious of noise. But now complications of behavior ensue 
depending upon previous experience. Whereas an infant subjected 
to such a noise for any length of time, might continue to jump, and 
to be tense and to cry, for th9 small boy it is not only a noise- 
which-is-coming-again but a-noise-to-be-avoided. Therefore, his 
hands go to his ears, or perhaps he runs from the shop.
But the pragmatist feels that he has not adequately ex­
plained the origin of consciousness until he has made clear the 
problematic nature of the situation from which it results. The 
small boy, for instance, as he enters the blacksmith's shop is, let 
us say, whittling as he walks. To make it simple let us suppose 
that he is not necessarily thinking "of much of anything." He is 
responding to the constant mechanical stimulation of the floor by 
continued locomotion; he is responding to the continued mechanical 
stimulation from knife and stick by continued industry. All goes
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smoothly. Then comes the blow on the anvil. He cannot continue 
to walk while jumping "as if shot," or to whittle while his hands 
stiffen convulsively. The mechanical stimuli of the present moment 
are in conflict and a new stimulus is required to break the deadlock. 
In this case the new stimulus comes in terms of "noise." For that 
auditory stimulus is mechanical only up to the point of conflict with 
the mechanical stimuli of walking and of whittling and becomes con­
scious, for the boy hears it as a noise, even as it sweeps trium­
phantly through every avenue of response in his whole body. He 
hears the blow not only with his ears, but pardon the paradox, with 
his eyes, his hands, his feet, his opened mouth, his heart, his 
lungs, yes the very roots of his hair. I must insist upon the im­
portance of the statement that the boy is conscious of the noise 
just at the instant that the deadlock of the mechanical stimuli is 
broken by the new response. Hearing, and responding to the blow 
by the organic action which I have described are identical. I ask 
anyone who doubts this to make trial of the description with him­
self, when next surprised by a clap of thunder. While this is per­
haps the most important aspect of the part the organism plays in 
consciousness, there are others which must not be neglected. Some 
of them appear in this illustration, others are merely implied.
There are three aspects, at least, which appear in this 
description of the response of the boy to the blow upon the anvil; 
that conscious behavior results from a problematic situation in 
which the mechanical stimuli set for the organism conflicting pro­
grams of action; that conscious behavior involves a response of the 
whole organism; and that the end which the conscious stimulus serves
is to make further action possible. Since it is further action 
which is made possible, consciousnese evidently involves a glimpse 
into the future so that the body may shun certain consequences and 
seek others.
Since the condition of seeing or hearing or being other­
wise conscious, is that the organic response must be fully organ­
ized (the boy hears the noise as soon as the whole organism i3 
tingling with the response and no sooner) there is the further con­
sequence that before action can become overt complete arrangements 
for it must have been made by the body. As we see in experiments 
in reaction time, the body has a certain set, and the action when 
it comes, unlike mechanical response, stands in no need of serial 
organization, because that ha3 been already accomplished. For in­
stance, to take the simplest case, when the observer sees a blue 
card he is to press a key. Then because the stimulus blue means to- 
press-a-key, seeing the blue involves pressing the key and the two 
may be simultaneous, or the action may even antedate the appointed 
stimulus - because the response is so fully organized that the ob­
server sees the blue card before it comes. This gives one the clue 
to hallucinations and other errors of response which go so far as 
to create stimuli out of "airy nothings." If then we would con­
trast mechanical and conscious behavior in regard to this character-' 
istic, we could say that whereas mechanical behavior is controlled 
at each step by a private push, as when a boy parades a tin soldier 
across the floor to a cardboard fort, bump,bump,bump, conscious be­
havior is a functional unit without bumps, responding to a continu­
ously acting future, pulling,like a string, if you will, from before.
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But the final and possibly the most significant aspect 
of conscious behavior I have mentioned before, that the act of find­
ing a new stimulus and the act of making a new response are strictly 
contemporaneous. The entire bodily action which ensues when mechan­
ical action is inhibited by conflicts, may be described equally well 
either as the finding of an adequate stimulus or the organizing of 
a response. For the former explanation, it means, in terms of our 
former example, that hearing is taking place, for the latter that 
the organism is being controlled by the future. For any sound 
which is heard has qualities - and analysis has revealed that quali­
ties of objects are the ways in which the future acts within the 
present. A qualityless sound is as absurd as a qualityless book.
The clang which the hammer made as it fell upon the horseshoe and 
the anvil was a painful noise to the small boy. Painful in func­
tional terms is something-to-be-avoided.
And in this last consideration, the two terms of our ori­
ginal problem are brought into organic union. Stimulus and response 
are inseparable in actual experience. We can examine them only as 
we can examine the outer and the inner sides of a shield. That the 
meaning of objects (i.e.their qualities) depends upon the response 
made by the organism, and that the response made by the organism 
depends upon the meaning of objects turn out to be, if not identical 
propositions, at least mutually dependent. There is nowhere need 
for an unknown term, "Hind" or "inward state" to mediate between 
them a3 James's illustration suggests.
We see this mor9 clearly if we reflect that by controlling 
fear one may overcome fear. By not responding to the object as
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fearful, the object loses its fearful character. When we "work our­
selves up" into a highly emotional state, we are working the objects 
up as well. If it is the fault of a neighbor over which we are "all 
wrought up" the fault grows in enormity as our response to it grows 
in violence.
Since these two factors, the future consequences, which 
are the qualities of objects, and the organic responses, which cor­
respond to these consequences, serve to account for emotional as 
well as cognitional states we have no need of a third factor, the 
unknown "inward state." And in this way Jame3 is answered. Be­
havior guided by anticipation of consequences is what we mean by 
consciousness, is what we mean by soul.
And so we are ready to return according to promise to the 
"automatic sweetheart," with the conclusion that by virtue of the 
fact that her behavior is not mechanical but is guided by anticipa­
tion of consequences, she can satisfy even an "egoism which craves 
above all things inward sympathy and recognition, love and admira­
tion." For to the "automatic sweetheart" the object of her care 
and affection is a-person-to-be-nursed, a-person-to-be-admired, a- 
person-to-be-loved, a-psrson-to-be-understood. Each of these quali­
ties breaks up in turn into other res?onses-to-b9-made, and brings 
her face to face with all the details of human fellowship. Here 
are its mutual enthusiasms, the-books-to-be-read, the-music-to-be- 
heard, the-paintings-to-be-3een, the-social-welfare-to-be-advanced. 
Here are its joys, the-walks-to-be-taken, the-food-to-be-eaten, the- 
flowers-to-be-tended, the-children-to-be-loved. Here too are its 
sorrows, those inexorable things which-must-be-endured, its duties,
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its hazards, its vain chances, its hopes. What further demand which 
the extremest egoism could make by way of consciousness, would the 
"automatic sweetheart" fail to satisfy?
James was deceived by the word "automatic." He did not 
see that the sort of behavior which he described as automatic is 
controlled by anticipation of future consequences and thereby es­
capes mechanism. Because he did not see this he had recourse to 
an unknown "inward state" to account for the difference between 
conscious and mechanical action.
i
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DISCRIMINATION AND SENSATION
It was a law of the great classic tradition that an epic 
should begin "in medias res," in order that the perils encompassing 
the hero might instantly arouse the listener’ 3 interest,as the less 
dramatic beginnings of the story could not do. Fortunately for us, 
however, the epic of consciousness lacks nothing of dramatic inten­
sity even at its very beginning. About the account of the origin 
of consciousness a crucial struggle is taking place.
The outlines of the pragmatic account were suggested in 
the introduction. There it appeared that what we ordinarily call 
sense-qualities of objects, like colors for example, are not given 
immediately to the opening eyes of infants but attain to distinct­
ness only after many days and sometimes years of experience. By care­
ful selection I could quote passages from James to prove that this 
is his position. There is hi3 famouar phrase describing the initial 
experience as a "blooming,buz z ing confusion" from which the child 
must set about making an intelligible world; there are the no less 
famous statements that sensations are last, not first things in the 
way of consciousness and that a simple sensation is a pure fiction. 
From such statements and from others like them, one could prove 
quite conclusively James's agreement with the fundamental pragmatic 
position that "we learn to see things" and that clearness and dis­
tinctness of perception are the results and not the causes of knowl­
edge.
But unfortunately one could prove no less conclusively 
James's agreement with the traditional account of the origin of 
knowledge, which holds that ideas are compounded of clear and defi­
nite elements known as sensations. The idea of a book would be, for
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example, according to the traditional account, a complex of such 
qualities as brown, white, gilt, long,thick and heavy. Quite in 
this vein James wrote that "sensations are the stable rock, the 
terminus a quo and the terminus ad quern of thought," and that "pure 
sensations can bnly be realized in the earliest days of life." (Prin­
ciples of Psychology. Vol.II.p.7)
Evidently there i3 something amiss here, or such contra­
dictions could not exist side by side in a thoughtful man's account 
of the origin of knowledge. I believe that this confusion was pos­
sible because James had not grasped the full significance of the 
pragmatic explanation and held that the result of the process of 
discrimination is a clear and definite mental something, easily 
identified with sensation, just as in the case of the "automatic 
sweetheart," he held that consciousness is an "inward state," whereas 
the consistent interpretation of the position is that the outcome 
of discrimination can be fully expressed in terms of the behavior 
of the organism in response to qualities of objects. It is impor­
tant to observe that if the outcome of discrimination can be ex­
pressed in other terms than behavior guided by anticipation, by such 
terms for instance as "clear ideas" or "definite perceptions" that 
the compounding of consciousness has been merely postponed until 
after this preliminary stage of discrimination. When this happens 
the pseudo-pragmatic account falls back to the level of the tradi­
tional account, adding mothing to it but a useless frill of dis­
crimination.
We have more than a hint of this error near the beginning 
of the chapter on "Discrimination and Comparison" where James said
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that for our knowledge to grow we must break objects asunder and 
reunite these elements, but that, "since the elements with which the 
traditional associationism performs its constructions, 'simple sen­
sations,' namely - are all products of discrimination carried to a 
high pitch, it seems as if we ought to discuss the subject of analy­
tic attention and discrimination first." (Ibid.Vol.I. p.487)
What is significant of James's failure to be truly prag­
matic in setting himself this program, is the fact that he spoke 
of the results of discrimination as "simple sensations" and "ele­
ments" to be constructed by "traditional associationism"into ideas. 
The consistent pragmatist would not know what to do with"traditional 
associationism" in addition to discrimination. I remember asking 
a small boy once whether he killed the snake or left it. He replied 
"I killed it and left it." So with James, he would hare us discrimi 
nate and associate. But for the pragmatist to discriminate means 
to make a definite response to an object, and a definite response 
can be made only if the object is meaningful. Then we are in no 
need of a process of association to reunite the quality with the 
object as James implied. To see the candle as hot, is to make a 
discrimination as to the quality of the candle but by no means are 
we to infer, as James did, that the object is thereby "broken asun­
der" and that another process is now needed to reunite the hotness 
and the candle.
The following paragraphs of the chapter show the mechani­
cal conception of discrimination at its height with the corollary 
that qualities of objects are elements separable from objects, in­
stead of being the ways in which objects control behavior. James
said that the undeniable fact is that "any number of impressions.
from any number of sensory sources,_falling simultaneously on a mind
which has not vet experienced them separately,_will fuse into a sin­
gle ,_undivided object for that mind. The law is that all things fuse
that can fuse, and nothing separates except what must. What makes im­
pressions separate we have to study in this chapter. Although they 
separate easier if they come in through distinct nerves, yet distinct 
nerves are not an unconditional ground of their discrimination, as 
we shall presently see. The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin; 
and entrails at once, feels it all as one great,blooming, buzzing 
confusion; and to the very end of life, our location of all things 
in one space is due to the fact that the original extents or bignes­
ses of all the sensations which came to our notice at once, coalesced 
together into one and the same space.” (Ibid, p.488)
The "fusing" suggests that what is analyzed out was pre­
sent before the analysis or discrimination took place. In functional 
terms this is nonsense, for a control of behavior existing but not 
functioning, is a form of inactive activity and presents too apparent 
a contradiction to pass.* For the qualities of objects to be thus 
fused into a whole, objects must be something lik9 the conglomerate 
rock called "pudding stone" in which small pebbles are held together 
by solidified lava. Only, James knew the history of philosophy too
♦While I say without hesitation that the paper which I now experience 
as smooth, was smooth all the time, that does not mean that it was 
functioning while not perceived as functioning for that is to go out­
side of experience and to try to talk intelligently of "the unknown.”; 
The statement means that I how experience the paper as something 
which would have revealed the quality smooth had I previously experi­
enced it. Such an assumption can be tried by the test of truth and 
is typical of pragmatic assumptions about the qualities of objects 
with reference to the past.
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well to return to the scholastic lava called substance to unite qual-i 
ities, and yet not so well but what he thought of the qualities of 
objects as elements blending with each other.
Even in the sentence containing the phrase which has made 
this chapter famous, that "the baby feels it all as a blooming, 
buzzing confusion" James spoke of sensations coalescing. It is as 
if the results of discrimination could melt together like snow-flakes. 
Perhaps I need not say more to establish the point that for James 
the outcome of the process of discrimination was something mental, 
like Locke’s sense-impressions, and that for this reason James did 
not advance beyond the traditional explanation of the origin of knowl 
edge. Yet that is too sweeping a statement, for he made the sug­
gestion, which with functional interpretation is 30 fruitful, that 
the approach to knowledge is by way of discrimination.
When the infant feels his world as a "blooming,buz zing 
confusion" his knowledge ha3 already begun, for he is making a dis- 
crimination of the greatest importance. The oblivion which wrapped 
him, as securely as sleep, has been broken as his first mechanical 
cry could not break it. The infant is assailed, as James truly 
said, "by eyes,ears, nose, skin and entrails at once" and the confu­
sion which is a quality of his universe reflects the response which 
he makes to this bombardment. It means that incompatible mechanical 
responses have been provoked such as blinking and continued staring, 
crying and regular breathing, sneezing and lying perfectly still.
The suspense of the mechanical responses, through conflict, is the 
very essence of a state of doubt. To suspend activity is as much a 
state of behavior as to act, and the moment the universe is
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"a blooming, buzzing confusion" to the child he has made the first 
great discrimination of conscious life by virtue of the fact that 
mechanical responses are inhibited. Thus naturally and without 
break does the novelty of conscious behavior arise out of the random 
mechanical behavior of the child. It is a novelty and a mystery 
quite on a par with the novelty and the mystery of the aqueousness 
which results when hydrogen and oxygen combine. But there are mys­
teries and mysteries, and the mystery of conscious behavior, like 
the other mysteries of science, invites exhaustive description, and 
is, in so far, unlike the mysteries of legend which block all des­
criptions by escaping from the world of experience into the world 
of the supernatural where no observations can be made.
Returning from this digression upon the functional inter­
pretation of "the blooming, buzzing confusion" to the chapter under 
discussion, we find James struggling with the problem of knowing 
objects which have been broken asunder by the act of discrimination. 
His statement has been quoted that "any number of impressions, from 
any number of sensory sources falling simultaneously on a mind which 
has not yet experienced them separately will fuse into a single, un­
divided object for that mind." Ho one, I imagine, will wish to dis­
pute this fact. There may, however, be different way3 of accounting 
for it. At least three appear at once; the one which James correctly 
rejected, a second which he unfortunately accepted, and the func­
tional interpretation which he should, as a pragmatist, have held in 
its place.
The explanation which Jame3 rejected he called "the 'fatal 
psychologist's fallacy' of treating an inferior state of mind as if
it must somehow know implicitly all that is explicitly known about
the_same topic by superior states of mind." (Ibid.pp.488 ,489) This
could be illustrated by an example which James uses later, that al­
though while drinking a glass of lemonade I was not conscious of the 
sweetness, and the sourness and the temperature as separate quali­
ties, yet these qualities must have been unconsciously operative 
upon my mind. Such a view reduced to its simplest terms, leads to 
the perversities of a consciousness composed of unconscious ele­
ments and unfelt sensations. James rejected it in favor of another 
explanation which was that "the thing thought of is unquestionably 
the same but is thought of twice over in two absolutely different 
psychoses - once as an unbroken unit and again as a sura of discrim­
inated parts." (Ibid. p. 489) He described the thoughts further as 
mirrors of things. It is not difficult to foresee the troubles 
awaiting this dualistic explanation. It is perhaps sufficient to 
mention one. If the object is to remain "unquestionably the same" 
and thoughts are its mirrors, it is proper to ask which thought mir­
rors it truly, that which shows it as an unbroken unit or that 
which shows it as a sum of discriminated parts? The disparity be­
tween object and thought causes still other difficulties to crowd 
around this explanation. If one would realize their gravity and 
persistence let him read themany volumes written by critical and 
objective idealists, from Kant to Royce, in honest endeavour to 
bridge or to annihilate this gap.
The purely mechanical difficulties in which James was 
involved as a consequence of this position are nearly as bewilder- 
ing as the epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomy. We may take, for ex-
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ample, his explanation of the possibility of the awareness of like­
ness or difference. The vehicle of any such discrimination he des­
cribed as a thought possessed of a knowledge of, that is mirroring, 
both terms compared and their difference. The causal antecedent of 
such a thought he held to be two other thoughtsin close succession, 
the first of which should know one term, the second, the other.(Ibid. 
p,501) Thus in order to arrive at the discrimination of any sepa­
rate quality out of "the one unanalyzed bloom of confusion" James 
assumed a thought possessing a knowledge of one quality, followed 
by a thought possessing the knowledge of another quality, followed 
by a third thought, knowing the qualities of the previous thoughts 
and a certain quality, in addition, namely, the difference between 
the first two. It would have been less cumbersome if James had 
stopped with the first knowledge of a quality, which i3 precisely Ms 
problem. Bu$, since any discrimination involves comparison, as 
James himself says, this complicated system of successive thoughts 
each mirroring a distinct quality is necessary for the existence of 
any quality as distinct, and by virtue of this interdependence the 
system is self-destructive. Thus even the mechanical implications 
of the explanation which James accepted come to wreck.
For a pragmatist there remains a third explanation, not 
mentioned by James. The pragmatist might alter James's statement 
to read: "the thing thought of is not in all respects the same, but
is thought twice over, differing in the second case from the first 
in its function of control." This explanation makes intelligible 
Jam3 a'3 observatio n that "any total impression made on the mind must 
be unanalyzable whose elements are never experienced apart," which
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he interprets as meaning that "the components of an absolutely 
changeless group of not-elsewhere-occurring attributes could never 
be discriminated." (Ibid p.502) If, to use his example, all cold 
objects were also wet, and all wet objects cold, we should never 
distinguish wetness from coldness. Here again James is suggestive, 
and may even predispose his readers to Bergsonian intuitionism, so 
sure is his insight and observation, 30 lame hi3 reasoned explana­
tion, He confessed that the phenomenon presented a miracle. He 
said, "why the repetition of the character in combination with dif­
ferent wholes will cause it thus to break up its adhesion with any­
one of them, and roll out, as it were, alone upon the table of con­
sciousness, is a little of a mystery." (Ibid.p.507)
But this phenomenon which James called "a little of a 
mystery" comes to the pragmatist as a most significant and helpful 
observation. It gives him the data he needs to test his description 
of discrimination. Theoretically since the quality of the object 
is held to vary with the response and vice-versa, it should follow 
that if what we later le*rn to consider as two qualities, should in­
variably occur together, the response to these qualities would be 
a single definite response. If we assume that at a later time this 
invariable union is broken by the repetition of either quality with 
different wholes, the undiscriminating response which served when 
the quality was united in its customary manner will in thi3 case 
lead to unforeseen consequences. This error will cause the quality 
to assume distinctness. In actual experience we find constant con­
firmation of this theory. Some of us may have been so unfortunate 
as to bite into a piece of chocolate-coated soap offered, as in
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friendship, on the first of April. Until that date our experience 
with chocolate-coated offerings may have been of an invariably 
pleasant nature, and a relatively simple response sufficed. Such 
offerings were things-to-be-eaten, but now owing to the teaching of 
our error such an offering, on the first of April, may be something 
to be eaten or something to be refused. We have learned to discrim­
inate.
It is in this fashion that the pragmatic account dispels 
the mystery of discrimination. It is seen to follow naturally, since 
for an object to have a quality, means that a certain organic re­
sponse is built up in the body corresponding to the consequences 
shown in the object. If the consequences are the same it follows 
that the responses are the same. It w a this relation of object 
and organism for which James was feeling but he stopped short of its 
di scovery.
It was toward this idea that he was working in his dis­
cussion of the limitation of discrimination b'y practical interests.
He said that when a distinction has no practical interest "we con­
tract a habit of leaving it unnoticed and at last grow callous to 
its presence." (Ibid, p.516) This important principle James some­
what slighted by understatement. Pragmatists say not that we grow 
callous to the presence of a distinction which has no practical 
bearing, but that what we mean by qualities of objects are the prac­
tical aspects of objects for behavior. All qualities from beauty 
to size, from color to age are instances of future consequences with 
relation to organic response, and thus all qualities are practical. 
But to sustain this arbitrary statement we must make a detour.
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Fortunately this detour leads us through territory, which 
although not included in James's chapter on discrimination, cannot 
well be ignored in studying it. I refer to his well-known account 
of the child and the candle. (v.Ibid.pp.24 to 27). James said that 
we are to suppose that we have a baby before us who sees a candle- 
flame for the first time, and by virtue of the reflex tendency,which 
is unconscious and mechanical, the infant extends his hands to grasp 
the candle and his fingers get burned. This burning institutes a 
second reflex act of withdrawal and both acts, as experiments with 
hemisphereless frogs show, can be accounted for fully by reference 
to the lower brain centres. James wrote, "If this were the baby's 
whole nervous system and if the reflexes were once for all organic, 
we should have no alterations in his behavior,no matter how often 
the experience recurred. The retinal image of the flame would al­
ways make the arm shoot forward, the burning of the finger would 
always send it back. But we know that 'the burnt child dreads the 
fire' and that one experience usually protects the fingers forever. 
The point is to see how the hemispheres may bring this to pass." 
(Ibid.p.25).
At this point in the experiment James performed a sleight- 
of-hand, unintentionally, and to his own confusion. He imported an 
idea ready-made to explain the possibility of an idea. This is how 
he did it. He said that we may assume that every reflex discharges 
upward into the hemispheres as well as downward or outward as in the 
act of reaching. The result of this upward discharge he called a 
"perceptual process s, in the hemispheres." Here is the sleight-of- 
hand, a physical discharge is transformed into a psychical unit in
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the cortex. It is the familiar sensation. Then by the laws of 
"traditional associationism," in this case by mediating "brain paths" 
any reflex, such as reaching for the candle, can arouse by its up­
ward discharge the sensation m^ (a feeling of reaching) and passing 
on through connecting brain paths it can arouse sg (the feeling of 
burnt finger), and finally in this Paul Revere-flight the discharge 
can arouse mg (the feeling of the movement of withdrawal.) With such 
a scheme the retinal image of the candle, may in a purely mechanical 
way set off these cortical centres "in rapid succession" and the 
sg or feeling of burnt finger may come before the physical contact, 
which was initially necessary to arouse it. Thus it is, James said 
that "an animal with hemispheres acts in antic ipation of future 
things; or to use our previous formula, he acts from considerations 
of distant good and ill." (Ibid, p.26)
This example of the child and the candle furnishes strik­
ing corroboration of the errors which \ie have found throughout 
James's theory of discrimination; namely, that it is a mechanical 
process and involves the use of the very sensations, the existence 
of which it is supposed to question, and finally begs the whole 
question by assuming the qualities it is brought in to explain.
The force of the criticism may be made more apparent by 
placing in contrast with James's avowedly hypothetical explanation 
of the child and the candle incident, the hypothetical explanation 
which is consistently pragmatic. The problem is: what do we mean
by hot? In what sense is hot equivalent to will-burn or in James's 
words how can "an animal act by anticipation of future things or from 
considerations of distant good and ill?"
- 35-
Again let us suppose the lighted candle and the child with 
its reflexes. Lest anyone suspect that even in reflexes conscious­
ness is surreptitiously introduced, let him remember that a brainless 
frog can perform mechanical responses swimming when placed in water, 
croaking when pinched and even raising a foot to wipe acid from its 
back.. Thus we are able to assume with a reasonable degree of cer­
tainty that reflex action need involve only the spine and lower brain 
centres. We need not assume as James did that every reflex also 
discharges upward and leaves its trace in brain paths in the hemi­
spheres. It is only when reflexes interfere with one another and a 
new form of response is required that the higher centres are needed 
to explain the changes which take place. As to just what happens in 
the higher centres perhaps neurologists will some day tell us.
Negatively, however, the pragmatist need not assume sensa- j 
tions connected in serial arrangement by brain paths. Were he exam­
ining the brain with a microscope he would look for purely physical 
changes there and not for psychical phenomena physically caused and 
connected. He would expect to find, in other words, a difference 
of organization so profound that the activity of the entire organ­
ism is affected by it. From observations of behavior he is ready to ! 
suggest the nature of that organization. It is an organization,which 
as James indicated, is effected not by virtue of what happened the 
moment before, but by what is going-to-happen. To exercise such 
control it is evident that the candle must be more to the organism 
than a retinal image, as such it can arouse only reflexes; it must 
take on a new function. The future must be part of the candle for 
that is the characteristic difference between reflex and conscious
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activity. Accordingly, tho candle is more than a retinal image by 
the assumption of a quality by which it directs the organism in a 
new way. It is now a candle which will-burn. The pragmatist instead 
of putting the meaning some where in the infant's cortex as a strangp 
bit of foreign matter called sensation, imbedded in a mass of nerve 
fibres, tissue and blood vessels, puts it in the object. Rather he 
gratefully leaves it where he finds it as after all the only place 
where it can thrive. He looks upon abstracting quality from objects 
as robbing a dewdrop of wetness or a circle of form. More exactly 
the quality of an object is the function of control whereby the ob­
ject is able to furnish a new stimulus to break the dead lock of me­
chanical responses.
If any one asks why the object takes on meaning when a 
conflict of mechanical responses renders further mechanical action 
impossible, he is asking why is consciousness? It is like asking,
Why is water? Why are roses? and reveals a tendency toward an anti- 
ecientific attitude which Dewey has called "the superstition of 
necessity." What meaning is, what discrimination is, what conscious­
ness is, the pragmatist earnestly seeks to ascertain, but why these 
things are, he no more seeks to know than why gravity is.
In summary of this chapter one can express in a sentence 
the point of greatest difference between James and pragmatism in 
regard to discrimination. James said that discrimination breaks an 
object asunder into qualities and pragmatism says that discrimina­
tion means that an object is controlling behavior by virtue of a 
particular quality of future reference. The chapter on sensation 
with which James opened the second volume makes the rift wider. Here
James attempted not only to break objects asunder into their re­
spective qualities, but to take the qualities themselves and by 
breaking them to find in each one a core of immediate experience. In 
general one could say, that he recognized differences of kind in 
qualities. He made a distinction between "simple" qualities, such 
as color, temperature, painfulness and those which we more naturally 
term functional such as edible, harmful, enjoyable, and satisfying. 
The former James thought give rise to simple sensations, describable 
as ultimates, unrelated data, ipses of experience; the latter to 
thoughts, describable as "knowledges about" or systems of relations.
If we must admit that James is correct in thinking that 
some qualities are ultimates and just "given" in sensation, then 
indeed the pragmatic position must be abandoned. For the point at 
issue is of no little moment for pragmatists. If the proposition 
that "we learn to see things" is not of general but only of limited 
application, if instead of saying with James in the chapter on dis­
crimination that the child's first experience of the universe is of 
a "biooming,buzzing confusion" the pragmatist must say with James 
in this chapter that "our earliest thoughts are almost exclusively 
sensational" (Ibid.Vol.II p.3) then indeed it little profiteth a man 
to risk his reputation by being a pragmatist. He has no critical 
weapon against the failures of the traditional accounts of knowledge, 
no constructive instrument for the explanation of human experience.
James's account of sensation deserves, then, minute and 
critical examination. We may as well begin with his definition of 
sensation. "As we can only think or talk about the relations of 
objects with which we have acquaintance already, we are forced to
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postulate a function in our thought whereby we first become aware 
of the hare immediate natures by which our several objects are dis­
tinguished. This function is sensation. (Ibid.p.3) This definition 
James made even more definite by an example. "In training-institu­
tions for the blind they teach the pupils as much about light as in 
ordinary schools. Reflection, refraction, the spectrum, the ether 
theory, etc., are all studied. But the best taught born-blind pupil 
of such an establishment yet lacks a knowledge which the least in­
structed seeing baby has. They can never show him what light is 
in its 'first intention,' and the loss of that sensible knowledge 
no book-learning can replace." (Ibid.p.4)
So also James said that a blind man might know all about 
the sky's blueness, and I might know all about your toothache, but 
so long as the blindman does not feel the blueness and I do not 
have the toothache, "our knowledge, wide as it is, of these reali­
ties, will be hollow and inadequate." (Ibid.p.7) It seems at first, 
undeniably, as if James were right. There is a difference between 
my knowledge of your toothache, and your knowledge of it, and there 
is a difference between the blindman's knowledge of the sky's blue­
ness and a seeing man’s knowledge of it. James said, however, that- 
the difference in these cases is a difference in the kinds of knowl­
edge, that the blind man may have perceptual knowledge or knowledge 
about the sky's blueness but never sensational or direct knowledge 
of that delightful fact. In other words he thought that the quality 
of blueness may be broken asunder and that under the wrappings of 
knowledgesabout, there will be found in the case of the seeing per­
son, a kernel of blueness which is immediate knowledge and can be
described as direct acquaintance. But consistent pragmatists while 
willing to analyze the quality blue, deny James's right to the as­
sumption that the analysis will reveal an inner core of pure sensa­
tion which is a way of knowing blue directly. They say that in one 
sense, qualities are all of a kind, that is, they are all"kncwledges 
about” objects and that as far as the horizon of discrimination may 
be extended, one will come to no pure immediate sensation but only 
to added "knowledge about."*
This we may see, perhaps, in the case James mentioned of 
the child who is taught about light in a school for the blind. When 
he is taught about light in connection with reflection, refraction, 
the spectrum, the ether-theory he is taught concerning the functions 
of light, the ways in which light will be found to act. Even that 
is only an approximate statement of what he is taught for it is more 
nearly exact to say, that he learns that a certain activity, such 
as holding a prism in a certain position will bring about certain 
results. He may knew, although he does not see, that when he bend3 
over the smooth water of a pool, the image of his face will be re­
flected from the water. He may learn that refraction of the sun's 
rays from the earth' 3 surface causes the warmth which his body will 
feel in summer. He can know light as far as to respond to this 
warmth, but being blind he is unable to make the complete response, 
which seeing involves, for the reason that there is a mechanical 
obstruction of one of the avenues through which the control of hi3
♦This does not mean that the difference between fact and meaning 
is abolished hut rather that both may be explained by reference 
to functional control.
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responses might otherwise come. This will bear further exposition.
We can imagine the blind child walking bare-foot on a sum­
mer day, his feet burning from contact with the hot ground. Then he 
reaches the shade of a great tree and the contact with the ground no 
longer hurts his bare feet. Even the spectator could describe the 
differences involved in knowing the glare and the shade by differ­
ences in the child's behavior. He might notice that so long as the 
child was walking in the full glare, he stepped "gingerly," plac­
ing each foot carefully as if in anticipation of the stinging heat, 
and that after the first step within the shade, he stepped forward 
easily as if no longer dreading the contact. But this description 
is not a substitution, as some one may think, of touch "sensations" 
for visual "sensations." The "hotness" which the child feels, a 
pragmatist is in no need of describing as a simple sensation. If he 
wanted to be very scientific - and tedious - he would repeat his say­
ing that in this instance the quality of hotness is the control ex­
ercised by refracted light upon the blind child through the soles of 
his feet, and that it is a meaningful control, that is a quality of 
the object for consciousness, because it shows the child the consequen­
ces of his future activity. That he places his feet so carefully is 
because, he knows that each step is going to hurt and because he tries 
to avoid these unpleasant consequences by all the'means in his 
power. Thus the blind child experiences the refraction of the sun's 
rays as something which will hurt his feet and perhaps also as some­
thing which will cause his head to ache. He has in other words, 
knowledge about it which may come from the instruction of his teach­
ers, and also from his experience as I have just described. In a 
similar way a seeing child may learn about the refraction of the 
sun's rays by the earth's surface. If a seeing child were walking
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hand in hand with the blind child in the sun, he would differ from 
the blind child by being able to protect his feet even more discrim­
inatingly. He might take occasion to step quite out of the path, to 
cool his feet on a patch of soft grass, or to step into a puddle of 
half-dried mud, which invites his eye. To these visual invitations 
of the soft grass and the cool mud the blind child can not respond, 
because they cannot reach him except through touch. For the seeing 
child, the qualities of softness and coolness, these delicious con­
sequences of mud and grass, have an additional avenue for controlling 
a response. While the blind child can know about them only through 
touch, the seeing child can know about them through sight a3 well, 
which is to say that he is capable of a different response, and con­
versely there is a different controlling quality of the object.
But in these typical instances we fail to arrive at any 
core of sensation which does not yield upon examination merely fur­
ther knowledge about, which is the control of behavior by anticipa­
tion of future consequences. A child overcome by the sun would lie 
in an unconscious condition upon the hot path, its skin becoming 
burned and blistered by the intense glare, but it could do nothing 
to avoid these consequences. A blind child can respond to the sun­
light as we have seen through the agency of touch, and for the see­
ing child there is a still further avenue through which the quality 
of the sunlight can influence behavior. But he, no more than the
blind child, knows light in its "first intention." He merely knows 
more about it than a blind child ever can. Moreover that light has 
a "first intention" is a myth.
It is a favorite bit of mystification for men of science
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to say that we have no magnetic and no electrical sense. We poor 
mortals can only know about magnetism and about electricity and 
never know them directly as the iron bar may know them. For the de­
light of freshmen these men of science paint the wonders of an iron 
age, in which men of iron might thrill and tremble at the essence of
f
magnetism and at the essence of electricity as men now tremble with 
the joy of pure sound and pure color, flavor and fragrance and the 
cold touch of steelj But is it true that because we do not know 
magnetism and electricity directly, our increasing store of knowledg« 
about them brings us no nearer to adequately knowing them? Is a 
scientist really talking of an unknown essence when he lectures upon 
the subject of electricity, to which perhaps he has devoted the study 
of a life time? No more than when he lectures of sound, or color, 
flavor, fragrance or temperature. In each of these instances too, 
he i3 restricted to knowledge about; that a color for instance has 
a certain place in the spectrum, has a certain number of wave lengthy 
affects a photographic plate in a certain way, is a sign of the pres- 
ence of certain physical elements at a certain temperature, may 
occur in connection with certain objects, these details are cases 
of"knowledge about" and each one indicates ways in which the or­
ganism may be controlled by the object.
Now, as to a further point, James, it will be remembered 
distinguished between sensation and perception. He called this 
distinction the difference between direct knowledge and knowledge 
about. He wrote: "The nearer the object comes to being a simple
quality like ’hot,' ‘cold,' ’red,’ ’noise,’ ’pain’ apprehended 
irrelatively to other things, the more the state of mind approaches
a pure sensation. The fuller of relations the object is, on the 
contrary, the more it is something classed, located, measured, com­
pared, assigned to a function, 9tc.eta; the more unreservedly do 
we call the state of mind a perception, and the relatively smaller 
is the part in it which sensation plays." (Ibid.p.l)
In the discussion of James's doctrine of sensation up to 
this point we have been concerned with an examination of direct ac­
quaintance. We have seen direct acquaintance yielding place to the 
pragmatic principle of "knowledge about." It now remains to be 
seen whether, when James spoke of "knowledge about," he meant by 
it the same thing which a consistent pragmatist should mean.
It is necessary to recall at this point a certain argu­
ment from the chapter on discrimination. James was discussing how 
things ar9 known and he rejected the "psychologist's fallacy" that 
an inferior state of mind knows implicitly all that a superior state 
of mind knows explicitly. Instead he maintained that the object 
undoubtedly remains the same but is known twice over by two differ­
ent psychoses. The first knows it as a unity, the second as a 
multiplicity or a sum of parts. This is the basis for James's posi­
tion in the chapter on sensation. The knowledge of a thing as a 
unity becomes "direct acquaintance," "pure sensation," and the 
knowledge of the same object as a sum of parts, which of course in­
volves relations, "knowledge about" or perception. The following 
quotation will show this.
"I have dwelt upon the facts of color-contrast at such 
great length because they form so good a text to comment on in my
struggle against the view that sensations are immutable psychic 
things which coexist with higher mental functions. Both sensation­
alists and intellectualists agree that such sensations exist. They 
fuse. say the pure sensationalists, and make the higher mental func­
tion; they are combined by activity of the Thinking Principle, say 
the intellectualist s. I myself have contended that they ¿ 0, not 
exist in or alongside of the higher mental function when that exists. 
The things which arouse them exist; and the higher mental function 
also knows these same things. But just as its knowledge of the 
things supersedes and displaces their knowledge, so it supersedes anc 
displaces them, when it comes, being as much as they are a direct 
resultant of whatever momentary brain-conditions may obtain. The 
psychological theory of contrast, on the other hand, holds the sen­
sations still to exist in themselves unchanged before the mind, 
whilst the ’relating activity’ of the latter deals with them freely 
and settles to its own satisfaction, what each shall be in view of 
what the others also are. Wundt says expressly that the Law of 
Relativity is ’not a law of sensation but a law of Apperception;’ 
and the word Apperception connotes with him a higher intellectual 
spontaneity. Thi3 way of taking things belongs with the philosophy 
that looks at the data of sense as something earth-born and servile, 
and the 'relating of them together’ as something spiritual and free. 
LoJ the Spirit can 9ven change the intrinsic quality of the sensible 
facts themselves, if by so doing, it can relate them better to each 
other! But (apart from the difficulty of seeing how changing the 
sensations should relate them better) is it not manifest that the 
relations are part of the ’content’ of consciousness, part of the
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’object’ just as much as the sensations are? Why ascribe the former 
exclusively to the knower and the latter to the known? The knower 
is in every case a unique pulse of thought corresponding to a unique 
reaction of the brain upon its conditions. All that the facts of 
contrast show us is that the same real thing may give us quite dif­
ferent sensations when the conditions alter, and that we must there­
fore be careful which one to select as the thing’s truest represen­
tative." (lb id.pp. 27,28)
Thus for James perception or "knowledge about" differed 
from purs sensation or "direct acquaintance" in its content. The 
latter was a direct mirroring of essences only, the former a direct 
mirroring of essences as related. Its unity reminds one of the 
orator’s "one multitude of stars" by virtue of which analogy the 
unity of the Godhead was to be proved. fe can illustrate the dif­
ference between sensation and perception as thus defined, by an 
example. To have a sensation of lemonade would be to have direct 
acquaintance with the "first intention" of lemonade, - a thing James 
would hasten to say which only an infant could getj A perception 
of lemonade, would be a no less direct acquaintance but it would 
have a complex object. It would know lemonade directly and con­
temporaneously, as aweet-and-sour-and-cool-and-wet, for within the 
single psychosis or "pulse of thought" there are terms and rela­
tions. That James meant thus to answer Hegel, Green and others is 
quite clear. But I believe that it is equally clear that just be­
cause his explanation of "knowledge about" started with a dualistic 
assumption, and was static and mechanical he failed to answer them. 
What he did do, was to reassert a position which their criticism
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shows to be unsound.
The error made in this early work on discrimination and 
sensation continued to reappear in his later work. It gave a 
mechanical turn to one of his most important teachings, namely, his 
doctrine of the continuity of experience. I wish to indicate this 
briefly by quotations from several essays.
In the volume of lectures called "A Pluralistic Universe" 
which was published in 1909, James discussed the continuity of 
experience in the seventh lecture. Again he dealt with the "sensa­
tional flux" as the foundation of experience. But the sensations 
of thi3 flux differed, he said, from those of "poor old Locke" 
which were "atomistic and unrelated;" those of which James was 
speaking were cases of "knowledge about," that is were single pulses 
of thought including terms and relations. He said,"every examiner 
of the sensible life jin concreto must 3ee that relations of every 
sort, of time,space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or 
what not, are just as integral members of the sensational flux as 
terms are, and that conjunctive relations are just as true members 
of the flux as disjunctive relations are," (’A Pluralistic Uni­
verse," pp.279,230.) Thus the whole panorama of experience seems 
to move past one, as does the landscape to an observer on a limited 
express.
Of the "concrete pulses of experience" James said,"they 
run into one another continuously and seem to interpenetrate. What 
in them is relation and what is matter related is hard to discern. 
You feel no one of them as inwardly simple and no two as wholly with­
out confluence where they touch. There is no datum so small, as not
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to show this mystery, if mystery it he." (Ibid.pp. 282,283)
The following description of sensational experiences 
shows the same assumption. "Inwardly they are one with their parts, 
and outwardly they pas3 continuously into their next neighbors, so 
that events separated by years of time in a man's lfe hang together 
unbrokenly by the intermediary events. Their names. to be sure, 
cut them into separate conceptual entities but no cuts existed in 
the continuum in which they originally came." (Ibid, p.285)
This explanation of "knowledge about" as the coexistence 
within the compass of a single thought of terms and relations en­
abled James to explain the continuity of experience from the point 
of view he called radical empiricism. He had only to enlarge the 
single "psychosis" so as to include as its terms an earlier and a 
later thought and as relat ion. the relation between them and then
he could say: "For such a philosophy._the relations which connect
experience must them selves be experienced relations,_and any kind
of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else
n n
in the system." ^Essays in Radical Empiricism: A World of Pure Ex­
perience" p.43) He made a partial list of the relations which might 
be directly experienced together with their terms. He mentioned 
relations of withness, of simultaneity and time interval, of space- 
adjacency and distance, of similarity and difference, relations of
r
activity involving change, tendency, resistance and the causal order 
generally, and finally memories, purposes, strivings fulfillments 
or disappointments. There is, he, said, no single type of connection 
joining all the experiences which compose our universe.(v.Ibid.pp.
45 and 46) Pragmatists, however, who are not committed to this
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static view of relationships say that there is one single type of 
relationships which accounts for the continuity of experience. Each 
of the relationships just mentioned by James, conforms according to 
pragmatism to this single functional type. Each in an instance in 
which conduct is directed by the future.
Finally in "Some Problems of Philosophy." first published 
after his death, James made the statement that "the perceptual flux 
as such means nothing and is but what it immediately is." (p.49). 
He said in a footnote, in the same connection, that instead of "per­
cept" he might speak of 'sensation,* ’feeling,* 'intuition,* and 
sometimes of'sensible experience' or of the 'immediate flow* of 
conscious life.
This is the problem of the chapters on sensation and dis­
crimination over again. It is still on the dualistic level. It is 
decidedly non-pragmatic. But as we shall meet the problems of sen- 
s tion and discrimination, and of direct acquaintance and knowledge 
about, in the chapters of the monograph immediately to follow upon 
the concept of consciousness, we may drop them here, to resume them 
there as parts of a larger problem.
I mu3t add a word for the assurance of those who may 
feel that pragmatism destroys the distinction between fact and 
meaning. In hi3 chapters on discrimination and sensation James made 
a false distinction between "direct acquaintance" and "knowledge 
about." A pragmatist cannot recognize a way of knowing things im­
mediately by any sort of direct acquaintance whidi mirrors the pre­
sent essence of an object a 3 if it were the kernel or heart of the 
matter to which all other knowledge about the object must be re-
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lated. Direct knowledge, as just described, is bound to be static, 
and can be explained only as a copy of reality. The insurmountable 
difficulties of dualism attach to this position. However, the prag­
matist must admit that we do discriminate between fact and meaning 
and he must recognize the distinction between them as very closely 
related to the distinction between "direct acquaintance" and "knowl­
edge about." Fact seems to have reference to something definite 
which is either the starting point or the goal of meaning, meaning 
to the process of transition, of leading, Jame3 would say, from one 
such point to another. We say for instance: Here are the facts of
the case, but what they mean, to what facts they point, is another
story. Or we make a similar distinction without naming it when we
| .
ask, "What is this?"
To put the pragmatist's problem very briefly he must har­
monize his definition of consciousness, "behavior guided by the 
future consequences of objects as present qualities," with the 
objection that in many cases of knowledge the present and the future, 
the fact and the meaning, seem to fall apart. His definition of con­
sciousness holds the fact and the meaning together, by saying that 
the meaning acts as a present fact, which seams, at first sight to 
imply that there is no possibility of discrimination between them.
It reminds one of James's statement that if wet things were always 
cold, and cold things were always wet, we should be unable to dis­
criminate between wet and cold. Hotfever, the pragmatist is able 
to explain, quite in accordance with the laws of discrimination, 
how the qualities of fact and meaning may often stand in contrast.
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An example will further explanation more simply than abstract state­
ment .
Suppose that a man walking along a quiet street hears a 
pistol shot. He hears the noise and wonders what it means. The 
noise is the fact, the meaning is still to be found. There is a 
sharp diremption between the two. A pragmatic explanation of this 
circumstance would be made in some such fashion as follows: As
this man is walking along, busy with his own thoughts, his body is 
performing the mechanical business of locomotion, and his five 
senses are as nearly as possible adjusted to exclude the monotonous 
sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and temperature of a familiar en­
vironment. But suddenly the mechanical stimulus of the pistol shot
t
breaks into the smooth mechanical adjustment of the previous mo­
ment. A new adjustment is needed to break the ensuing deadlock, 
and thereupon the air waves striking the ear take on meaning as a 
concomitant of a new organic adjustment. Thus the noise which was 
described as the "fact” to be accounted for, conforms to the general 
functional rule by being an instance in which the future (it is 
something t_o be heard) . is a present stimulus. So far there is no 
distinction between fact and meaning. That distinction enters now. 
Responses have a way of leading to other responses, and to hear the 
noise as a pistol shot may be an insufficient response of this type. 
It may merely set the stage and be insufficient, because, as a con­
scious stimulus to the next conscious response, it suggests incom­
patible responses just as did the initial mechanical stimulus. It 
may mean target practice, it may mean murder, but the suggestion of 
two possible responses, is itself a response, which a spectator
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could see in the naan's arrested step, hia suspended breath, his 
fixed eyes. This is the response for ambiguous meaning, and is cru­
cial for this problem. For the basis for the discrimination be­
tween fact and meaning, as between any other qualities, must be 
found in difference of response. And we have found just such a dif­
ference in the respective responses to "noise" and to "what does it 
mean? "
We can account also for the apparent difference in time 
quality in these responses. The response for "noise" comes as the 
solution for a conflict of mechanical responses. Before the re­
sponse there was no conscious preparation for it. With the advent 
of conscious behavior, to supplement mechanical conflicts, the fu*- 
ture at once begins to work as a present quality of the stimulus.
But this conscious activity of hearing, which is the future in opera-*- 
tion, may lead to a further conscious response, namely to seeking 
a still more adequate adjustment through the agency of its meaning. 
Then the conscious activity as in process, or as stimulus, may be 
sharply set off as a present fact, because a compl te adjustment 
may be delayed for the space of minutes, days, or years. For the 
man to hear the pistol shot is such a resronse in progress, for him 
to wonder, is it murder or is it target practice? is to delay any 
adequate response. If he heard it as meaning murder then a definite 
activity could follow, if he heard it as meaning target practice, 
again a definite response could follow smoothly upon the hearing.
But in their stead there comes a mediating response, which keeps
■
him in a state of suspense by showing the possibility of different 
responses. Here the pragmatist plays his ace, and the future,by
■ * ------------ ------
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the way, is "trump." The •possibility of different responses is 
what the future means, lust as a response in progress is what the 
present means. The pragmatist concludes, then, that we are able 
to distinguish between fact and meaning, which we make, in a dif­
ferent sense from James*s, equivalent to "direct acquaintance" and 
"knowledge about" because the present and the future submit to func­
tional analysis like any other qualities of objects. This conclusion 
must not be overlooked or forgotten, especially since in discussing 
James's theory of consciousness it is necessary to refute again and 
again his mistaken use of "direct acquaintance" and"knowledge about.’
JAMES’S EARLY IDEAS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
0
James approached the problem of consciousness on the 
experimental level. His work with the problem, while experimental 
is consistently pragmatic. When, however, he faced the need of 
elaborating the theory of consciousness he returned to traditional 
conceptions. First we must examine the pragmatic beginnings.
In the opening chapter of the Psychology James indicated 
the test for discriminating conscious from mechanical behavior."the 
pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attain­
ment are thus the mark and the criterion of the presence of mental­
ity in a phenomenon." (Principles of Psychology, Vol.I.p.8) Again, 
he characterized as conscious, actions performed "for the sake of 
their result." (Ibid.p.8) This he called action "from in front" 
in distinction from mechanical action which is controlled by "laws 
from behind," (Ibid.p.10) In psychological terms James put the 
difference thus, "the difference between the hemisphereless animal 
and the whole one may be concisely expressed by saying that the one 
obeys absent, the other only present objects." (Ibid.p.20)
In reaching his conclusion that to urge the automaton- 
theory upon us as it is now urged on purely a priori and quasi-meta- 
physical grounds is "an unwarrantable impertinence in the present 
state of psychology." (Ibid.p.138) James was quite in accord with 
this position. He said that all experiments tend to prove that 
consciousness is efficacious as a "selecting agency." He stated 
the facts thus: "The dilemma in regard to the nervous system seems,
in short, to be one of the following kind. We may construct one
- 53-
- 54-
which will act infallibly and certainly, but it will then be capable 
of reacting to very few changes in the environment - it will fail 
to be adapted to all the rest. We may, on the other hand, construct 
a nervous system potentially adapted to respond to an infinite vari­
ety of minute features in the situation; but its fallibility will 
then be as great as its elaboration. We can never be sure that its 
equilibrium will be upset in the appropriate direction. In short, a 
high brain may do many things, and may do each of them at a very 
slight hint. But its hair-trigger organization makes of it a happy- 
go-lucky, hit-or-miss-affair. It is as likely to do the crazy as 
the sane thing at any given minute. A low brain does few things, 
and in doing them perfectly forfeits all other uses. The perfor­
mances of a high brain are like dice thrown forever on a table. Un­
less they be loaded, what chance is there that the highest number 
will turn up oftener than the lowest?
"All this is said of the brain as a physical machine 
pure and simple. Can consciousness increase its efficiency by 
loading its dice? Such is the problem.
"Loading its dice would mean bringing a more or less con­
stant pressure to bear in favor of those of its performances which 
make for the most permanent interests of the brain's owner; it 
would mean a constant inhibition of the tendencies to stray aside." 
(Ibid.p.140)
So also James spoke of consciousness as a "fighter for 
ends" and said that with the advent of consciousness, "real ends 
appear for the first time now on the world's stage." (Ibid.p.41)
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In his earliest signed article,* a criticism of Spencer's 
definition of mind, which appeared in"The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy" in 1878, James was interested in this same teleological 
aspect of consciousness. He said that "mere correspondence with the 
outer world is a notion on which it is wholly impossible to base a 
definition of mental action" (p.6). "In other words," he said,"there 
belongs to the mind from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote.
It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on." (p.17)
After this beginning of a pragmatic account of conscious­
ness we are hardly prepared for the frank return which James made 
to a traditional and dualistic account of mind and matter. This 
happened as soon as he undertook a critical exposition of the his­
torical conceptions of consciousness; the automaton-theory, the 
mind-stuff theory, and the soul theory. He said that his explana­
tion of consciousness wa3 to be in terms of empirical parallelism 
as "the wisest course." "By keeping to it, our psychology will re­
main positivistic and non-metaphysical.(Ibid.p.182) He said also, 
"all people unhesitatingly believe that they feel themselves think­
ing and that they distinguish the mental state as an inward activity 
or passion from all the objects with which it may cognitively deal.
I regard this belief as the most fundamental of all the postulates 
of Psychology and shall discard all curious inquiries about its cer­
tainty as too metaphysical for the scope of this book." (Ibid.p.185)
* He had been publishing unsigned reviews for ten years. For a com­
plete list of the published writings of William James, one should 
consult "The Psychological Review, Vol.XVIII., No. 2, March,1911.
cf.Thesis for Ph.D. by Queen L.Shepherd,1914,"Some Recent Concep­
tions of Consciousness," Chap. II, for the dualism involved in "em­
pirical parallelism"such as Titchener's.
Jamas constantly separated the objective from the sub­
jective in experience. For instance he said that words like blue, 
hot, and cold, may "stand for outer qualities and for the feelings 
which these arouse." (Ibid.p.195) He rebuked the poverty of the 
English language which does not allow a word to show "the generic 
distinction between the-thing-thought-of and the-thought-thinking-it 
which in German is expressed by the opposition between Gedachtes 
and Gedanke. in Latin by that between cogitatum and cogitatio. (Ibid, 
p.195 note) Again he spoke of the duality thus: "What the thought 
sees is only its own object; what the psychologist sees is the 
thought’s object, plus the thought itself, plus possibly all the 
rest of the world." (Ibid.p.197) Finally in summary of the chap­
ter on "The Methods and Snares of Psychology" James said, "These 
thoughts are the subjective data of which he"(the psychologist)
"treats,_and their reaction to their objects, to the brain.and to
the rest of the world constitute the subject matter of psychologic 
science." (Ibid.p.197)
Having established a dualism it was necessary for James 
to consider the relations existing between minds and other things.
He devoted a chapter to the discussion of this problem, dealing 
with mind as a temporal existence, mind as spatial, and finally as 
knowing or feeling objects. The question of the temporal existence 
of mind led James into a discussion of lapsing consciousness and 
cases of split-off-consciousness or primary and secondary personal­
ities. His conclusion from the data afforded by such cases was that 
consciousness might be regarded as a product of the nervous system 
which could vary quantitatively. "As glands cease to secrete and
—  - --  ---- ---------
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muscles to contract, so the train should sometimes cease to carry 
currents, and with this minimum of its activity might well coexist 
a minimum of consciousness. On the other hand, we see how deceptive 
are appearances, and are forced to admit that a part of conscious­
ness may sever its connection with other parts and yet continue to 
he." (Ibid.p.213)
A3 to space relations, or the historical question of the 
seat of the soul, James said that if the "thinking principle" is 
extended we know neither its form nor its seat, while if it is un­
extended it is absurd to talk of its having space relations at all. 
"Its relations cannot be spatial but must be exclusively cognitive 
or dynamic as we have seen." (Ibid.p. 215)
But this final type of relationship, being based on a 
dualism which recognized mind or consciousness as a "thinking prin­
ciple" mediating between the brain and objects, was not simple but 
involved within itself two relationships, namely, the relation ex­
isting between the mind and th9 brain on the one hand, and between 
the mind and the object-known on the other. Of th9 first of these 
two relationships James admitted that "the relations of a mind to 
its own brain are of a unique and utterly mysterious sort." Of the 
second relationship he said, in the course of a paragraph, "now the 
relation of knowing is the most mysterious thing in the world." 
(Ibid, p . 216)
Yet in spite of theae baffling mysteries James reasserted 
the dualistic position saying that "the psychologist's attitude 
toward cognition, will be so important in the sequel that we must
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not leave it until it is made perfectly clear. It ie a thorough­
going dualism. It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing 
known and treats them as irreducible. Neither gets cut of itself 
or into the other, neither in any-way ¿s the other, heither make3 the 
other. They jU3t stand face to face in a common world, and one sim­
ply knows, or is known unto, its counterpart. This singular rela­
tion is not to be expressed in any lower terms, or translated into 
any more intelligible name. Some sort of signal must be given by 
the thing to the mind's brain, or the knowing will not occur - we 
find as a matter of fact that the mere existence of a thing outside 
the brain is not a sufficient cause for our knowing it, it must 
strike the brain in some way as \vell as be there to be known. But 
the brain being struck, the knowledge i3 constituted by a new con­
struction that occurs altogether jin the mind. The thing remains 
the sane whether known or not." (Ibid, p.219)
To understand the chapters on "The Stream of Thought" and 
"The Consciousness of Self" one must appreciate the dilemma which 
ensueg from this dualistic position that knowledge is an affair 
within the mind and that "the thing known remains the same whether 
known or not." Dewey has formulated this dilemma in "Studies in 
Logical Theory" saving, "The rock against which every such logic 
splits is that either reality already has the statement which thought 
is endeavoring to give it, or else it has not. In the former case, 
thought is futilely reiterative, in the latter, it is falsificatoryj' 
(p.47) Or a gain,v"thought either shapes its own material or else 
just accepts it. In the first case....its activity can only alter
this stuff and thus lead the mind farther away from reality. But 
if thought j u 81 accepts its material, how can there by any distinc-
!
tive aim or activity of thought at all?" (p.36)
It was no light difficulty into which James fell. He had 
to surrender either the unity or the validity of experience. He 
wished to keep both in justice to experience and he did so by al­
ternately holding contrary opinions. He showed first on the sub­
jective side that there is unity in the stream of thought which 
"f1ows on." Then the validity of experience was threatened by re­
calcitrant, stable things. Accordingly, to save the validity, he 
assumed a stream of objects corresponding to the stream of thought. 
But thi3 violated the principle that "things remain the same," and 
accordingly James offered a third solution in the "Passing Thought" 
which was not a true unity but only a synthesis of past experience 
achieved in a highly miraculous fashion. We must examine these three 
solutions of the dilemma more in detail. The first is the attempt
to keep the unity of experience by describing thought as a stream.
As an initial statement James said that "no one aver had 
simple sensation by itself"(Ibid.p.224) and as a minimum assump­
tion of what happens when consciousness is present he said that 
"thought goes on." This simple phrase postulates at once the unity 
of experience and the divorce between thought and things.
In speaking of the continuity of thought James made haste 
to deny any monistic conclusions which might be drawn from the for­
mula by declaring for an unequivocal pluralism. There streams
of thought, each stream being the personal consciousness of some
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mind, soae concrete and particular I or you. A thought not 30 re­
lated to an organism is something outside of experience and so, as 
James had a healthy objection to unknowns as a basis of explanation., 
he said he could take no account of such a thought. It is signifi­
cant that thus at the outset of the chapter James threw what he had 
previously called "the unique and utterly mysterious" relation of 
the mind to the brain into the foreground to explain the continuity 
of thought. This relationship was made to carry the burden of the 
unity and continuity of the stream of thought and by occasionally 
substituting for it the relationship of the mind to objects, without 
being aware that he was so doing, James kept an appearance of val­
idity for the stream.
His development of the thesis that thought is in constant 
change shows this see-saw rather strikingly. He first showed what 
he meant by the constant change of thought by opposing to his posi­
tion the Lockian and atomistic doctrine which holds that identical 
sensations may recur. A Lockian might ask, "does not the same 
piano-key, struck with the same force make us hear in the same way?" 
James answered that the object is the same, the thought, a new 
thought of the same object and that we confuse the two. He develops** 
at some length the idea of the modification of the brain by continu­
ous neural processes and asked whether as the brain tension shifted 
from one relative state of equilibrium to another "it is likely that 
its faithful psychic concomitant is heavier-footed than itself and 
that it cannot match each one of the organ' 3 irradiations by a 
shifting inward iridescence of its own?" (Ibid. p. 235 . ) A3 to brain 
states James said that "Each brain-state is a record in which the
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eye of Omniscience might read all the fors-gone history of its 
owner. It is out of the question then that any total brain-state 
should identically recur.” (Ibid.P.334) "Ergo" we can add for 
James, "the faithful psychic concomitant" can never "identically 
recur," But while insisting on the change in the stream of thought, 
James believed that he was insisting equally upon the stability of 
things. Thus he wrote "What is got twice is the same object," and 
"the realities, concrete and abstract, physical and ideal, whose 
permanent existence we believe in, seem to be constantly com­
ing up again before our thought, and lead us, in our carelessness 
to suppose that our 'ideas’ of them are the same ideas." (Ibid.p.231) 
But even in asserting the sameness of objects James wrote such a sen­
tence as this, "We take no heed, as a rule, of the different ways 
in which the same things look and sound and smell at different 
distances and under different circumstances." (Ibid.p.331) Of 
what "sameness" was James talking if he was forced to admit the 
relativity of objective qualities?
The position into which James had worked was uncomfortable 
and would have been more so had he clearly realized it. His pre­
mises put him under obligation to account for the stream character oi 
thought parallel to constant changes of brain states all the while 
that things remain permanent and static. He said, "Often we are 
ourselves struck at the strange differences in our successive views
of the same thing.... what was unreal has grown real, and what was
exciting is insipid." (Ibid.p.233) But if the thing does not 
change, did James mean that all but one of our "successive views 
of the same things" are wrong, and that the unreal ha3 not really
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grown real, the exciting net really insipid, but only that some 
physical change has been going on within our brains, and that its 
Achates, "the faithful psychic concomitant” has fallen into step 
with this brain change? If things have a permanent nature, and con­
sciousness disregards this in favor of its own inward iridescence, 
it is hard to see that we are better off in regard to the validity 
of knowledge, than we would have been if left in subjective ideal­
ism with sensations caused by we-know-not-what.
But if the validity of knowledge is sacrificed by this 
view, the continuity of experience fares no better, and yet James's 
object was to establish these principles. For notice that if every 
individual thought corresponds to a separate brain state, such 
thoughts break the unity of experience as inevitably as separate 
sensations would. Both are parts of a mechanical whole which must 
be statically joined. The "pulses of thought” of which James was 
writing are larger units of knowledge than sensations are, but are 
not different in kind. The reason that James did not see that the 
continuity was broken by the succession of thoughts was that his 
doctrine of the fringe seamed to mediate between the thoughts in 
such a way as to bring them into organic unity. Here we find the 
old distinction between "direct acquaintance" and "knowledge about" 
under a new name. Jame3 held that each thought had a mucleu3 con­
sisting of direct knowledge of qualities of objects, such as blue­
ness, loudness, coldness, and about this nucleus there is a fringe, 
also called a halo, penumbra and psychic overtone, consisting of a 
direct knowledge of a different order of qualities, namely, the re­
lations of objects such as withness, nextness, -onness, forness.
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Stated thus from the side of the object, the static character of 
the fringe is very evident, as well as its artificial nature, but 
James conceived of it always as a dynamic force passing the con­
sciousness over from one thought to the next. He called it "the free 
water of consciousness." He gained this dynamic force by using the 
relation between the mind and the object as identical with the rela­
tion between the mind and the brain. It is because he said that "the 
fringe" was descriptive of a certain class of objective qualities 
and yet always explained its dynamic character by reference to con­
stantly changing brain states that he did not see it as it was, a 
mechanical and static conception. "Nothing," he said, "is easier 
than to symbolize all these facts" (i.e.knowledge about) "in terms 
of brain action." (Ibid. p. 257) It wa3 indeed too fatally easy. 
Psychosis and neurosis were for him the double aspects of conscious­
ness. "A waxing excitement of tracts or processes which, a mpment 
hence, will be the cerebral correlatives of something which a mo­
ment hence will be vividly present to the thought" was, he held the 
sense of whither. ( Ibid.p.257) He said also, "But if consciousness 
corresponds to the fact of the rearrangement itself, why if the 
rearrangement stop not, should the consciousness ever cease? And if 
a lingering rearrangement brings with it one kind of consciousness, 
why should not a swift rearrangement bring another kind of conscious­
ness as peculiar as the rearrangement itself? The lingering con­
sciousness if of simple objects, we call 'sensations* or 'images' 
according a3 they are faint or vivid, 'concepts' or 'thoughts* 
when faint. For the swift consciousness we have only those names 
of 'transitive states' or 'feelings of relation' which we have
used." (Ibid, p. 2 4 7)
Herein is the crux of the matter. Even if we are able 
to grant that mental states are the "faithful psychic concomitants" 
of continually changing brain states and that therefore "within a 
personal consciousness thought is in constant change" that can have 
reference only to thought in a vacuum, and not to thought in rela­
tion to objects. The organic unity of the onward movement of 
thought so easy to explain by correspondence of brain states and 
mental states is "chopped into bits" when applied to objects. The 
nucleus of the thought knowing the stable parts of objects, the 
fringe knowing the diaphanous relationships are and must remain, 
static, isolated data.
Such a fringe cannot lead any where, as Jamas thought it 
did, for as he himself would say, a feeling of leading is toto 
coelo other than leading (v.p.252 "the feeling of an absence is toto 
coelo other than the absence of a feeling.") Yet the confusion of 
which James was guilty was worse than this. He warned us first that 
we must not confuse the thing with the thought of the thing, saying 
that things are discrete and discontinuous and do pass before us in 
a train or chain, (v,ibid.p.240) and then he straightway made a 
thought of transition equivalent to transition by neglecting the 
very distinction he had made.
If one puts a pragmatic account of knowledge side by side 
with this chapter on the stream of thought certain important dif­
ferences appear. In the first place the pragmatist does not recog­
nize mind as a "thinking principle," "the faithful psychic concomi­
tant" of brain states mediating between objects and organisms. He
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ccnsiders mind to be a unique type of relationship between objects 
and organisms. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that in any instance 
of a conscious relationship a living organism is being controlled 
by the future which appears as a present quality of an object. The 
object becomes meaningful. This is to assert that an object,when 
known>changes in one very important respect, though James repeatedly 
asserted that "the object remains the same." It changes by taking 
on meaning. This is not a chemical, nor a physical but a functional 
change. The object controls behavior by forecasting the future. This 
makes possible an interpretation of the continuity of experience as 
the progressive development of the meaning of an object, and it 
makes possible an interprotation of the validity of experience as 
the fulfilment of meaning. It gives a dynamic interpretation to 
"the fringe." It avoids representationism.
But James’s statement of the stream of thought ends in re­
presentationism. We have seen that if the stream of thought mir­
rors objects, then obviously it must falsify as well since it 
changes and "things are the same." Or if the objects change harmon­
iously with the stream of thought there is still the mystery of what 
representative knowledge may mean. It cannot mean mere copying, for 
an actual river which mirrors the trees which lean from its banks 
does not therefore know the trees. Nor yet could we say that two 
trees exactly alike, to the smallest leaf, know each other. It is 
contradictory also to imagine that objects and thoughts may form 
parts of the same stream, as James suggested, since objects, by 
definition, have spatial qualities, and thoughts by definition, do 
not. But once let the ghastly procession of thoughts in a mental
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stream without body or spatial qualities give way to a stream of 
objects guiding behavior and James's chapter becomes intelligible.
Indeed the plausibility which Janies gave to his account 
of the continuity of the thought stream which survives qualitative 
changes was due to the fact that he vaa really employing the stream 
of objects in their function of control of behavior, in spite of an
explicit denial of so doing. He said that the comings and goings and
contrasts of objects "no more break the flow of the thought that 
thinks them than they break the time and space in which they lie." 
Then he offered an example, "A silence may be broken by a thunder
clap and we may be so stunned and confused for a moment by the
shock as to give no instant account to ourselves of what has hap­
pened. But that very confusion is a mental state and a state that 
passes us straight over from the silence to the sound."(Ibid.p.240) 
He continues the description saying that "into the awareness of the 
thunder itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps and con­
tinues: for what we hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder 
pure. but thunder-breaking-up on-silence-and-contrasting-with it."
But a pragmatist must be called in to save "That very confusion" 
which James called a mental state, and which his account of knowl­
edge was inadequate to explain. For James, if holding consistently 
to his assumptions, could have made analysis of the phenomenon of 
"thunder-breaking-up on silence" only in some such way as follows.
Air waves striking the ear cause neural activity resulting in a 
changed brain-state. Parallel to this there are mental changes."The 
things remain the same," which means, doubtless, that there is pure 
silence, then a crash of pure thunder. The relation of nextness
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between them serves as a hyphen. We are not concerned now with his 
statement that into the awareness of the one, creeps the awareness 
of the other, but only with the objects as they really are. And 
where, in this description is there any room or cause for the mental- 
state of confusion? The pragmatist could account for it because he 
holds that neural changes have as concomitants not changing mental 
states but changing objects. He would accordingly describe the 
"confusion" not as a mental state, but as a type of behavior media­
ting between the behavior to silence and the behavior to thunder.lt 
is the behavior which marks the very process of the transformation 
of the object from silence into thunder. But James called it a 
"mental-state" and should therefore have been able to name the ob­
ject which it mirrors. Was it "thunder-breaking-upon-silence?" But 
that is a perfectly orderly object and not at all like the mental 
state "confusion," no more so, at least, than * dog-chasing-cat’ or 
’one added to two’ would be. Unless interpreted functionally, the 
"confusion" is a gratuitous mental state bearing no relation to the 
silence or to the thunder. As to the awareness of the one creeping 
into the awareness of the other, we are bound, if we follow James, 
to conclude that this is one of the many instances in which knowl­
edge falsifies reality.
Instead, then,of a stream of thoughts, the consistent 
pragmatist believes in a stream of things. But when he speaks of 
a stream of objects he does not mean to remove the steadfast earth 
from under the feet of man. He is merely accounting for a fact 
for which James vainly tried to account, namely, the continuity of
experience. That there are real discontinuities in experience as
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well, the pragmatist admits for it is certain that facts may appear 
in temporary separation from meanings.
In the chapter following the "Stream of Thought" James 
dealt with the consciousness of self. His immediate problem was 
to account for self consciousness and to do so the self aiid to be 
made one with the stream of objects. In the former chapter he 
raised the question, how is our world known? In this chapter how 
are we aware of ourselves as distinct from the world? Because in 
his earlier chapter his conclusion was dualistic, faamely, that a 
stream of thought knows things, James found on his hands the further 
question of how this stream of thought is known. He was unwilling 
to admit that it is known only to deity, unwilling also to say that 
all consciousness is self consciousness and yet he could not rest 
with the conclusion that we can know only things and not our own 
thoughts. Therefore, at a blow he crushed the stream of thought 
into an object among other objects and called it the ego or the me 
and introduced a new knower in the passing Thought. The obdurate 
necessity with which Janies was laboring was the same as in the last 
chapter, the need of a knower that things may be known,of a sub­
ject that there may be an object. But James denied that this knower 
was a soul or self and made it as small and harmless a3 possible, 
merely a passing Thought whose sole essence was awareness. This 
passing Thought was unaware of itself but was aware of objects 
among which it found the Thought which passed at its own coming. He 
wrote: "Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each Thought dies 
away and is replaced by another. The other among the things it 
knows, knows its own predecessor and finding it warm in the way
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we have described greets it saying, "Thou art mine and part of the 
same self with me." (Ibid, p.339)
the problem of self-consciousness to be and his solution of it. I 
shall discuss first some of the detailed difficulties which arise 
when one accepts James’s account of the passing Thought, such as 
the relation of the passing Thought to objects, the conflict be­
tween the simplicity and the duration of the Thought, and the rela­
tion of the Thought to the fringe of the former chapter. Then I shall 
discuss more fully the agreement between the theory of the passing 
Thought and the stream of Thought and draw some final conclusions.
cap of a minimum assumption in the form of the dubious axiom that 
there can be no object of thought without a subject. He felt that 
only a subject could give the unity which we find in experience and 
which disconnected things could not give. He stated his position in 
contrast to Hume's by saying that Hume was correct in discovering . 
the parts in the stream of thought, but was mistaken in finding no 
unity, no "thread of resemblance," no "core of sameness." He said 
that all the associationists from Hume to the Mills needed a prin­
ciple of unity and smuggled in surreptitiously what they ought 
avowedly to have postulated in the form of a present judging Thought, 
(v.ibid.p.352) He said expressly that he considered the passing 
Thought as an agent of subjective synthesis essential to knowledge 
as such, in other words, accounting for the unity of experience, and 
not to be confounded with "objective synthesis or union instead of
This may serve as a general statement of what James took
We must not forget that James was working under the handi-
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difference or disconnection known among things." (Ibid.p.331) He 
thus defined the passing Thought as a peculiar way of thinking ob­
jects together. He could apparently have assented to the realistic 
formula that awareness is a unique sort of togetherness of objects. 
Only, and the only is important, this would have meant for him that 
thought imposes upon objects a new sort of relationship and that is 
out of accord with the thesis that "things remain the same," whether 
known or not. And James was true to this thesis at the expense of 
gaining the unity of experience by a sacrifice of its validity.
Thus he wrote: "This sort of bringing of things together into the 
object of a single judgment is of course essential to all thinking.
The things are conjoined i,n the thought, whatever may be the rela­
tion in which they appear to the thought." (Ibid.p»33l) This is 
further complicated when we recall that James said that the passing 
Thought is "a vehicle of choice as well as of cognition." (Ibid, 
p.340) This threatens to remove the awareness of any moment even 
farther from reality, for the passing Thought mast select not among 
objects but in the mental stream what thoughts of things it shall 
appropriate, what thoughts of things it shall repudiate. True,
James said that it knows "another Thought and the Object of that 
Other" (Ibid.p.340). But that it may know the Object of the Thought 
as well as the Thought we may venture to doubt since James found it 
possible to speak of "things conjoined in thought, whatever may be 
the relation in which they appear to the thought." My charge is 
that James can never by any possibility consider how things ap­
pear to thought, since the passing Thought, which is only conscious­
ness in progress, is as a section of the mental stream, confined
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to the stream as the faithful concomitant, not of the stream of 
things but of brain states. Of course, one might object, that I 
am neglecting the fact that brain states change because of a chang­
ing environment and that the stream of thought is parallel to brain 
changes which are parallel to the stream of things, and hence the 
stream of thought and the stream of things are parallel after all. 
One who so objects is apparently forgetting that James has repeat­
edly asserted that "things remain the same," just as James himself 
forgot it, for I doubt not that if pressed he would have resorted 
to this very objection. And the objection bears eloquent testimony 
to the weakness of James's position and to the fundamental validity 
of the pragmatist'8 claim that things have a share in the business 
of knowing.
This same error is inherent in James’s distinction be­
tween subjective and objective synthesis. He spoke of the passing 
Thought as the agent of subjective synthesis creating a unity within 
tbs stream of thought, while out in the world of things there rules 
a very different principle of objective synthesis or "union instead 
of difference among things." These two, James said must not be 
confounded. But these rival principles of union do themselves con- 
confound the amazed spectator, who sees thus tardily that the world- 
he-knows is under no obligation to conform to the world-which-is.
The pragmatist, however, boldly discards subjective synthesis and is 
content to rest the unity of experience upon objective synthesis.
In it he finds the relationship of purposive control by which ob­
jects direct behavior.
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When we recall James's statement that "our thought is 
not composed of parts, however so composed its object may be”
(Ibid.p.363) we find a new difficulty in reconciling this simplicity 
with the thought's duration. The question at issue is how the pass­
ing Thought can grasp any series, such as the three notes of a 
bird's whistle in an instantaneous synthesis and yet of itself have 
no parts. How can a single indivisible thought be in successive 
points at the same time? James objected to Kant's transcendental 
Ego of Apperception as mythological, yet the transcendental element 
in the passing Thought is no less dangerously mythological since it 
is thus superior to the condition of time.
I believe that it is a mistake to treat James’s concep­
tion of the passing Thought as distinct from his conception of 
the stream of Thought, in spite of some real and other apparent 
divergences. The "passing Thought" is a new name for the "faithful, 
psychic concomitant" of changing brain states. The greatest dif­
ference which I find in the two views, and its importance must 
not be minimized, is that while in the earlier chapter the unity of 
experience was effected through the fringe, or a knowledge of rela­
tions corresponding to a change from one brain state to another, the 
unity is now said to be due to the passing Thought which includes 
the past in the present. The relation of correspondence between 
the mind and the brain is still all important for this second view
but the concomitance of the relation is strained to the breaking
the
point, since for the mind to correspond point for point with/,brain, 
the brain must be supposed to retain the physical impress, or struc­
ture, of numerous past states of infinite complexity. It is ask­
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ing a good deal of mortal flesh. When one throws a stone into the 
water the rings spread quickly over the surface of the pool and 
the outer ring, which is just coming into being, includes the inner 
ring. Some such inclusion as this seemed to have been meant by 
James as characteristic of the passing Thought. But the illustra­
tion, if its aptness can be granted, reveals one of the flaws in the 
assumption, as soon as one stops to reflect that the inner ring, 
which it is so easy to call the same, is itself in constant change.
James gave us the key to this explanation of the passing 
Thought, as merely any instant of the mental stream, in his diagram 
of three successive thoughts A,B, and C, in which B includes A as 
its object and C includes B. Then, he said, "A,B, and C would stand 
for three pulses in a consciousness of personal identity. Each 
pulse would be something different from the others but B would know 
and adopt A, and C would know and adopt A and B. Three successive 
states of the same brain on which each experience in passing leaves 
its mark, might very well engender thoughts differing from each 
other in just such a way as this," (Ibid. p. 343) . The passing Thought 
therefore knows the part of the stream of thought which has passed 
because it is the "faithful psychic concomitant" of a brain state 
in which persist traces of former brain states which were in their 
aoraents of power the brain states corresponding to other passing 
Thoughts which have now become part of the stream of thought which 
has passed. This persistence of past brain states within the pre­
sent brain state is the basis for "the warmth and intimacy" which 
iccording to James the present judging Thought finds in past thoughts, 
t seriously doubt his right to any knowledge of "the past" at all
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from these premises. James expressly considered the passing Thought 
as the psychic concomitant of a brain state in process at any given 
moment. He said "the bare fact is that when the brain acts, a 
thought occurs." (Ibid, p.345). Therefore, no matter how complicated 
the brain state might be by states persisting within it from the 
past, "the bold fact" would remain, that it must be a present brain 
state, and each brain state which should persist within it, could do 
so only by virtue of being a present state. The inner ring on the 
surface of a pool is as much present at any instant as is the outer. 
Therefore, on the basis of correspondence of brain states and mental 
states we may challenge any present judging Thought to prove that 
it can have awareness of the past. The passing Thought as the con­
comitant of a brain state would limit mortals to eternity by destroy­
ing time.
For suppose that a passing Thought occurs, which is the 
awareness of A B, corresponding to a brain state B-in-which-A-per- 
3 i 31 s« For this it is necessary to presuppose an original brain 
state A. But to get "sameness," or "warmth and intimacy" the brain
state A, with its corresponding mental state A must recur for com­
parison with the passing Thought AB, otherwise AB has as little to 
do with A, as XT could have. In other words, James did not succeed 
in providing for the persistence of a brain state A, in the brain 
state AB, but only for a change of a brain state A into a brain
state AB. He said it wa3 impossible for the same brain state ever
identically to recur. HFhat James called the persistence of brain 
states and what he thought yielded "sameness," "warmth and intimacy,"
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"the sense of personal identity” and "knowledge of the stream of 
thought as past" yields only an ever new awareness. It is not even 
an awareness of change, for as we have seen the passing Thought is 
limited to direct acquaintance and cut off from all knowledge of re­
lations even within the mental stream. In this fashion the stream 
of thought dries up at its source and becomes no more than a train 
of disconnected awarenesses corresponding to brain states of greater 
or less complexity.
And so we have here another victory to be recorded upon 
the tablets of that strange and mysterious variety of knowledge 
called by James "direct acquaintance." It is a principle which does 
not enter unheralded at the end of the chapter but was present all 
along. When James said that the present moment does not know it­
self, i3 "the darkest in the whole series," he made this reservation, 
"it may feel its own immediate existence - we have all along ad­
mitted the possibility of this, hard as it is by direct introspec­
tion to ascertain the fact - but nothing can be known about it till 
it be dead and gone." (Ibid.p.341). Now, if I have made my point,
I have just shown that nothing can be known about the passing 
Thought when it is dead and gone, which restricts us to the feeling 
of immediate existence which on James's own account is of "the most 
intimately felt part of its present Object, the body and the central 
adjustments, (v.ibid. p.341)
But the problem of the chapter was to account for self 
consciousness and the conclusion to which we come from James's
premises is far indeed from James's own conclusion. It is more like
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Hume's. The "passing Thought" and "awareness" like "direct acquain­
tance" are only sensations in disguise, and James’s proudly flow­
ing stream of thought is only Hume’s "heap of sensations" after all. 
James had still to learn that mind is not a third thing which inter­
venes between things and living organisms when knowing takes place. 
And accordingly we may turn now to his later phase of thought in 
which he made this discovery and restated the problem.
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JAMES'S LATER VIEW OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In 1904 James published an article entitled "Does 'Con­
sciousness* Exist?" He said that for twenty years past he had mis­
trusted consciousness as an entity and for seven or eight years past 
he had suggested its non-existence to his students. In the Hibbert 
Lectures at Manchester College, published in 1909, James voiced a 
similar feeling of dissatisfaction with hi3 earlier view of con­
sciousness, and confessed that for years he had been struggling with 
the problem sincerely, and as patiently as he could, covering hun­
dreds of sheets of paper with notes and memoranda and discussions 
with himself over the difficulty. He said that the course which he 
had taken in his psychology wa3 to say "that every complex mental 
fact is a separate psychic entity succeeding upon a lot of other 
psychic entities, which are erroneously called its parts, and sup­
erseding them in function, but not literally being composed of them." 
But this course he found unsatisfactory because it made the universe 
discontinuous. In his own words: "These fields of experience that 
replace each other so punctually, each knowing the same matter, but 
in ever widening contexts, from simplest feeling up 'to absolute 
knowledge, can they have no being in common when their cognitive 
function is so manifestly common? The regular succession of them 
is, on such terms, an unintelligible miracle. If you reply that 
their common object is of itself enough to make the many witnesses 
continuous, the same implacable logic fellows you - how can one and 
the same object appear so variously? Its diverse appearances break 
it into a plurality, and our world of objects then falls into dis­
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continuous pieces quite as much as did our world of subjects. The 
resultant irrationality is really intolerable." (A Pluralistic Uni­
verse,pp.205-206)
From this "intolerable irrationality" of his earlier 
philosophy James sought to escape by a theory of consciousness which 
he himself considered pragmatic. It remains for us to see whether 
it is really pragmatic or not. Of the doctrine of the Psychology 
in regard to consciousness, James retained this much,'thoughts' 
and 'things' are names for two sorts of object, which common sense 
will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to 
each other." (Essays in Radical Empiricism,p.1) This, he held,
was compatible with the statement that "experience,_I believe has
no such inner duplicity: (as consciousness and object) and the sepa­
ration of it into consciousness and content comes not by wav of 
subtraction but by way of addition." (Ibid, p.9)
Yet even in this brave beginning dualism had slipped 
noiselessly back into experience. James saw that it was there, but 
he excused it, saying that it i3 "reinterpreted, so that instead of 
being mysterious and elusive, it becomes verifiable and concrete." 
(Ibid.p.10) If James is to be considered consistently pragmatic he 
must be able to make this claim good, for if he does not, he will 
be forced to leave us with the problem of traditional dualism still 
unsolved.
The dualism which he upheld took this form. There are 
in experience two levels or contexts; on the one we speak of a por­
tion of experience as a "thing," on the other as a "thought." Some­
times a portion of experience may be spoken of in either way, and
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that, he said, is the problem of how one identical point can be on 
two lines, which is possible, as we know, if it is situated at their 
intersection. James made the further claim that we have a function­
al test by which we ascertain whether a given portion of experience 
is a thought or a thing. According to this functional test if it 
is a thing, its relationships, or "couplings," are constant and 
coherent and if it is a thought the relationships are instable and 
incoherent, (v.ibid.pp.21,22)
This position is not essentially different from that 
taken by T.H. Green in his distinction between the real and the 
apparent in the chapter called "The Spiritual Principle in Nature," 
with which he began the Prolegomena to Ethics. He said, "If now 
from the futile question, What is real? which we can only answer by 
saying that the real is everything, we pass to one more hopeful - 
How do we decide whether any particular event or object is really 
what it seems to be, or whether our belief about it is true? - the 
answer must be that we do so by testing the unalterableness of the 
qualities which we ascribe to it or which form its apparent nature." 
(Prolegomena, Paragraph 24). And then James: "The room thought-
of, namely, has many thought-of couplings with many thought-of things. 
Some of these couplings are inconstant, others are stable. In the 
reader's personal history the room occupies a single date - he saw 
it only once perhaps, a year ago. Of the house's history, on the 
other hand, it forms a permanent ingredient. Some couplings have 
the curious stubbornness, to borrow Royce's term, of fact; others 
show the fluidity of fancy - we let them come and go as we please. 
Grouped with the rest of its house, with the name of its town, of
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its owner, builder, value, decorative plan, the room maintains a 
definite foothold, to which, if we try to loosen it, it tends to 
return, and to reassert itself with force. With these associates, in 
a word, it coheres, while to other houses, other towns, other owners, 
etc., it shows no tendency to cohere at all. The two collections, 
first of i13 cohesive, and second of its loose associates, inevitably 
come to be contrasted. We call the first collection the system of 
external realities, in the midst of which the room as ’real' exists; 
the other we call the stream of our internal thinking, in which, as 
a ’mental image,' it for a moment floats. (Essays in Radical Empiri­
cism, pp.21,22)
Green spoke of single, unalterable relationships which 
constitute reality, James of stubborn, cohesive, permanent rela­
tionships. Green did not further analyze his idea of unalterable­
ness, beyond naming it also uniformity and inclusiveness; James, 
however, tried to specify what he meant by unalterableness and sta­
bility and coherence. He said that we sift out the 'mental' from 
the ‘real' objects because with 'real' objects "consequences al­
ways accrue." (Ibid.p.33). This is the functional solution which 
he promised and it is the heart of pragmatism as James understood it. 
I question whether pragmatism with such a heart, is, in the lan­
guage of our authors, "real" or only "apparent." The suggestion, 
|owever, is useful, as far as it goes, because it indicates, what 
Green did not recognize, that consistency and unalterableness are 
meaningful only in functional terms. But the solution was inade­
quate and misleading, because, while James merely held up one experi­
- 81-
ence against another experience, he nevertheless drew the illogical 
conclusion that the relations revealed in one experience were less 
experiential because they guided conduct more successfully than did 
the relations revealed in the other experience. For instance, he 
said, "Mental knives may he sharp, hut they won't cut real wood." 
(Ibid.p.33) He might as well have 3aid "absent knives" or "thin" 
knives or "dull" knives as "mental" knives. One cannot thus con­
trast "mental" with "real," meaning that within experience he is 
contrasting experiential with non-experiential data, "thoughts" with 
"things." The "effective relationships" by which James thought to 
distinguish the mental from the real, and the subjective from the 
objective is merely a statement of the fact that within our experi­
ence we find certain qualities of objects more to our purpose than 
others. The coherency and unalterableness of certain relationships 
are not absolute at all but quite strictly relative to purpose. Rela­
tions among objects are stubborn in reference to the stubbornness of 
particular desires and the fluidity of fancy has meaning only for 
the ebb and flow of particular interests. There is, for example, 
as much stubbornness about my thought of "dainty Ariel" as someone 
who will not bake me bread, as there is of yonder hill in the same 
connection. And I can never, as James seemed to imply, contrast 
the one with the other directly outside of thought.
According to James's use of stability as a test for 
reality, objects are real from the standpoint of the physical sci­
ences and history, but the objective reality turns to instable, men­
tal existence the moment it is brought into relation with a con­
scious organism. James said that real knives cut real wood (v.ibid.
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p.33) and also of a pen that what we mean by saying it is physical, 
is that it holds ink and marks paper, and that what we mean by mental 
is that it comes and goes with the movements of the eyes. (v.ibid. 
p.124). But it is easy to see that "if I dip a pen in ink, it will 
mark paper," is no more, and no less, a stable relationship than,
"if I close my eyes I will have no retinal image of the pen." The 
illustrations of stability which James employed show that he made 
stable relationships equivalent to physical relationships outside 
of experience. Since, however, James had no special dispensation, 
by which he could speak of objects outside of experience, and still 
be taken seriously, the logical result of his definition of stable 
relationships would have been to deny that such relationships can 
ever be experienced. In justice to James it must be said that he 
did not see the drift of his definition of stability toward making 
the real identical with the non-experiential world, because of his 
use of the idea of "pure experience," the examination of which I 
must postpone until after I have discussed his use of perceptual 
and conceptual knowledge. For the present we must observe that it 
is the office of pragmatism to offer a new definition of stability. 
The table upon which I write is stable as far as my purpose is con­
cerned, yet for other purposes it would be most instable since it 
is every instant yielding to slow decay, is jarred by the opening 
and shutting of heavy doors and the passing of people. On the. 
other hand, judged by the ever renewed delight of childhood,fairy­
land has a stability like to the table's, and its very inaccessi­
bility to older, sadder men is as stubborn a relation as fate.
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But stability so defined will scarcely serve as a winnow­
ing fan to separate things from thoughts, for the reason that is is 
based on the pragmatic assumption that thoughts are things function­
ing in a certain way. So pragmatism differs at this point from James 
in claiming that we know but one order, that of conscious experience, 
and that within it objects are meaningful. It says further that 
from every object within the conscious order, consequences accrue, 
but some of these consequences can be correctly foreseen and pro­
vided for; on such an object we learn to depend and we call it sta­
ble and real. Other objects, such as creakings in a lonely house at 
night, are no less real but may be less highly organized as to mean­
ings. They are instable in that they may suggest various responses, 
and some cf the suggestions may turn out to be less advantageous to 
follow than others. It is then we say, "I thought it was a ghost, 
but it was a rat." And this distinction between thought and reality, 
which enters thus late into experience is a distinction between the 
respective meanings of an experiential datum. It does not make the 
original creaking into a thought, nor yet into a thing, that dis­
tinction,as James used it is still meaningless for pragmatists, but 
what it does indicate, is that there is an advantage to be gained if 
the person responds to the experience in a particular way. Just in 
the degree that an experience gains "stable" quality a person can 
deal with it.
But it would be quite unfair to dismiss James's explana­
tion of the "effective relationship" without further hearing. He 
worked too long, too honestly, too brilliantly with functionalism as 
he understood it, to entitle us to set it aside in a few paltry para­
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graphs. In speaking of the knowing of perceptual by conceptual ex­
periences, Janies indicated what he meant by saying that consciousness 
has functional significance. He said: "One experience would be the 
knower, the other the reality known: and I could perfectly well de­
fine without the notion of 'consciousness' what the knowing actually 
and practically amounts to - leading towards namely and terminating- 
in percepts, through a series of transitional experiences which the 
world supplies." (Ibid.p.25) James held very consistently to this 
idea of "leading towards" as the function performed by knowing. He 
spoke of "conjunctive relations" as of paths between portions of 
experience (v.ibid. Part II. "The World as Pure Experience); he 
spoke of the "cc-conscious transition" by which experiences of the 
same self pass into each other by continuous transition (ibid.p.47 
et seq.) and finally in discussing the cognitive relation (ibid.p.52 
et seq.) this "ambulatory" nature of consciousness received further 
emphasis. He said that the knower and the known are either:"(l) 
the selfsame piece of experience taken twice over in different con­
texts: or they are (2) two pieces of actual experience belonging to 
the same subject with definite tracts of conjunctive transitional 
experience between them: or (3) the knower is a possible experience 
either of that subject or of another to which the said conjunctive 
transitions would lead, if sufficiently prolonged." (Ibid.p.53)
We have just discussed James's exposition of the first 
type of cognitional relation, namely the selfsame piece of experience 
taken twice over in two contexts, once as thing and once as thought. 
The third type of relationship might, James said, be reduced to the 
second, and the second he accordingly elaborated. According to
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these two types knowing consists in the transition actual,or possi­
ble, from one piece of actual experience to another. As an example, 
James took the cognitional relation existing between his thought of 
Memorial Hall, while sitting in his library at Cambridge, and Mem­
orial Hall.
Before giving James's explanation of this case of cogni­
tion let me state briefly a pragmatic account of it which may serve 
as a standard of comparison. A pragmatist would say that, when he 
ha»a thought of Memorial Hall, in that experience then present to him, 
future consequences relative to his possible action toward the Hall 
are controlling hi3 behavior. At the time of the experience he is 
responding to certain meanings, to certain suggestions of the Hall, 
and that response and that stimulus, then and there, constitute 
cognition. If later he acts upon these suggestions and finds that 
further experience fulfils or fails to fulfil the meaning of the 
thought of Memorial Hall, he has added a new process of verification 
to the original experience of cognition. Now James's explanation 
missed the significance of cognition and described verification in 
its stead. He said: "My mind may have before it only the name, or 
it may have a clear image, or it may have a very dim image of the 
hall, but such intrinsic differences in the image make no difference 
in its cognitive function. Certain extrinsic phenomena, special 
experiences of cognition, are what impart to the image, be it what 
it may, its knowing office. For instance, if you ask me what 
hall I mean by my image, and I can tell you nothing: or if I fail to 
lead you towards the Harvard Delta; or if being led by you, I am un^ - 
certain whether the Hall I see be what I had in mind or not; you
would rightly deny that I had 'meant' that particular hall at all, 
even though my mental image might to some degree have resembled it." 
(Ibid.p.55).
that was James describing? Surely not, as he supposed, the 
cognitive relation but only the truth relation. It was not a ques- 
tion of thinking but rather of correctness of thinking, whether he 
had the data, \7hich could lead him to Memorial Hall. James held 
that fulfilment of meaning is cognition, and not verification alone, 
and yet he advanced no definition of meaning except to call it "lead­
ing" or "mental pointing" which lacked cognitional value until iden- 
tified with truth. It was definition in a circle. He said of an 
idea that if fulfilled, then "my soul was prophetic, and my idea 
must be, and by common consent would be, called cognizant of real­
ity." (Ibid.p.56) If this statement be taken as referring to veri­
fication, as was not intended, it brings us to the common-sense 
proposition that effective leading is the test of truth.
But James took greatest pains to assure his readers that 
he was speaking of leading as the functional definition of cogni­
tion. He said: "In this continuing and corroborating, taken in no
transcendental sense, but denoting definitely felt transitions, lies 
all that knowing of a percept by an idea can possibly contain or 
signifv. Whenever such transitions are felt, the first experience
knows the last one. ----  Whenever certain intermediaries are given,
such that, as they develop toirard their terminus, there is experi­
ence from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of 
one process fulfilled, the result is that their starting-point 
thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known.
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That is all that knowing (in the simple case considered) can he 
known-as, that is the whole of its nature put into experiential 
terms." (Ibid. pp.56-57)
This statement raised the issue of objective reference. 
James held that an idea or an experience is the starting point of 
knowledge, that there are intermediaries in continuous development 
from point to point, that there is a definite direction of develop­
ment, and finally a terminus which is the object meant or known. As 
a description of a process of verification this is valuable but it 
works confusion as a description of knowing. James was unable to ex­
plain this apparently simple empirical statement without introducing 
a non-empirical element. He said that the transition, the develop­
ment and the continuing must be taken in no transcendental sense 
(v.ibid.p.56) but simply as denoting definitely felt transitions, re­
lations which "unroll themselves in time." Then, however, he intro­
duced a non-experiential and purely transcendental element by men­
tioning that they develop toward a terminus (v.ibid.p.57 et 3eq.) - 
a terminus by definition not yet within experience, yet guiding ex­
perience - , that the development has a direction, - a direction 
given by the object still outside of experience -, and that the re­
sult is a fulfilment, - an end intended from the first but known only 
when reached. Then James added a further cause for confusion by 
saying of the fulfilment that the starting point thereby becomes a 
knower and the terminus an object meant or known. By completing its 
promise, a promise, which was not a promise, becomes a promise. And 
once more James distinctly said that he was not talking of truth 
but of cognition for he said that when th9 object is reached, "the
percept here not only verifies the concept, proves its function of 
knowing that percept to be true, but the percept's existence as the 
terminus of the chain of intermediaries creates the function. What­
ever terminates that chain was, because it now proves itself to be, 
what the concept ’had in mind?" (Ibi d. pp. 60-61)
James was not blind to the dilemma involved in this the-
4
ory of objective reference and proposed a solution for it. He 
stated the dilemma thus: "Can the knowledge be there before these 
elements that constitute its being have come? And if knowledge be 
not there, how can objective reference occur?" (Ibid.p.67) The solu­
tion James found in a distinction between knowing as verified and 
completed, and th9 same knowing as in transit. This knowing in 
transit or virtual knowledge not "completed and nailed down" consti­
tutes, he said, the greater part of our knowing. "To continue think­
ing unchallenged is ninety-nine times out of a hundred._our practical
substitute for knowing in the completed sense. As each experience 
runs by cognitive transition into the next one, and we nowhere feel 
a collision with what we elsewhere count as truth or fact, we com­
mit ourselves to the current as if the port were sure." (Ibid.p.69)
The difficulty with this solution is that one cannot discover what 
James could possibly mean by "virtual knowledge." He had insisted 
that the end creates the function. Now he seemed to say that ninety- 
nine times out of a hundred it does not. But what does create the 
function in these rather important ninety-nine exceptions to the 
rule, James did not say.
At this point, had he been a pragmatist, James would 
rightly have begun to speak of the functional nature of the cogni­
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tive relation. But he said not a word of this relation of simulta­
neous stimulus and response between organism and environment, in 
which the leading is done by the future, which in the form of a 
present quality of the environment, shows the consequences of possi­
ble action. This failure to define meaning is the central defect of 
his philosophical system. It left him without a standard for truth, 
left him unable to defend the freedom of the will without defending 
the freedom of indifference, and left him, finally, a prey to over­
credulity and insidious forms of irrationality.
If we follow James's treatment of consciousness through 
some of the other essays which stand as the record of his final 
thought, we find verification still confused with cognition; the 
same separation of the real from the ideal on the grounds of sta­
bility, and more clearly still the cause for these errors in the 
assertion of a traditional dualism, masking under the disguise of 
"direct knowledge," to which "knowledge about" points and leads, and 
which in its turn brings one face to face with reality.
In the year 1509 a volume of James's essays appeared 
called "The Meaning of Truth." The first two of the essays en­
titled "The Functionof Cognition" and "The Tigers in India" have 
direct bearing on the problem of consciousness. Although the essay 
on "The Function of Cognition" was first read before the Aristole- 
lian Society, December 1,1884, and published in Mind in 1885 James 
reedited it for this volume and appended a brief critical analysis 
indicating wherein his later opinions differed from this statement 
of 1884. This justifies its inclusion in the study of his final 
theory of consciousness, and this inclusion is further justified
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because examination shows that James was working here with the same 
doctrine of consciousness whichhe held in the "Essays in Radical 
Empiricism."* His position in brief was this: "Real cognition in­
volves an unmediated dualism of the khower and the known." (The 
Meaning of Truth, Note, p.17) The idea, or feeling, or thought 
"points to,""resembles," "terminates in" the reality it means. 
Knowledge as direct, though "dumb" acquaintance is superior to 
knowledge about, and finally sensations are "the mother-earth, the 
anchorage, the stable rock, the first and la3t limits, the terminus 
a quo and the terminus ad quern of the mind." (Ibid, p.39)
This attitude toward sensation is what strikes one as 
most incompatible with a pragmatic interpretation of consciousness. 
Yet James in his critical analysis of the essay did not correct it. 
As a matter of fact th9 idea plays as important a role in "The 
Essays in Radical Empiricism" as it does here, only there it is con­
sistently called "knowledge as acquaintance" or "direct knowledge" 
or "completed knowledge," and is opposed to "knowledge about" or 
"virtual knowledge." Instead of speaking of perceptual and con­
ceptual knowledge James frequently used these more descriptive terms 
of "direct acquaintance" and "knowledge about." The problem is the 
old problem which James met in the psychology and his answer is the 
same. If, as James did, a philosopher chooses to admit at the 
basis of knowledge sensations, alias "direct acquaintance," alias 
"completed knowledge," in the sense of something mental standing 
face to face with reality, like a mirror and equally "dumb," he com-
*cf. "A Word More about Truth" in "The Meaning of Truth" pp.136,
137 for James's statement of the relationship of these articles 
to his later thought.
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mita himself to dualism (and paradoxically to solipisism) and he re­
nounces pragmatism. If on the other hand he trusts his all to 
"knowledge about" he finds, paradoxically also, that "knowledge about" 
yields him fact as well as meaning. On defining consciousness as 
the functioning of the future through some specific present quality 
of an object, he is giving to "knowledge about" the power to shape 
conduct and a tongue to speak prophetically. This is pragmatism 
and this is what James renounced for "dumb acquaintance." We must 
not think that for a pragmatist "knowledge about" means of necessity 
roundabout, mediated experience, for on the contrary it is direct 
knowledge but the directness lies in the relationship of control ex­
isting between the object and the organism. Furthermore the direct­
ness of this "knowledge about" differs from the "directness" which 
James found in sensations and "knowledge as acquaintance." For him 
directness meant face-to-faceness with a permanent reality, for a 
pragmatist directness means the specific control which a particular 
object exerts upon a particular organism. One is static, the other 
is dynamic. For James moreover "knowledge about" was also static 
and meant simply the removal of thought from its object by a series 
of static mediating acquaintances. One must bear in mind also that 
James set different values on these respective types of knowledge, 
saying that knowledge as direct though "dumb" acquaintance is super­
ior to knowledge about." (The Meaning of Truth,p. 39) For instance 
James said: "It i3 always the speechlessness of sensation, its in­
ability to make any statement, that is held to make the very notion 
of it meaningless, and to justify the student of knowledge in scout­
ing it out of existence. 'Significance,1 in the sense of standing
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as the sign of other mental states, is taken to he the sole func­
tion of what mental states we have; and from our perception that 
our little primitive sensation has as yet no significance in this 
literal sense, it is an easy step to call it first meaningless,next 
senseless, then vacuous, and finally to brand it as absurd and in- 
admissable. But in this universal liquidation, this everlasting 
slip, slip, slip of direct-acquaintance into knowledge about; until 
at last nothing is left about which the knowledge can be supposed 
to obtain, does not all ’significance' depart from the situation?
And when our knowledge about things has reached its never so com­
plicated perfection must there not needs abide alongside of it and 
inextricably mixed in with it some acquaintance with what things 
all this knowledge is about?” (Ibid. ppJ.3-14) It is in a para­
graph such as this that irreconcilable difference presents itself 
between what James meant by consciousness as a functional relation 
and what consistent pragmatists mean. James tells us that knowl­
edge about is a stage only on the road to direct knowledge and that 
the latter r93embles or corresponds to reality. This needs fur­
ther explanation and the correspondence means it appears that this 
direct knowledge, if valid, will "lead to" the reality meant, (v. 
ibid, p. 17 46 seq. ) It is a case again of the idea of Memorial Hall 
leading to Memorial Hall. And again one may protest that James 
substituted a test of truth for a criterion of the presence of 
knowing. But it was more serious than that, for what becomes of 
the thought when it reaches reality? Does the thought of Memorial 
Hall wait outside on the doorstep when it happily "terminates in
i
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Memorial Hall? Reluctantly we must admit that "the leading" or 
"the pointing" proves meaningless, even for purposes of verifica­
tion, when stated as James proposed. A thought cannot approach a 
thing; it cannot "terminate in" an object. One body can approach 
another, and a thing, through its meaning, can direct a conscious 
organism's approach; the church bell summons to prayer, the bugle 
calls to arms, a spring day Invites to the woods and hills, and 
a soft couch tempts to repose. But James did not 90 provide for 
functioning of the object and so missed the only possible basis 
for the "effective relationship" in consciousness.
Some one may very properly object that it is a misrepre 
sentation of James's thoery to a3k what becomes of the thought of 
Memorial Hall, when it terminates in the reality, for the reason 
that James had already answered the question in such a way as to 
•avoid representationism, or what I have called face-to-face knowl 
edge. He spoke, in the beginning, of the point at the intersec­
tion of two lines, appearing in one context as thing, in another 
as thought, and by this identity of thought with thing it may be 
claimed that James had set himself beyond reach of all the criti­
cism to which an unmodifed dualism is subject. But James was not 
beyond criticism. Having defined thought as a process of lead­
ing towards reality, the termination of that leading would con­
stitute not knowledge but unconsciousness. James avoided this 
logical conclusion by introducing an ambiguous "tertium quid" 
called, as we have already had occasion to observe, pure experi­
ence. The analysis of pure experience, I must still reserve for 
a somewhat later portion of this chapter. It is sufficient for
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the present to see clearly that James’s theory of consciousness as 
leading towards reality, left him the choice of complete knowledge 
as face-to-face knowledge, whatever that may mean, or else uncon­
sciousness. Furthermore, if I may he allowed to dogmatise for the 
present, the conception of pure experience could in no way save him 
from these undesirable alternatives.
It is easy, sometimes, to make the mistake of believing 
that, in describing conceptual knowledge, Jame3 was using knowl­
edge about in afunctional sense. The essay on "The Tigers in 
India" shows the fallacy of this. James took as a case of concep­
tual knowledge, our knowledge of tigers in India for that, he said, 
involves "mental pointing." The pointing of our thought to the 
tigers is known simply and solely as a procession of mental asso­
ciates and motor consequences that follow on the thought and that 
would lead harmoniously, if followed out, into some ideal or real 
context, or even into the immediate presence of the tigers. It is 
known as our rejection of a jaguar, if that beast were shown us as
a tiger; as our assent to a genuine tiger if so shown. It is
known as our ability to utter all sorts of propositions which don't 
contradict other propositions that are true of the real tigers. It 
is even known, if we take the tigers very seriously, as actions of 
ours which may terminate in directly intuited tigers, as they 
would be if we took a voyage to India for the purpose of tiger-hunt­
ing and brought back a lot of skins of the striped rascals which we
had laid low. In all this there is no self-transcendency in our
mental images taken by themselves. They are one phenomenal fact;
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the tigerg are another; and. their pointing to the tigers i3 a per­
fectly commonplace intra-experiential relation, if you once grant 
a connecting world to be there," (Ibid. pp.44,45)
This account, which is typical of the difference which, 
James believed, exists between conceptual and perceptual knowl- 
edge, is one which a consistent pragmatist cannot accept. He rein­
terprets the "mental pointing." He believes that conceptual knowl­
edge differs from perceptual with reference to a constant, speci­
fiable quality, namely, that in conceptual knowledge the experience 
has among its other characteristics, the quality of being "present
as absent." There is no difference of kind between perceptual and 
conceptual knowledge; no emptiness of space or.time to be bridged 
by mediating knowledges before the concept can arrive at its termi­
nus, there is only a difference in the response of the organism 
to the experience which ha3 it in hand. This difference of re­
sponse can be definitely indicated. For one thing, one does not 
fear the tigers-pre sent-in-experience-as-absent-in-India, in the 
degree at least, that he fears tigers-pre sent-in-his-experience-as- 
ab Out-1o-p ounce-up on-him.
But the other idea, that conceptual knowledge involves 
a process of leading which must terminate in perceptual knowledge, 
as a type of which James used the Memorial Hall example, and the 
tigers-in-India problem is central to the group of essays pub­
lished after his death under the title "Some Problems of Philoso­
phy," It is the essence of "the Pragmatic Rule" as he here de­
fined it, namely, "that the meaning of a concept may always be 
found, if not in some sensible particular which it directly desig-
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nates, then in some particular difference in the course of human 
experience which its being true will make.” (Some Problems of 
Philosophy, p.60). It may not at first appear that this "Pragmatic 
Rule" is a restatement of the untenable thesis of "mental pointing" 
but this is what the volume goes to show. I will quote several of 
his definitions of percepts and concepts as typical and brief, al­
though to apprehend the full significance of the separation of the 
conceptual from the perceptual order one should read no less than 
the whole book. He said: "Perception is solely of the here and
now; conception is of the like and unlike, of the future, of the 
past, and of the far away. But this map of what surrounds the 
present, like all maps is only a surface; its features are but ab­
stract signs and symbols of things that in themselves are concrete 
bits of sensible experience." (Ibid, p.74) Then also, "whether 
our concepts live by returning to the perceptual world or not, 
they live by having come from it. It is the nourishing ground 
from which their sap is drawn." (Ibid, p.80) Still another quo­
tation shows th9 familiar distinction between the perceptual order, 
as direct and adequate face-to-face knowledge, and the conceptual 
order as mediating, abstract and remote knowledge-about. «This 
habit of telling what everything is becomes inveterate. The far­
ther we push it, the more we learn about our subject of discourse, 
and we end by thinking that knowing the latter always consists in 
getting farther and farther away from the perceptual type of ex­
perience." (Ibid.p.83) To this quotation I must add one more 
which shows unmistakably which way of knowing seemed to James to 
report reality more truly. He wrote: "But the concepts.... being
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thin extracts from perception are always insufficient representa­
tives thereof; and although they yield wider information, must 
never he treated after the rationalistic fashion, as if they gave 
a deeper quality of truth. The deeper features of reality are 
found only in perceptual experience."*(lb id.p.97)
I have endeavored to show what James meant by concept and 
percept. It is no less necessary to ascertain what he meant by 
reality for he spoke continually of percepts as able to terminate 
in reality. He seems to have meant by it the physical order. He 
spoke of the "real physical world" (Essays in Radical Empiricism, 
p.65), of the actual world as "the perceptual world" in contrast 
to the "wholly subjective world" of "mere daydreams and joys and 
sufferings and wishes of individual minds." (Ibid, p.66) And yet 
there remained the old impossibility, unless one were willing to 
take Kant's solution - of speaking of things as they are in them­
selves apart from experience. James did not meet the problem as 
squarely as his predecessors had done but confused the issue in 
this fashion: "The instant field of the present is always experi­
ence in its 'pure* state, plain unqualified actuality, a simple 
that. as yet undifferentiated into thing and thought and only vir­
tually classifyable as objective fact or as some one's opinion 
about fact." (Ibid.p.74) An so at last we must come to terms with 
the meaning of "pure experience."
As we have seen, James proposed a functional test by
which "pure experience" is broken apart into thoughts and realities.
"A 'mind' or a 'personal consciousness* is the name for a series
*It is hardly necessary to state that it is in statements like 
this that James's philosophical kinship to Bergson appears.
of experiences run together by certain definite transitions and an 
objective reality is a series of similar experiences knit by differ- 
ent transitions," (Ibid.p.80) If, however, we try to define "pure 
experience" which is not yet thought and not yet objective reality 
the sense of bewilderment grows upon us. James called it also "the 
perceptual order" and "the immediate flux of life" but he had al­
ready told us that the essence of the perceptual order is that it 
stands face to face with a reality in which it terminates. There­
fore, "pure experience" cannot be the same as the 'perceptual order' 
because it contains within itself in undifferentiated state the 
thought and the reality-thought-of which he had said it is the es­
sence of the perceptual order to oppose. Indeed "pure experience" 
out of which the stream of objective reality is to flow, as well 
as the stream of thought is as strange a contradiction as ever 
haunted philosophy. As it is neither thought, nor thing, being 
both at once, it is a third thing different from either of them. A 
pragmatist would know how to deal with "pure experience" for it is 
exactly what he means by consciousness; exactly what he means by 
an "object controlling behavior through the future," but James lost 
the right to a pragmatic interpretation by his definitions of thoughts 
and things. His dualism drives "pure experience" to take up its 
existence in some fourth dimensional world. Since it will not fit 
into the thought-order, or into the objective-order, it is an aware­
ness which defies examination, description and analysis. So it is 
that in the flowing robes of "pure experience" the ghosts of trans­
cendental sensations return to haunt the scenes of knowledge. This 
was the logical result, not a revolutionary step, in the progress
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from James's early view of the stream of thought,, and thence to the 
passing Thought, and now to "pure experience" or awareness out of 
which concrete things and thoughts are "to bud and grow."
We have already seen how inadequate was the test of 
stability of relationship by which "pure experience" was made to 
fall apart into things and thoughts. For instance, James said that 
so far as a pen is a stable feature in the world, "holds ink, marks 
paper and obeys the guidance of a hand, it is a physical pen. That 
is what we mean by being physical in a pen. So far as it is in­
stable, on the contrary, coming and going with the movements of my 
eyes, altering with what I call my fancy, continuous with subse­
quent experiences of its 'having been’ (in the past ), it is the 
percept of a pen in my mind. Those peculiarities are what we mean 
by being 'conscious' in a pen." (Ibid.p.124). But, one wonders 
what more stable physical relation could be required than the one 
James calls instabla, namely, the coming and going of the pen in 
direct correspondence to the movements of the eyes. If there were 
a real instability about the pen, it would mean that the person ob­
serving it would be confused and in doubt, for an instable experi­
ence is an unorganized experience; but by his definition of stabi­
lity James reinstated the very "block universe" against which he 
hurled his choicest anathemas.
Indeed so tyrannous was James's idea of the physical 
order as a stable reality opposed to thought that it wa3 little 
better than an Absolute. Take these sentences: "We were virtual 
knowers of the Hall long before we were certified to have been its 
actual knowers, by the percepts' retroactive validating power. Just
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ao we are •mortal’ all the time by reason of the virtuality of the 
inevitable event, which will make us 30 when it shall have coma." 
(Ibid, p.68) Then, because mistakes and fictions and utopias are 
the sort of things which have no place, even eventually, in the 
stable, physical order, James was under obligation to refrain from 
recognizing them, unless he should reconstruct his whole theory of 
knowledge and no longer think of it as a process constituted by 
its terminus. He did, however, give a large place to fancies and I 
cannot but hold him inconsistent in so doing. He said: "Most 
thought-paths, it is true, are substitutes for nothing actual, they 
end outside the real world altogether, in wayward fancies, Utopias, 
fictions and mistakes.n .(Ibid. p. 64)
When we come to a summary ana evaluation* of James's 
later view of consciousness it appears inadequate because James had 
missed the real significance of functionalism. His theory that the
* In studying the final phase of James’s theory of knowledge we 
cannot afford to ignore an article called "A Word More About Truth" 
in which he answered the critics who found that his theory of 
knowledge involved a "salto mortals." He 3poke despairingly of the 
lack of understanding which his view of cognition and truth had met, 
saying that "an ordinary philosopher would feel disheartened and a 
common choleric sinner would curse God and die after such a recep­
tion," (The Meaning of Truth,p.136). However instead of taking 
counsel of despair he would try to vary his statements, in the hope 
of better understanding, feeling, he said, that the fault must lie 
in hi3 lame form of statement and not in his doctrine. He com­
plained that his critics had taken his theory of knowing abstractly 
so that its "ambulatory" nature emptied of its concreteness ap­
peared "saltatory." Then followed hi3 restatement of this ambu­
latory relation in its concreteness. It does not differ from his 
view of consciousness of which the knowing of Memorial Hall by an 
idea is the type. He said, "I say that we know an object by means 
of an idea, whenever we ambulate towards the object under the im­
pulse which the idea communicates." (Ibid.p.140, cf. especially pp. 
140-144). But this answer to hi3 critics doe3 not answer consis­
tently pragmatic critics for they challenge his dualism as much 
in its concreteness a9 when abstract.
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end known creates the function of knowing, introduced an idea of 
leading which was meaningless and confused cognition with verifica­
tion. Since, however, verification depends upon a prior definition 
of meaning, James was exposed to uncertainty on that side a3 well, 
as the critics of his theory of the true as the satisfactory, have 
easily shown. Finally James's theory of thought as a leading to­
ward reality, condemned him to the logical conclusion that complete 
knowledge, or arrest of leading, must be unconsciousness, when 
thought and thing are identical, or that if not unconsciousness, 
complete knowledge must be a direct correspondence of thing and 
thought, a position open to all the criticisms of ordinary dual­
ism. "Pure experience" is the ambiguous phrase with which Jame3 
evaded the alternatives, but the evasion was of the logic only, 
and not of the difficulty.
So James failed in his attempt to reinterpret dualism. It 
remained the old enigma in spite of him. Moreover, because he was 
working on the dualistic level, the pragmatism which he defined, is 
not an adequate explanation of the problem of knowledge, but is at 
best, a new name for traditional ways of thinking.
INSTINCT AND ATTENTION
In 1904 James delivered the presidential address to the 
American Psychological Association on "The Experience of Activity." 
It was an echo, persisting thus to the close of his life, of the 
profound impression made upon him in his earlier thinking by the 
philosophy of Renouvier. (cf. "Notes of a Son and Brother," by 
Henry James,p.264). James sought to treat this subject of activity 
concretely and empirically and failed to see that it was an ab­
straction which he was so eagerly habilitating in concrete details. 
He even took occasion to deny that it was an abstraction in a note
appended to this address when it was printed. He wrote: "I have
found myself more than once accused in print of being the assertor 
of a metaphysical principle of activity. Since literary misunder­
standings retard the settlement of problems, I should like to say 
that such an interpretation of the pages I have published on Effort 
and on Will is absolutely foreign to what I meant to express.(Prin­
ciples of Psychology, Vol.II.Chap.XXVI) I owe all my doctrines 
on this subject to Renouvier; and Renouvier, as I understand him,
is, (or at any rate then was) an out and out phenomenist, a denier
of forces in the most strenuous sense." ^Essays in Radical Em­
piricism," pp.184-185 note)
In the face of this it may seem that I am indeed mis­
understanding James to assert that in this address on "The Ex­
perience of Activity," as well as in his earlier discussions of in­
stinct, of attention and of the will, I find that he did stand 
sponsor for a "metaphysical principle of activity," as blind as 
Schopenhauer's Will, and as destructive of calcuiability as Berg-
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"Elan Vital." I shall return briefly to the address on"Ths Experi­
ence of Activity" at the close of the present chapter, outlining 
first James's position on the subjects of instinct and attention 
and reserving for the following chapter a study of the will.
With delightful ease and wit Jame3 dismissed that treat­
ment of instinct which finds in it the mystery of great prophetic 
power. Such a treatment was Pope's, when, in the "Essay on Man," 
he found in instinct an argument for design and credited "the na­
tions of the field and flood" with prescience of tempests and of 
tides. James recognized in instincts, quite as pragmatists must, 
the simplest type of intelligence. He emphasized the fact, more­
over, that it fa a next-to-next procedure, and that the end obeyed 
is always particular and not abstract. His statement of this is in 
his most pleasingly concrete style. "A very common way of talking
about these admirably definite tendencies to act is by naming ab-
I V
stractly the purpose they subserve, such as self-preservation, or 
defence, or care for egg3 and young and saying that the animal has 
an instinctive fear of death or love of life, or that she has an 
instinct of self-preservation, or an instinct of maternity and the 
like. But this represents the animal as obeying abstractions, 
which not once in a million cases is it possible it can have framed* 
The strict psychological way of interpreting the facts leads to far 
clearer results. The actions we call instinctive all conform to 
the general reflex type! they are called forth by determinate sen­
sory stimuli in contact with the animal's body, or at a distance in 
his environment. The cat runs after the mouse, runs or shows
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fight before the dog, avoids falling from walls and trees, shuns 
fire and water, etc., not because he has any notion either of life,
or of death, or of self, or of preservation....... He acts in each
case separately and simply because he cannot help it, being so 
framed that when that particular running thing called a mouse, ap­
pears in hi3 field of vision he must pursue; and when that parti­
cular, barking and obstreperous thing called a dog appears there, 
he must retire, if at a distance, and scratch if close by; that he
mus t withdraw his feet from water and his face from flame".... etc.
(Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 383-384)
"It takes," said James, quoting Berkeley, "a mind de­
bauched by learning, to a3k the why of any instinctive act. The com­
mon man can only say, * Of course we smile, of course our heart pal­
pitates at the sight of the crowd, of course we love the maiden"... 
To the broody hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that 
there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs 
was not the utterly fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too- 
much-sat-upon object which it is to her." (Ibid.p.387)
The last sentence in this description of instinct has,in 
particular, a decidedly pragmatic ring. This effect is increased 
by his observation that higher forms of consciousness seem to arise 
directly from contrary instincts. "The animal that exhibits them 
loses the instinctive*_demeanor and appears to lead a life of hesi­
tation and choice, an intellectual life; not however because__he
has no instincts, rather because he has so many that they block 
each others path. (Ibid, p. 39 3) But James did not use these fruit­
ful pragmatic observations, in his definition of instinct, and
r.....-■■■ ---- --  —
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precisely because he did not use them he was forced to introduce 
a "metaphysical principle of activity."
His initial definition of instinct instructs us as to the 
cause of his failure. He said that "instinct is usually defined as 
the faculty of acting in such a wayas to produce certain ends. 
without foresight of the ends and without previous education in the 
performance." (Ibid.p. 383) As it stands this negative definition 
does not distinguish between instinctive and reflex action,which 
also produces certain ends without foresight of the ends and with­
out previous education in the performance. James said that instinc­
tive actions "are called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in con* 
tact with the animal's body, or at a distance in the environment" 
(Ibid.p.384) but he failed to add that these stimuli differ from the 
merely mechanical which induce reflex action by being meaningful. 
Meaning for consciousness-as-instinct, is, to be sure, limited 
to an extremely short span of the future - it is merely, next! 
and is therefore distinguishable from meaning for conscioussness- 
as-intellect, which may expand "in saecula saeculorum." But 
having neglected in his negative statement of instinctive action 
to specify that the stimulus is meaningful James was led to re­
introduce the very element of mystery which he so eloquently 
laughed out of consideration. He needed only to generalize the- 
never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon nestful of eggs for the type of 
this meaningful stimulus, but failing to do this he was forced 
to put the "push" entirely in the nervous organism, with no 
recognition that this is a first case of the control of conduct 
by an object which has a quality of futurity. James's explanation 
of instinct was, as we have seen, that each animal is "so framed"
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that it acts in a certain way by necessity. This is very well as 
far as it goes, which is merely to the point of stating the prob­
lem, and James's next step was to say that"every instinct is an 
impulse" (Ibid.p.385) and then, that "Nature implants contrary 
impulses" and on the whole Nature says to "her fishy children, 
bite at every worm and take your chances. (Ibid.p.392) I cannot 
see that explanation is furthered more by the mystery of impulses 
implanted by Nature than by the former mystery of fishes and fowls
K -
provided by Providence with a knowledge of tides and tempests. It
is not so large a piece of mystery, to be sure, but is, neverthe-
less, a fragment of that same magic carpet.
And James insisted that impulses are blind. He wrote: 
"Thus, greediness and suspicion, curiosity and timidity, coyness
and desire, bashfuiness and vanity, sociability and pugnacity, seem
%
to shoot over each other a3 quickly, and to remain in as unstable 
equilibrium, in the higher birds and mammals as in man. They are 
all impulses, congenital, blind at first, and productive of motor 
reactions of a rigorously determinate sort." (Ibid, p.392) And 
the following statement is also significant, "Han has a far greater 
variety of impulses than any lower animal; and anyone of these im­
pulses, taken in itself, is as blind as the lowest instinct can be; 
but owing to man's memory, power of reflection, and power of in- 
ference, they come each one to be felt by him, after he has once 
yielded to them and experienced their results, in connection with 
a foresight of those results. In this condition an impulse acted 
out, may be said to be acted out, in part at least, for the sake of
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its results. It is obvious that every instinctive act, in an ani­
mal with memory._must cease to be 'blind'_after being once repeated,.
and must be accompanied with foresight of its 'end' just so far as 
that end may have fallen under the animal's cognizance."(Ibid.p.390) 
The difficulty with this description is that it introduces 
a third sort of action between mechanical and conscious action, 
namely, "blind," though conscious, impulses. This is a curious 
contradiction in terms, for we have seen that conscious action, 
means action directed by foresight, so that an impulse, if con­
scious, can hardly be also "blind." It must, if conscious, and 
James would be the first to deny that it is merely mechanical, 
involve interest and attention, which means a reconstruction of the 
stimulus in such a fashion as to provide before hand for an act.
The bone or the glove which the puppy buries is some-thing-to-be- 
hidden, and that he does not discriminate between them marks how 
shortsighted the impulse is; but between an action characterized 
by shortness of vision, and blindness, there lies all the difference 
between instinctive and mechanical behavior,*
*An article by Dewey on "The Theory of Emotion:" (Psychological 
Review.Sept.1894 and January,1895) Suggests a biological interpre­
tation of instinct and emotion. In it he holds that every instinc­
tive act directly serves self-preservation;and the emotion which 
is so inseparable a part of such activity is due to the tension of 
suppressed activity. Dewey makes this summary of his position:"Cer­
tain movements, formerly useful in themselves, become reduced to 
tendencies to action, to attitudes. As such they serve, when in­
stinctively aroused into action, as means for realizing ends. But 
so far as there is difficulty in adjusting the organic activity 
represented by the attitude with that which stands for the idea or 
end, there is temporary struggle and partial inhibition. This i3 
reported as affect.or emotional seizure. Let the coordination be 
effected in one act, instead of in a successive series of mutually 
exclusive stimuli, and we have interest. Let such coordinations be­
come thoroughly habitual and hereditary and we have gefiihlston. " 
(Op.cit.P.32 ). This position is of far reaching importance for
Just as James had recourse to a "metaphysical principle of 
activity under the name of blind impulse in his discussion of in­
stinct, so, in his discussion of attention, he introduced a like 
principle. He said that it is strange that "so potent a fact as the 
perpetual presence of selective attention has received hardly any 
notice from psychologists of the English Empiricist school." (Ibid. 
Vol. I.p.402) His explanation for this neglect on their part was 
that attention involves a measure of spontaneous activity which is 
incompatible with the idea of all experience raining down upon a 
purely passive and receptive mind through the avenues of sense. He 
concluded that the empiricist writers "have, then,utterly ignored 
the glaring fact that subjective interest, may, by laying its 
weighty index-finger on the particular items of experience, 30 ac­
cent them as to give to the least frequent associations far more 
power to 3hape our thought than the most frequent ones possess"
(Ibid, p. 403) - Subjective interest with its weighty index-finger, 
which "makes experience more than it is made by it"(Ibid.p.403) is 
the new form which the "metaphysical principle of activity" takes.
He was talking in cases of attention not of interesting objects but 
of a subject with an interest.
This belief in subjective interest marked his definition
of attention. "Everyone knows,"James said,"what attention is. It is
the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one
out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains
♦(Cont.from P.107) pragmatism in regard to its central docttine of 
consciousness. Since pragmatism makes of instinct the simplest form 
of consciousness,it must be prepared to carry this biological inter- 
prstation even into the most highly developed forms of conscious­
ness, ^ enj oyment of music, willingness to die for country,devotion 
to philosophical problems. And this,by-the-way,it finds no incon­
gruity in doing.
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of thought. Focalization, concentration of consciousness are its 
essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
effectively with others, and is a condition which has a real oppo­
site in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state which in French is 
called distraction and Zerstreutheit in German. " ( Ibid.pp. 403, 404) 
This definition introduces to us a knower with arbitrary selective 
power over "what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought." It is the recurrence of the fifth character­
istic of the stream of thought which is, James said, "always inter­
ested m ore in one part of its object than in another, and welcomes 
or rejects, or chooses all the while it thinks.? (Ibid.p.284) There 
also he represented the mind as "a theatre of simultaneous possi­
bilities" and said that "consciousness consists in the comparison 
of these with each other, the selection of some and the suppression 
of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of attention." 
(Ibid.p.388)
James made use of a striking figure to illustrate his 
meaning. He compared the mind to a sculptor at work on a block 
of marble. It is the sculptor who is alone responsible for extri­
cating one statue from all the thousand different ones beside it, 
which from eternity were possible. "Other sculptors, other statues 
from the same stone! Other mind3, other worlds from the same mono­
tonous and inexpressive chaos!" (Ibid.p.289) This is the final 
meaning of subjective interest with its weighty index finger which 
is the sculptor at work in an indifferent and neutral universe.
But this is only half of the story of attention, for
- 110-
James said that there is passive as well as voluntary attention. In 
the case of passive attention the interest is a quality of the ob­
ject. Speaking of the extreme mobility of attention in children 
he said, "This reflex and passive character of the attention, which, 
as a French writer says, makes the child seem to belong less to him­
self than to every object which happens to catch his notice is the 
first thing which the teacher must overcome. It never is overcome 
in some people, whose work to the end of life, gets done in the 
interstices of their mind-wandering." (Ibid.p.417)
It might 3eem at first sight that in this conception of 
passive attention James had come to a truly pragmatic attitude on 
the subject of the functional control of objects, but, again, 
because he missed the specific nature of this control, James had no 
standard by which to distinguish passive attention from a mechani­
cal reflex, and he saved voluntary attention from being mechanical 
only by means of a "metaphysical principle of activity" which he 
called subjective interest. The difficulty is this. He contrasted 
"passive,reflex, non-voluntary, effortless" attention with active 
and voluntary attention. It is on the quality of effort that the 
question turns. If perfectly "effortless," passive attention must 
pass into mechanical response,-it does so by the way constantly,for 
how many of us are even passively attentive to the familiar details 
of dressing? - but with even a modicum of effort, to save it from 
being mechanical action, it passes into voluntary attention. For if 
there is effort it means that the stimulus must be reconstructed 
even if it is only by the redirection of no more than two incom­
patible responses which it must reconcile in a further possible
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response, and this is the essence of volition. On the other hand 
take James’s case for voluntary attention. He said that it is often 
necessary to launch oneself by a determined effort (v.ibid.p.419) 
into the stream of passive attention which "bears one along without 
the least distraction." We have in this the phenomenon of "subjec­
tive interest," often identified with the will, directing a reluc­
tant mind to uninteresting things. James said: "All forms of at­
tentive effort would be exercised at once by one whom we might sup­
pose at a dinner party resolutely to listen to a neighbor giving 
him insipid and unwelcome advice in a low voice, whilst all around 
the guests were loudly laughing and talking about exciting and in­
teresting things." (Ibid.p.420) Naturally it is hard for the dinner 
guest to sustain such voluntary attention, and one effort of will 
after another is necessary to drag the uninteresting object back 
to the focus of attention. Even such measures, James said, will not 
avail if the objects thus forcibly brought back do not develop. Some 
objects, he said, do not develop, "they simply go out"(Ibid.p.421) 
and then the mind has nothing to do but iro follow willy-nilly what­
ever interesting objects solicit it. As before we found passive 
attention breaking down into voluntary, we now find to our confu­
sion, that voluntary attention, that is, subjective determination 
of attention versus objective, is led away captive by objects. The 
position yields to attack on another side also. If the object does 
not develop, then the attention follows, as we have seen, some ob­
ject which does, but if the object does develop, "bud and sprout 
and grow"(Ibid. p. 42 3) then there is no fear of lapsing attention,to 
be sure, but also no room for voluntary attention, for such absorp-
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tion in an object is passive attention again.
Thus James's view of attention falls into a strange and 
self destructive circle. Passive attention, as he defined it, is 
an impossible conception, for if truly effortless it is identical 
with mechanical action, but if ever so slightly touched with effort 
it is not different from voluntary attention. Voluntary attention, 
in its turn, appears to be a mistaken way of writing volition plus 
attention or objective control of behavior. And this, with the 
examples James used, immediately suggests the pragmatic interpreta­
tion of attention. If the nature of the objective control is the 
effortless type described by James as passive attention, the vi­
ciousness of the circle is evident, but if it is not that, then one 
must be able to specify some other and adequate type of control. 
This the pragmatist does calling it control by meaning and this 
James did not do and he therefore had to throw upon "subjective in­
terest" the whole burden of difference between mechanical and con­
scious action.
This leaves us with the curious result that apparently 
neither for James nor for the consistent pragmatist could there 
properly be a distinction between consciousness and attention at 
all. According to James "subjective interest" seemed to be another 
name for will and voluntary attention seemed to mean that the will 
could initiate a new direction of thought, or motivate an existent 
thought stream independently of the object. But as a matter of 
fact we do distinguish between consciousness and attention and be­
tween active and passive attention and the pragmatist, no less
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than James., is under the challenge of common-sense to explain this 
distinction. James made the distinction possible by the metaphor 
of focus and margin. He believed that subjective interest played, 
so to speak, like a search light upon an object. The center of 
interest he called the focus by analogy with the focus of light, aid 
about it he spoke of a margin of dim interest. He expressed a simi­
lar idea under the metaphor of nucleus and fringe, but it was the 
former figure which he had in mind when he spoke of the essence of 
attention as focalization and concentration of consciousness. He 
conceived of it as a power of the mind whereby a part of the en­
vironment is marked off from the rest and therefore, at times,spoke 
of it as a selective agency identical with volition (v. ibid.p. 447) 
But it is open to question whether even from the side of vision the 
figure of the focus does not mislead. Assuredly one can see a 
blur, as he can also be conscious of a confusion, but seeing a 
blur is not necessarily a case of dim vision, or being conscious 
of confusion of dim consciousness. The conception of the focus 
and margin of consciousness, implying that the objects within the 
focus have been selected by the search-light of attention and that 
those in the margin are in the limbo of "unconscious consciousness" 
where attention penetrates but feebly, is due to a static interpre­
tation of knowing.
As a matter of fact to speak correctly of the focus and 
margin in an experience involves a reading backwards and the appli­
cation of some experience as a standard. When once we have arrived 
at the goal of a fact we can look back at our previous experiences 
and see that some of them offered inadequate cues to lead us to­
ward the fact. The standard by which we judge another experience
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to be marginal is that of adequate meaning for the purpose as ac­
complished. The mere sight of an object on the horizon is marginal 
from the standpoint of the later experience of the pilot in recog­
nizing it as a ship, and this again is marginal from the standpoint 
of identifying the particular ship. The pilot in the first instance 
clearly recognized an object on the horizon, and that experience is 
"dim" only when tested by a standard of more complete identification.
Similarly the distinction between consciousness and atten­
tion turns on a later interprotation of any given experience. If 
while writing this paper I "hear" but do not "attend" to the noises 
about me and if I "feel" but do not "attend" to the temperature of
the room and the texture of the paper under my hand, it means that
my total organic adjustment takes account of these things but that 
they are not pivotal. The aspect of the situation which is pivotal 
depends upon my purpose. Any sudden change in my environment, 
causing, as it does, an equally sudden need for organic readjust­
ment, may make that become pivotal which was not before. It is 
then that I contrast the two experiences and say that, while con­
scious of this aspect all the while, I was not attending to it until 
now. For instance the ventilating system in the building where I 
study, causes a low whirring sound as the air is forced into the 
room. All morning long I may work without ever attending to that 
sound but at noon when the fans are stopped I "hear the difference" 
at once. How could I "hear the difference" if I had not been con­
scious, or sub-conscious of the sound? is a question which is fre­
quently asked. Pragmatism answers that in this case, my total ad­
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justment was to an environment whose central interest was in a prob­
lem in philosophy, and that my body was functioning as a unit to 
farther that interest, eyes were to-see-not the spring sunshine out­
side, ears to-hear-not any noises, nor was my nose to 3mell the 
perfume of earth and growing things just outside the open windows. 
But when a sudden silence came,, or a startling noise broke in, 
at once the smoothness of the total adjustment was broken and a new 
adjustment had to be made before the old interest in philosophy 
could be central again. However, it is not strictly true, even in 
retrospect, to say that I was conscious of some aspect of my en­
vironment even though I was not attending to it. It is true only 
in this sense that any adjustment to a central interest, takes the 
color of the total adjustment of which it is a part. Herein we 
find the secrets of those moods which come with gray days, of the 
enervation of uncongenial surroundings, of that distraction of 
thought which is born of disorder. But attention stands in con­
trast to consciousness because in a later judgment of two experi­
ences we see this difference of central interest in adjustment to 
environments which differ in this one particular, and we then tele­
scope the two experiences and declare that total adjustment means 
being conscious of aspects to which we were not attending. Properly 
understood however attention is a name for the fact, discovered in 
retrospect, that consciousness, or the mutual adjustment of stimulus 
and response,varies from moment to moment. This novelty of experi­
ence gives rise to contrasts of purpose and the fact that purposes
are discriminated from each other is attention.
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Finally the distinction between passive and voluntary 
attention may also be maintained. In the first place just so long 
as the responses are perfectly smooth, there is no consciousness, 
it is a touch-and-go affair of mechanical response; with complica­
tion a passive consciousness arises, getting along not without ef­
fort but with a minimum. It is then that organic responses flow 
easily, dreamily, with a stream of easily organized meanings. In 
voluntary attention however the object to be organized is more com­
plicated and effort rises to a maximum. Passive attention means 
that the central purpose is steady and that the organization of the 
responses may be effected smoothly and easily because of the har­
monious nature of the object. Such an object absorbs us and has 
its way with us. But let a division take place in the object, then 
a remote end must struggle with one more immediate. The business 
of consciousness is to legislate between those two and we are, as 
we say, "in-two minds what to do." This process of organization, 
which includes subordination, may come to a sharp and distinct con­
flict, which is the characteristic of voluntary attention. So,far 
from having, as James thought an uninteresting object with which 
to deal in voluntary attention, we have an object with rival inter­
ests, some great, some petty, but all clamorous for acceptance.
"But",said James, "whether the attention come by grace of 
genius or by dint of will, the longer one does attend to a topic 
the more mastery of it one has; and the faculty of voluntarily bring­
ing back a wandering attention, over and over again, is the very 
root of judgment, character and will." (Ibid, p.424) Consistent
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pragmatism can accept this statement if it is reinterpreted in func­
tional terms. The control of conduct by consistent, permanent and 
worthy interests is character, and is "the very root of judgment," 
and, as shall appear later is the only explanation for freedom of 
the will.
The effects of attention as enumerated by James are to 
make us perceive, conceive, distinguish and remember better than 
we otherwise could and to shorten reaction time. In support of this 
James cited many of the familiar experiments in reaction time which 
are performed in psychological laboratories. These experiments 
fit well with the pragmatic explanation of consciousness. Preper­
ception, understood as organization of response in anticipation of 
a given stimulus naturally shortens the period of reaction time.
This illustrates what the pragmatist means by saying that the organi­
zation takes place equally in the object (as meaning) and in the 
organism (as bodily "set"). The object is to be a stimulus of a 
certain character, and prsperception means that a bodily response 
to the object so organized is already on the way before the signal 
is given. The object has been given a chance to control while still 
present-as-absent.
James said that experiments show that reaction-time i3 
shorter when the observer concentrates his attention on the ex­
pected movement than when h9 concentrates it on the expected signal, 
in other words,on the answer rather than on the question, provided 
he knows in a general way in advance the kind of stimulus he is to 
receive (v.ibid.pp.432,433) He 3aid "It is a beautiful example of
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the summation of stimulations, and of the way in which expec­
tant attention, even when not very strongly focalized, will pre­
pare the motor centres, and shorten the work which a stimulus haj3 
to perform on them, in order to produce a given effect when it 
comes. "(Ibid p. 434). This comment shows how near, and how far, 
Jamas was from approaching a functional view of consciousness. 
There is something wooden about a "summation of stimulations" 
and a focalized attention preparing motor centres before the 
stimulus has come. The mistake which James was making here was 
in thinking that expectant attention was a voluntary activity 
resident in the actor and not a part of the control already 
being exerted by the stimulus as a 3ignal-about-to-come. Fixing 
attention on the answer, whether word or movement, means not to 
neglect the nature of the stimulus, but to respond to it as a 
stimulus already highly organized with meaning almost unambiguous.
Because James kept these two distinct factors in 
attention, namely,- organic adaptation and ideational preparation- 
he was obliged to face the problem of freedom. "Is voluntary 
attention a resultant or a force?" He said "When a few pages 
back, I symbolized 'the ideational preparation element in 
attention by a brain-cell played upon from within, I added 
•by other brain-cells or by some spiritual force* without deciding 
which. The question 'which' is one of those central psychologic 
mysteries which part the schools "(Ibid p. 447).
Upon this self-put question James's whole chapter on 
attention stands or falls. In voluntary attention have we what
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Jaraes called a spiritual force (v.Ibid p. 454) or is attention 
just a concomitant feature "the dull rattling off of a chain that ) 
was forged innumerable ages ago?" (v. ibid p. 453). If the 
latter, voluntary attention d.nd effort and freedom become il­
lusions, if the former the whole subject of attention escapes 
from the earth of science and philosophy into the pale heaven of 
the mysteries. But James was caught in the contradictions of one 
of the world's most ancient of foolish questions. His trouble 
came because he put a sharp line of cleavage between the object 
and the agent in the conscious situation. h 9 failed to see that 
the effort is in two places at once, and that just as push and 
pull are always equal in the physical world, that just so the 
effort in the organism is the counterpart of the reorganization 
going on in the object.
This mistaken view of attention as a "metaphysical 
principle of activity" becomes very clear in connection with 
James's discussions of conceptual thinking. He wrote: "Each 
act of conception results from our attention singling out some 
one part of the mass of matter for thought which the world 
presents, and holding fast to it without confusion"(I bid, p.461). 
He said also, speaking of the same topic, "Everyone of our 
conceptions is of something which our attention originally tore 
out of the continuum of felt experience and provisionally isolated 
so as to make of it an individual topic of discourse"(Ibid, p. 
465). Attention tearing conceptions out of the continuum of felt 
experience is a subjective force at work upon a meaningless world,
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corresponding to the sculptor at work upon a block of marble.
This is the view, too, of the final chapter of the psychology 
where James said he should at considerable length defend the 
mind*3 claim to originality and fertility in bringing forth 
conceptions of relations and imposing them upon the flux. In 
a footnote he gave picturesque expression to this view.
"The conceiving or theorizing faculty works exclus­
ively for the sake of ends that do not exist at all in the 
world of the impressions received by way of our senses, but are 
set by our emotional and practical activity. It is a transform­
er of the world of our impressions into a totally different 
world, the world of our conception; and the transformation is 
effected in the interests of our volitional nature, and for
no other purpose whatsoever:......... The world's contents are
given to each of us in an order so foreign to our subjective 
interests that we can hardly by an effort of the imagination
picture to ourselves what it is like..........The real world
as it is given at this moment is the sum total of all its 
beings and events now. But can we think of such a sum? Can 
we realize for an instant what a cross-section of all existence 
at a definite point of time would be? While I talk and the 
flies buzz, a sea gull catches a fish at the mouth of the 
Amaz on, a tree falls in the Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes 
in Germany, a horse dies in Tartary and twins are born in Francs. 
What does that mean? Does the contemporaneity of these events 
with each other and with a million more as disjointed as they>
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form a rational bond between them, and unite them into anything 
that means for us a world? Yet just such a collateral contem­
poraneity and nothing else is the real order of the world. It 
is an order with which we have nothing to do but to get away 
from it as fast as possible. As I said, we break it; we break 
it into histories; and we break it into arts; and we break it 
into sciences; and then we begin to feel at home?....(Ibid, 
vol.II, pp. 634, 635.).
It is in quotations such as this that one sees the 
startling conclusions which follow from admitting in knowledge 
the existence of a "metaphysical principle of activity" such 
as subjective interest with its weighty index finger.. That 
it may have a function, the universe itself must become mean­
ingless. But as a matter of fact we know that a cross-section 
of experience, tp use James’s figure, would not give us mere 
meaningless coexistences. The present is for each of us, 
exactly such a cross-section of experience and the world content 
then given to each of us is full of meaning, which we find but 
do not superimpose. The present, for a conscious being, is 
permeated with futurity and this light of the dawn is what 
distinguishes the world of intelligence from the dark world of 
mechanical response. This, then, i3 the far-reaching conse­
quence of the assumption of subjective interest, namely, that 
the real world has to become meaaingless before the sculptor 
and his chisel.
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In his 03say on "The Experience of Activity" from which 
I have already quoted a footnote in which James disclaimed any 
belief in a "metaphysical principle of activity", James was 
dealing with a genuine problem. He was casting about him for the 
pragmatic motivation of experience. Witness his questions.
"What in the will enables it to act thua? And these trains of 
experience themselves, in which activities appear, what makes 
them jgo, at all? Does the activity in one bit of experience bring 
the next bit into being?" (Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 171). 
The chief merit of the article is that it raises questions such 
as these. In so far as James attempted to answer them I feel 
that his answers pointed backward to the same dualism of "impulse* 
and "subjective interest" as existed in the psychology. For he 
said in closing that "these questions lead us, however, into 
that region of panpsychic and ontologic speculation of which 
Professors Bergson and Strong have lately enlarged the literature 
in so able and interesting a way. The results of these authors 
seem in many respects dissimilar, and I understand them as yet 
but imperfectly; but I cannot help suspecting that the direction 
of their work is very promising and that they have the hunter’s 
instinct for the fruitful trails." (Ibid, p. 189).
Those who have followed the work of these writers know 
that their "fruitful trails" lead to nothing so directly as to 
subj activism.
- 1 2 3 -
THE WILL
It is because of his doctrine of the will, as well as 
his doctrine of truth, that James, and with him American prag­
matists as a group, have been considered closely allied to French 
voluntarists and anti-intellectualists. I am convinced that as 
directed against James the charge ha3 a large measure of truth, 
because in spite of his denial, his philosophy undoubtedly har­
bored1^  metaphysical principle of activity", appearing in will as 
"subjective determination" as it appeared in instinct as "blind 
impulse", and in attention as "subjective interest". I am 
equally convinced that this element is foreign to the pragmatism 
of such a thinker as Dewey, and, I may add, it is foreign to 
pragmatism as taught and accepted by the large group of prag­
matists in American universities; for in adhering more and more 
closely to Dewey’s position, pragmatism is becoming less and less 
the protean entity which a distinguished critic has called it.
Beginning with James’s treatment of the will in the 
psychology, we find it a topic of many-sided interest. He ap­
proached it from the physiological, the psychological, the ethi­
cal and the metaphysical points of view. Side by side with 
eloquent practical advice for training the will are scientific 
charts and diagrams. It is an inspiring chapter to be read with 
a glow of admiration for the deep insight into character and the 
willing spirit of tolerant investigation. The crucial philosoph­
ical problem raised by the subject of volition, centers about the
conflict which James sketched between subjective determination, 
or the fiat, on one side, and ideo-raotor action on the other.
This conflict reappeared in his later work in an article entitled 
"The Dilemma of Determinism"
As a preliminary statement of beliaf in subjective 
determination, we find this: "There is indeed the fiat, the
element of consent, or resolve that the act shall ensue. Thi3 
doubtless to the reader’s mind, as to my own, constitutes the 
essence of the voluntariness of the act". (Principles of Psych­
ology, Vol. II, p. 501). "Ef fort of attention." James said,
"is thug the essential phenomenon of will". (Ibid, p. 562).
This he carefully distinguished from muscular effort, saying, for 
example, that the volitional effort of getting out of bed and 
bathing one’s self on a cold morning may be great, although the 
muscular exertion involved is insignificant.. From this and 
similar observations volitional effort easily took the name of 
mental effort in contrast to muscular", (v. Ibid, p. 563,"The 
difficulty is mental".) The slippery incline from volitional 
to subjective by way of mental is one to test the logic of an 
exceedingly wary man, James frankly fell. He said: "To sum it 
all up in a word, the terminus of the psychological process in 
volition, the p_oint t£ which the will ij3 always applied is always
an idea....... I have put the thing in this ultra-simple way
because I want more than anything else to emphasize the fact 
that volition is primarily a relation, not between our self and 
extra-mental matter (as many philosophers still maintain) but
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between our self and our own states of mind" (Ibid, pp. 567-568).
I will add one further quotation to make this subjective 
attitude perfectly clear. James wrote, "and I freely confess that 
I am impotent to carry the analysis of the matter any further, or 
to.explain in other terms of what this consent consists. It 
seems a subjective experience sui generis. which we can designate
but not define..........And the transition from merely considering
an object as possible, to deciding or willing it to be real;; the 
change from the fluctuating to the stable personal attitude concern­
ing it; from the 'don't care' stats of mind to that in which'we 
mean business', is one of the most familiar things in life. We can 
partly enumerate its conditions, and we can partly trace its con­
sequences, especially the momentous one that when the mental object 
is a movement of our own body it realizes itself outwardly when the 
mental change in question ha3 occurred. But the change itself as 
a subjective phenomenon is something which we can translate into 
no simpler terms". (Ibid, pp. 568-569).
But before this discussion of subjective determination 
James wrote some important pages upon ideo-motor action. By the 
latter he meant the sequence of motion upon the mere thought of 
it, as the simplest type of volition. For instance, "whilst talk­
ing I become conscious of a pin on the floor, or of some dust on 
my sleeve. Without interrupting the conversation I brush away the 
dust or pick up the pin". (Ibid, p. 522). But, James said, "just 
as the bare presence of one idea prompts a movement, so the bare 
presence of another idea will prevent its taking place". (Ibid, p. 
527). In- just such cases of inhibition by conflict he believed
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that a fiat must enter to remove one of the obstructing ideas, 30 
that action can again become ideo-motor.
We cannot be too careful in ascertaining James's meaning 
in this apparently simple position. It is highly desirable to know 
first, what he meant by a mere "thought of a movement", and then, 
also, what he meant by the bare presence of such a thought. He 
defined "the idea of a movement" negatively by saying that it is 
not "the thought of the innervation which the movement requires". 
Then positively, "it is the anticipation of the movements' sensible 
effects, resident or remote and sometimes very remote indeed. Such 
anticipations, to say the least, determine what our movements shall 
be". (Ibid, p. 521).
By a "resident sensation" James meant a kinaesthetic im­
pression made upon muscles and joints by some actual motion, such, 
for example, as extending one's hand; by "remote sensation" a kin- 
aesthetic impression made by the movement, "on the eye, or ear, or 
distant skin" (Ibid, p. 518) as, for instance, the chiming of the 
words on his mental ear as he wrote. The latter class he considered 
by far the most important, as we are interested in"the ends which 
the movement is to attain". (Ibid, p. 519). These ends James 
represented as sensations. According to this I might say that I 
write the word "blue" because I have a sensation of blue chiming 
upon my mental ear;I brush away the dust because of the bare present 
of the sensation of dust. But i3 this true? Do we, as a matter of 
fact, ever experience either resident or remote sensations, which 
are according, to this position taken by James, and borrowing the 
phrase from Dewey, "self-enclosed particulars", ultimates of feeling
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tha very atoms of consciousness? To avoid needless repetition I 
refer the reader at this point to the third chapter of this 
monograph and the discussion there of this subject of sensation.
Here I shall assart dogmatically that such sensations are never 
experienced. One may, however, experience the dust as something- 
to-be-brushed away-, that is, in terms of a simple future response, 
and of that conception I find hints in James’s treatment at this 
point, hints which entail a serious ambiguity. His initial 
position was that upon the visual impression of a dust fleck upon 
the retina (a remote sensation) there follows a movement. Thus 
"remote sensation" plays a double role, first as a present sensa­
tion preceding action, and in the second place, as a desired sensa­
tion to be reached by action. It is thought of in the first way 
when described as "a bare presence of an idea", in the second way 
when more dynamically described as a "mental cue", and"the 
anticipation of the movement's sensible effects".
In addition to the ambiguity thus inherent in the 
position that in ideo-motor action "the bare-presence of the idea" 
induces the action, because in one instance the "bare presence" 
i8 taken mechanically, in a second instance dynamically, there 
remains the fact that the dynamic element introduced in the second 
instance is inconsistent with the very notion of a sensation. To 
mix them is to try to mix oil and water. A sensation, as defined
in philosophical fiction, is confined to the present as a cor­
relate of some neural activity at a given instant. To call it 
an anticipation of a movement because it is correlated with a
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neural activity which is afterwards found to culminate by serial 
stages in the movement, is to give it in retrospect a function it 
could not, by definition, have had in process. Yet this James did. 
He said: "The express fiat, or act of mental consent to the move­
ment comes in when the neutralization of the antagonistic and in­
hibitory idea is required. But that there is no express fiat needed 
when the conditions are simple, the reader ought now to be con­
vinced. Lest, however, he should still share the common prejudice 
that voluntary action 'without exertion of will power' is Hamlet 
with the prince's part left out, I will make a few further remarks. 
The first point to start from in understanding voluntary attention 
and the possible occurence of it with no fiat or express resolve is 
the fact that consciousness is in its very nature impulsive. We do 
not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add something 
dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse of feeling which we 
have is the correlate of some neural activity that is already on its 
way to instigate a movement. Our sensations and thoughts are but 
cross-sections, as it were, of currents whose essential consequence 
is motion and which no sooner run in at one nerve than they run out 
at another. The popular notion that mere consciousness as such is 
not essentially a fore-runner of activity, that the latter must 
result from superadded 'will-force, ' is a very natural inference 
from these special cases in which we think of an act for an in­
definite length of time without the action taking place. These 
cases, however, are not the norm; they are cases of inhibition by 
antagonistic thoughts. When the blocking is released we feel as if
an inward spring were let loose, and this Ì3 the additional im­
pulse or f iat upon which the act effectively succeeds." (Ibid.pp. 
526-527)
Unless one keeps clearly in mind this mechanical or at 
best "ambulatory" nature of anticipation which the "bare presence" 
of an idea, as a mental correlate of neural activity., carried for
James, - it was again just "the faithful psychic concomitant" of
*
changing brainstates, - he may be misled into attributing more 
pragmatism to James than a strict interpretation can allow. James 
may seem particularly pragmatic to the casual reader when speaking, 
as he does in this chapter, of objective determination of conduct. 
To be explicit, in the first of the five types of decision dis­
tinguished by James the part played by the object is specifically 
mentioned. This James called the reasonable type. He wrote: "In 
this easy transition from doubt to assurance we seem to ourselves 
almost passive; the reasons which decide us appearing to flow in 
from the nature of things, and to owe nothing to our will." (Ibid. 
p.531). Moreover the other types of decision, not excepting that 
where an express fiat is necessary, lend themselves to this ob­
jective interpretation of volition. But how completely James had 
missed the meaning of the control of conduct by the object, ap­
peared in his treatment of the final type of decision in which, "in 
the very act of murdering the vanquished possibility the chooser 
realizes how much in that instant he is making himself lose. It is 
deliberately driving a thorn into one's flesh and the sense of in­
ward effort with which the act is accompanied is an element which
sets the fourth type of decision in strong contrast with the pre-
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vious three varieties and makes of it an altogether peculiar sort 
of mental phenomenon." (Ibid, p.534)
Had James seen clearly that in all types of decision it 
is the future consequences which appear as present qualities of 
objects to determine conduct, he would not have been led to postu­
late an inwar-d effort by which one drives a thorn into one's flesh 
for stern duty's sake. The "inwardness" is taken out of the effort, - 
alas, that the thorn remains.' - when one realizes that it is a 
case in which the controlling object has incompatible qualities 
which are pulling, drawing, influencing, interesting, moving, or 
whatever dynamic term you wish, the organism in different direc­
tions at the same time. The effort is as much in the object as in 
the organism, for the stimulus must be reorganized in proportion 
as the response grows determinate.
But this is a very different conception of objective 
control from the one which James here elaborated. For according 
to his statement of ideo-motor action, and of objective control, 
in the test case of the presence of rival ideas before the mind, 
there must be war to the death; some, to use his phrase, are mur­
dered and the survivor of the melee leads to action. And who 
does the murder? James answers that it is the fiat, otherwise 
known as subjective determination. This is necessary, since his 
conception of ideo-motcr action does not provide room for a reor­
ganization of the stimulus. For ideo-motor action meant for James 
the mechanical accompaniment of an idea-of-an-action by the action; 
and in a case of decision between alternate ideas, one must give 
way, or be crowded out, by an effort of attention, so that the
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activity may be reduced to the ideo-motor type again. But as a 
matter of fact are those ideas against which one decides really 
murdered? If so, then certainly in judgments of regret, we have 
a clear case of voices from the dead. The pragmatist says that 
they are reorganized rather than destroyed and that their presence 
in the situation marks and stamps the response no less clearly than 
does the controlling interest.
I wish to make it perfectly clear that, so far, in dis­
cussing the will, James was able to point to nothing truly voli­
tional unless we grant that character to the fiat, which James 
could not explain beyond naming it "inward effort" and "effort 
of attention." In ideo-motor action, as we saw, the "bare presence" 
of a resident or remote sensation upon which the idea follows, 
proved an ambiguous conception, and so far as intelligible it 
proved mechanical. It bound James to a rigid determinism. Inde­
cision wnich he considered the presence of alternative ideas in the 
mind, could be ended, and this is the critical spot which reveals 
the weakness of the whole conception, only by crowding one of the 
alternatives out of the mind. It took a force exterior to the 
original situation, a "deus ex machina", in the shape of a fiat to 
make further action possible, precisely because the ideas in them­
selves were considered as powerless, simply things present, static 
and non-functional. It is startling to find James failing so com­
pletely throughout his system of philosophy, to find any adequate 
explanation of functionalism. Because he had never glimpsed the 
pragmatic standard of the future working within the present, living 
thoughts turned in his hands into cold mirrors of a distant reality,
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anticipation into a lo-Jk-step of the mind and train, instinct into 
a blind impulse, and volition, instead of opening the world to the 
human actor, blinded him to every path save one and surrendered 
him, thus blinded, to necessity.
Facing honestly the results of the ideo-motor position 
James found that it meant mechanical determination and a denial 
of the freedom of the will. If the action is related to the pres­
ence of an idea then the presence of rival ideas and their re­
sultant blocking may be treated as a problem in physics. This 
led James to say: "The question of fact in the free-will contro­
versy is thus extremely simple. It relates solely to the amount of 
effort of attention or consent which we can at any time put forth. 
Are the duration and intensity of this effort fixed functions of 
the object or are they not?" (Ibid.p.571) He said in the next 
paragraph that his own belief was that the question of free-will 
was insoluble on strictly psychologic grounds. He proposed to 
solve it on ethical grounds, and taking the risk of error on his 
head, to accept without proof what seemed to him the morally pre­
ferable view, namely, the subjective hypothesis and freedom of 
the will (v.ibid pp. 573 et seq.) Here we touch a characteristic 
mood of James, his "head for risks and sense for living on the 
perilous edge," which forms a connection of spirit between his 
doctrine of the freedom' of the will and his well known doctrine 
of truth.
"The Dilemma of Determinism" is a later and more popular 
discussion of free-will from this ethical point of view suggested
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in the psychology. It deserves careful study hut is so well known 
that direct quotations from it are,perhaps, unnecessary. James’s 
statement of the problem was briefly as follows. He supposed him­
self in a situation of choice in which it was possible for him to 
walk home from his lecture by way of Divinity Avenue or of Oxford 
Street. From the common sense point of view, he said, that either 
course was possible. No one could predict in advance, not even 
the agent, which street he would take, and anyone could imagine a 
universe in which he was walking down Oxford Street as readily as 
one in which he was walking down Divinity Avenue. Even supposing 
that, once the decision was made, time could be turned backward 
to the previous moment, this second time the other alternative 
would stand an equal chance of being chosen. This is the freedom 
which is also chance and which James was busily rehabilitating 
for robust, adventurous spirits, "with a head for risks and a 
sense for living on the perilous edge." But unfortunately, also, 
it recalls that state of equilibrium of desires, in which the ass 
of Buridanus perished of hunger and thirst at a point mid-way be­
tween abundance of food and water. For the indeterminism into 
which the common-sense view led James was nothing short of the free­
dom of indifference.
If we are to suppose that indeterminism means volition 
without reason, are there any of us who would care to accept it 
as the gift which James said it is? (v. "The Will To Believe,"etc. 
pp. 158,159). If it is by chance only that a man chooses to go to 
college, that he chooses a profession, a wife, a philosophy, and 
not because in each case certain reasons weigh more heavily on one
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side than on the other, then I fail to see any more room for judg­
ments of regret with this doctrine of indeterminism than James 
found to comport with determinism. For the freedom of indifference 
which James called chance is the most unbending fatalism. "It 
happened so" we can say of an act after it has been accomplished,but 
before that accomplishment, to maintain the level beam of indif­
ference, we must banish considerations of consequences. Conduct 
is left at the mercy of a freak outburst of an unknown, unaccount­
able thing called "subjective interest." Divinity Avenue or Ox­
ford Street, who or what is to decide? Not the superior attractive­
ness of one street over the other, not the friend who lives on one 
and not on the other, not the shorter time taken to traverse one 
than the other, not any of thess qualities of the rival streets, 
for they are said to be equal in charms and merits. The streets 
have, according to James’s account no more to do with the decision 
than has the other side of the moon, or the square root of x. "For 
the system of other things ha3 no positive hold on the chance 
thing. Its origin is in a certain fashion negative: it escapes, and 
says, Hands off.' coming, when it comes as a free gift or not at 
all." (Ibid.p.154). This conception of chance reads like an echo of 
Greek tragedy in which the strivings of heroic hearts only serve 
to show the grimness of the unalterable decrees of a Fate which 
makes a mockery of all striving.
Thus James brings us to a curious pass. The objection 
which he urged most successfully against determinism, namely, that 
in a "block universe" there is no room for regrets, because they
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bear witness to a belief that what has happened was not the 
only event possible from eternity, may be turned for a slightly 
different reason, against his own doctrine of indeterminism. 
According to it there is strictly no ground for regret for that 
implies reasonableness, and the whole matter is outside the 
bounds of the reasonable. Incalculability is chaotic and full of 
novelty, but for the human actor it is only another sort of fatal­
ism, and if it does truly describe the order of the world, regrets 
are meaningless.
This is the unwelcome fruit of the hypothesis that the 
fiat is a subjective element not further analy zable. But, as in 
the psychology James felt that it was compatible with subjective 
determination to speak of the reasonable determination of voli­
tion by objective qualities, just so he made his theory of inde­
terminism plausible by the foreign elements it contained. For 
he would not for a moment have admitted that the theory of inde­
terminism leaves no room for judgments of regret. He espoused 
it precisely because he felt that it did account for them. And 
yet judgments of regret are meaningless unless in the situation 
of choice the objects snow what the future consequences of the 
choice will be. And for this James made no allowance. This 
appeared in his use of the word "chance" to define the genuineness 
of possibility in t.ie world. He said, "the question is of things; 
not of eulogistic names for them and the best word is the one that 
enables men to know the quickest whether they disagree or not 
about the things. But the word "chance" with its singular nega­
tivity, is just the word for this purpose. Whoever uses it in­
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stead of freedom; squarely and resolutely gives up all pretense 
to control the things he says are free. For him, he confesses 
that they are no better than mere chance would be. It is a 
word of impotence, and is therefore the only sincere word we can 
use, if, in granting freedom to certain things, we grant it honest­
ly, and really risk the game. "Who chooses me must give and 
forfeit all he hath." Any other word permits of quibbling, and 
lets us, after the fashion of the soft determinists, make a 
pretense of restoring the caged bird to liberty with one hand, 
while with the other we anxiously tie a string to its leg to 
make sure it does not get beyond our sight." (ibid, pp 179-160).
But an examination of the choice between Divinity 
Avenue and Oxford street may serve to illustrate the fact that 
judgments of regret are not evidences of the simon pure chance - 
nature of the universe for which James took them. For just so 
long as these streets remain perfectly indifferent to the voli­
tional agent, as James arranged that they should be, and the 
agent by a subjective fiat takes one of these equally passible 
bifurcations, nowhere in the indifferent universe is there room 
for a judgment of regret. Unless there is in Oxford street some 
quality which makes it superior to Divinity Avenue for the purpose 
of the volitional agent he can never have reason to regret his 
choice of the latter.
And so, as I have said, in recognizing judgments of 
regret James tacitly employed a prixiciple of objective determin­
ation of conduct as a basis for his indeterminism. He could do 
so, only because he did not recognize the ambiguity which gave
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apparent strength to his position. His position as an indeter- 
minist,resting his claim to absolute freedom of the will upon the 
judgment of regret appears in all its inconsistency in these two 
sentences from near the close of the essay. "The indeterminism 
I defend, the free-will theory of popular sense based on the 
judgment of regret, represents that world as vulnerable, and 
liable to be injured by certain of its parts if they act wrong.
And it represents their acting wrong as a matter of possibility or 
accident, neither inevitable nor yet to be infallibly warded off." 
(ibid, pp 176-177)
It has remained for pragmatism, seen at its best in the 
work of Dewey,to furnish a new conception of non-mechanical ob­
jective determination of conduct, which comports with the freedom 
of reasonable choice and the genuineness of possibility, which 
were the moral desiderates which James had in view. This non- 
mechanical objective determination of conduct rests in its 
simplest form on the belief that the qualities of objects show 
the future within the present. James struggled against objective 
determination of conduct because through it the dead hand of the 
past seemed to crush freedom.
"And the first morning of creation wrote 
What the last dawn of reckoning shall read." (ibid p.150) 
He thought of objects with permanent qualities being what they 
are because of an unalterable past and he did not see, with all 
his insistence upon novelty, that in every experience, the quality 
of pastness has meaning only in future terms of anticipation of
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consequences. Divinity Avenue and Oxford street, when they 
appear as rivals in the situation of choice appear as streets-to- 
be-chosen. Oxford street may offer also the quality of street- 
which-will-be-most-direct and Divinity Avenue outweigh that qual­
ity by being the stra«fc-which-wiIl-offer-the-most-shade. Suppose,
for the sake of the argument that we grant to James that these 
and all the other qualities of the streets exactly off-3et each 
other. Then we have genuine indecision, and since our purpose 
remains to get home some-how, we seek for some additional factor, 
a new stimulus to settle the dispute. We figuratively, or 
literally, toss-a-penny. This is not subjective determination 
however, for it is still in terms of response to a meaningful 
environment that we are acting, although on the other hand the 
truth remains that our environment becomes what it is, by devel­
oping new meanings in response to our need of an adequate stimu­
lus.
James is correct in thinking that we can imagine a world 
with either street chosen. There are genuine possibilities here 
in the sense that the pedestrian must determine which shall be 
actually taken as James said. But the nature of this determin­
ation is the whole point. It must be reasonable or else it falls 
out-side of conscious activity. And the reasonableness of the 
determinism is that that quality of the situation shall prevail 
which promises to further some end. When we pass judgment on the 
end we call that volition right or wrong, when we pass judgment 
upon the fulfilment which subsequent experience makes of the prom­
ise we call it a successful or a futile act.
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In summary, we may say that, while James did valuable 
work in hia destructive criticism of mechanical determinism, 
showing by an application of the judgment of regret, the baleful 
subjectivistic philosophies to which it leads, he nevertheless 
failed to give an adequate basis for belief in indeterminism 
while recognizing at times the function of objects in situations 
of choice, he felt that this by itself must end in mechinical 
determination. Therefore, largely for ethical reasons, he intro­
duced a subjective explanation of will in the fiat. But this, 
aside from the fact that it is unscientific did not enable him to 
escape determinism. The freedom of indifference straight-way 
reintroduced necessity, and necessity in its most obdurate form, 
for it substituted for a calculable and dependable causal series, 
the incalculable necessity of fate. Pragmatism also recognizing 
judgments of regret as an argument against determinism, defends the 
freedom of the will by a new interpretation of objective determina­
tion, which substitutes for the control of conduct by the past, 
the control of conduct by the future. And this explanation has 
the merit of meeting the scientific demand for calculability and 
the ethical demand for moral responsibility and "sweet reasonable­
ness
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-THE QUESTION OF TRUTH
It is safe to say that nowhere was James more confused, 
and nowhere has he been more eagerly quoted than on the subject of 
truth. A popular notion of pragmatism, gained from James, has 
been, and is still, that pragmatism is a theory of truth, and 
that truth is "what works". It is under this guise that prag­
matism is generally presented from the pulpit an,d from the lecture 
platform. This is not a misquotation of James for it is clearly 
the position assumed repeatedly in the three well-known volumes 
of Essays. "Pragmatism" (1907), "The Meaning of Truth" (1909) 
and "The Will to Believe" (1912) . A quotation from Dewey will 
show at once where-in the pragmatic definition of truth differs 
from this blanket-assertion that truth is that which works.
Dewey says: "The right , the true and good difference is that 
which carries out satisfactorily the specific purpose for the 
sake of which knowing occurs. All manufactures are the product 
of an activity, but it does not follow that all manufactures are 
equally good. And so all "knowledges" are differences made in 
things by knowing, but some differences are not calculated or 
wanted in the knowing, and hence are disturbers and interlopers 
when they come - while others fulfil the intent of the knowing, 
being in such harmony with the consistent behavior of the organism 
as to reinforce and enlarge its functioning." (Essays Philoso­
phical and Psychological in Honor of William James, p. 69).
The reason for the different definitions of truth given
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by James and Dewey respectively, lies in their radical difference 
in interpreting consciousness. James never reached a dynamic 
conception of consciousness. In his earlier writing conscious­
ness was "the faithful psychic concomitant of changing brain 
states" and in his later writing it was "ambulatory" still, being 
"the instant field of the present" moving from point to point, 
from concept to concept by "definitely felt transitions". There 
is no dynamic element in such change. It may be as mechanical 
a process as digestion. But James identified anticipation with 
just such change by taking the position of a* spectator, and read­
ing back into the conscious process as the essence of anticipation 
the fact that while consciousness is at each moment confined to 
"the instant field of the present", this field moves and thus the 
future is constantly becoming the present. For Dewy, conscious­
ness is dynamic because of a very different interpretation of 
anticipation. For if one would speak as a pragmatist of the in­
stant field of the present he must recognize that it is nothing 
less than an organic response in process toward some future con­
sequence which is present as a stimulus. This contrast between 
James and pragmatism must be sharply drawn. James wrote of the 
present moment of consciousness, "the specious present", as of 
something which a spectator could regard as in the process of 
becoming future, because it slips along an abstraction called time 
as the concomitant of chang.mg brain states. Dewey, speaking 
for consistent pragmatists , says that the future lives within 
the present as meaning, as intention^as anticipation. Since
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for an ambulatory consciousness, anything which any successive mo­
ment holds, is as much, and as little, anticipated as anything else, 
James had to find an external standard by which to judge of things 
as true or false, when the present should arrive within the be­
wildering novelty of the future. He shoived his pragmatic spirit, 
in selecting the standard of use, but because the standard was 
external to his theory of consciousness he employed it too widely.
It failed naturally to check with his theory of consciousness or 
to be checked by it. But for a pragmatist with a truly dynamic 
theory of anticipation, the standard is given by consciousness 
itself. For the pragmatist consciousness implied the anticipation 
of a specific future and the consequent adjustment toward that 
future. Accordingly, if, when the future comes, it fulfils this 
definite anticipation, then the adjustment proves smooth and use­
ful and Bewey speaks of it as being harmonious.
James's essay on "The Sentiment of Rationality" shows the 
result of this too wide application of the standard of truth, with 
the consequence that the question of truth is confused with the 
question of morality. For if not checked by specific intentions, 
the useful may a3 easily be interpreted as that which is emotion­
ally satisfying, or ethically satisfying as anything else. For to 
be satisfying in any way is beyond question to be useful in some 
sense. And upon this ambiguity the argument of the essay rests.
One must not forget that in the first place by rational 
James meant acceptable as true. One must bear that in mind 
as he reads James's summary of the argument, which is in part 
as follows. "No philosophy will permanently be deemed rational 
by all men, which (in addition to meeting logical demands) does
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not to some degree pretend to determine expectancy, and in a 
still greater degree make a direct appeal to all those powers 
of our nature which we hold in highest esteem." (The fill to 
Believe etc. p. 110). Earlier in the essay this was his state­
ment! "Well; of two conceptions equally fit to satisfy the log­
ical demand, that one which awakens the active impulses, or 
satisfies other aesthetic demands better than the other, will 
be accounted the more rational conception and will deservedly 
prevail, (ibid. p. 76)
I am tempted here to an aside, for one cannot help 
recognizing in these quotations a very just description of 
James's own philosophy. He tried to meet logical demands but 
in a still greater degree he made a direct appeal to "all those 
powers of our nature which we hold in highest esteem," and one 
must pause to ask thoughtfully, whether, therefore, his philosophy 
should deservedly prevail. In his Phi Beta Kappa oration on 
James in 1911 (cf. William James and Other Essays) Royce answered 
this question with an emphatic yes. Such I feel has been the 
customary answer, and I.believe that it is an answer dangerous for 
philosophy, if philosophy is to remain, as James defined it "an 
unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly." For this answer 
is in accord with James's claim that the demands which can justly 
be made of a philosophy are, specifically, that "it must, in a 
general way at least., banish uncertainty from the future" (Will 
to Believe, etc. p. 77).and "it must define the future congruously 
with our spontaneous powers" (ibid p. 82). Hot for a moment would 
science be willing to accept these strictures upon her mode of
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advance. The scientist tells us, often until we are weary, that 
he is not bound to please any one; wnat he is after is the truthj 
The standard of truth does not differ for science and for phil­
osophy, although Janies urged in this essay that we must accept 
that philosophy of life as truest which brings the most satisfactory 
results, taking"satisfactory "in its widest sense.
The following is the argument which he made for this 
claim and we must grant its persuasiveness, unless we see its 
ambiguity. "If I refuse to stop a murder because I am in doubt 
whether it be not justifiable homicide, I am virtually abetting 
the crime. If I refuse to bail out a boat because I am in doubt 
whether my efforts will keep her afloat I am really helping to 
sink her. If in the mountain precipice I doubt my right to risk 
a leap, I actively connive at my destruction. He who commands 
himself not to be credulous of God, of duty, of freedom, of 
immortality may again and again be indistinguishable from him who 
dogmatically denies them. Scepticism in moral matters is an 
active ally of immorality. Who is not for, is against. The 
universe will have no neutrals in these questions. In theory, as 
in practice, dodge or hedge, or talk as we like about a wise 
scepticism, we are really doing volunteer military service for 
one side or the other . (ibid. p. 109)
In each instance chosen we find James dealing with a 
situation of doubt, the doubtful murder, the boat which may float 
or may sink, the risk of the leap from the mountain precipice, and 
the questions of God , of duty, of freedom, of immortality. James 
meant these as genuinely doubtful situations, in which you cannot
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foretell in which way the issue will turn, out situations in 
wnich by courageous action you may turn that doubtfulness into 
victory for the interest dearest to you. Again we meet James’s 
"head for risks and sense for living on the perilous edge" and 
all that is heroic in us rises to his challenge to meet him on 
this dizzy slope of valiant effort, but the question of truth 
he has not raised. James was dealing not with truth but with 
morality. Here is the boat. It may sink. The truth of that 
anticipation we are no-t in a position to test experimentally be­
fore hand. There are however moral alternatives before us. Is 
it better to exert ourselves, quite painfully perhaps, on the 
chance of being saved, or is the chance worth so little that we 
had better enjoy what leisure life still affords us? But if 
James should add triumphantly, "Tour belief that the boat would 
not sink, saved it from sinking.’ Belief created its own verifi­
cation"; "¡Jot so", we could reply, not our belief but our bailing 
kept us afloat.’"
That
man courage to 
stable organiza 
ethics. For in 
for example, is 
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145
answer comes, possibly from a spectator. "He did nothing and the 
boat sank", or "If he had done nothing the boat would have sunk, 
for it was fast filling with water. " The only "working" which 
one can identify with truth in this case is that the anticipation 
that the boat would or would not sink is fulfilled. The larger 
"wording" of this anticipation if it leads to reconstructing 
the conditions on a more desirable basis, is still guidance by 
the future, but with the question of desirable or undesirable 
there enters the moral question of a conflict of ends. But this 
does not mean that our belief must define the future congruously 
with our desires, we should be woefully betrayed by sinking 
crafts did it do so, neither must we take as literal the 
statement that the belief creats its own verification. Hot 
the belief that a certain thing is true makes it true, but the 
belief, if correct, guides conduct effectively. If our faith, 
or lack of faith, in immortality is compared to our belief 
that the boat will or will not sink, the divergence of the ques­
tion of truth from the question of the value of certain modes of 
conduct becomes even more apparent. A man may be genuinely 
doubtful whether or not his individual life will survive the ship­
wreck of his body, and yet make moral decisions daily and hourly 
until that very moment of ship-wreck comes.
The course which James took was to say that, because 
a man’s life is made more humanly worthy by a faith in immortality, 
the belief, in so far forth is true. He had a right to say that a 
belief in so far as it leads to desirable conduct is morally useful
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and eminently practical, because it serves social ends. This is 
so tautological as to be incontestable. But to say that it is, 
in so far forth, true as well, is to make truth meaningless in 
contradistinction to goodness and utility. It does even more.
It culminates in a defense of irrationality, for this essay on 
"The Sentiment of Rationality" unless accepted as an essay on the 
Sentiment of Morality", and as such valuable, is a renunciation 
of reason» It is this because it contains the emotional demand 
that our philosophy must define the future congruously with our 
desires. Such has been the dream of remantici3ts, Alastors, 
haunted by a vision which has led them to deny the rationality 
of the empirical world and to substitute for it a utopian 
vision of a golden age, "a future congruous to our desires."
Perhaps the errors of this position may be made more 
evident by showing how, at times, James used the consistent 
pragmatic definition of 'truth. It 'was to be expected that in 
taking truth broadly, as that which works, he would include 
within that conception the obvious case in which the working 
consists in the fulfilment of expectation. And beybnd a doubt 
James expressed that view, but he failed to see that.it ex­
hausted the truth function and so he .obscured the whole question, 
as in the essay just considered, by adding practical consequences 
which were foreign to the problem.
We must recall James’s illustration of knowing Memorial 
Hall, as given in the essay "Does Consciousness Exist?" He
supposed that sitting in his study.in Cambridge he had an idea of 
Memorial Hail.* Then he proposed to test this idea. He concluded
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that unless his idea should prove able to lead him to Memorial 
Hall, or enable him in some way to point to Memorial Hall and 
say "This is what my idea meant”; it was open to question whether 
he had actually had an idea of Memorial Hall. The idea made a 
promise. If unfulfilled or unfulfillable he said you could 
rightly doubt whether I had meant that particular hall after all.
In the essay on ”Knower and Known" James used the same example of 
knowing Memorial Hall and significantly enough the adverb "truly" 
slipped into the first sentence. "Suppose me to be sitting here 
in my library at Cambridge; at ten minutes walk from ‘Memorial Hall* 
and to be thinking truly of the latter object" (The Meaning of 
Truth p. 104). Then he continued; "if in its presence I feel 
my idea; however imperfect it may have been; to have led hither 
and to be no?/ terminated, - why then my soul was
prophetic, and my idea must be, and by common consent would be, 
called cognisant of reality. That percept was what I meant, for 
into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness 
and fulfilled intention. Nowhere is there jar, but every later 
moment continues and corroborates an earlier one." (ibid.p.105).
Tiais by the way, James called a complete description of knowing, 
showing that he confused oognition with verification.
I believe that James nowhere expressed this idea of truth 
as fulfilment of promise more clearly than in the article on the 
"Notion of Truth." He said; "True ideas are those that we can 
assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those 
that we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to
have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is
all that truth is known as ii
This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth of an 
idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens 
to an idea. It becomes true, it is made true ’ay events. Its 
verity i_s in fact, an event, a process: the process namely of its 
verifying•itself, its verification. Its validity is the process 
of its valid - at ion. ,
But what do the words verification and validation them­
selves pragmatically mean? They again signify certain practical 
consequences of the verified and validated idea. It is hard to 
find any one phrase that characterizes these consequences Tietter 
than the ordinary agreement - formula - just such consequences 
being what we have in mind whenever we say that our ideas 'agree* 
with reality. They lead us, namely, through the acts and other 
ideas which they instigate, into or up to, or towards, other parts 
of experience with which we feel all the while - such feeling being 
among our potentialities - that the original ideas remain in agree­
ment. The connections and transitions come to us from point to 
point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This func­
tion of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's "verification. 
(Pragmatism, pp. 201, 202.)
I wish particularly to emphasize the difference in the 
definition of "practical consequences" in the above quotation from 
James's definition of "the practical consequences" of a belief in 
the Absolute, which were considered as proof of the truth of the
idea, in so far as the belief granted moral holidays. In contrast 
to this the "practical consequences" just mentioned have to do 
with the continuous, harmonious and satisfactory adjustment of the 
organism to the environment in a direction intended . It means, 
in less abstract terms, that a man understands the nature of 
the world in which he is living, and acts accordingly, and moreover 
that his acting by its smooth accomplishment proves the correctness 
of his estimate of the world. He knows for instance that it is a 
world in which water will quench his thirst, food satisfy his 
hunger, sleep renew his strength, friends cheer his heart, and 
knowledge give him added power over "nature". In so far as acting 
upon this knowledge, its promises are met, the knowledge may be 
called true; in so far as the world makes a promise which it does 
not keep, so that when the person trusts himself to the promise, 
he finds that satisfactory adjustment is impossible in the way 
indicated, error enters, and the knowledge may be called false.
However, this essay on "The Notion of Truth" gives strik­
ing proof of the persistent ambiguity which beset James. That he 
began with the pragmatic conception of truth as the fulfilment of 
intention is evident, but in the course of a few pages this defi­
nition of truth was identified with his dominant idea of the true 
as tne useful in an unrestricted sense. He wrote: ^Agreement thus 
turns out to be essentially an affair of leading - leading that is 
useful because it is into quarters that contain objects that are 
important" (ibid p. 215). In this fashion James has brought 
us back once more to a consideration of truth as that which gives 
emotional satisfaction. Again he has strayed from the narrow
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pragmatic path where truth means the fulfilment of anticipations, 
to wander in a pathless place where truth means the achievment of 
consequences which are useful but are not originally intended.
It is with an understanding of this distinction that 
one should read his essay on "The Will to Believe." To begin 
with,his problem was artificial because he hsd abruptly severed 
the future from the present. He asked us to suppose that it is 
|ust as genuinely possible that any one religious creed is as true 
as another, and this he called a "living option" but he proceded 
to make it a blind option, one which could not be decided on in­
tellectual grounds, (v. The Will To Be-lieve p. 11) To illustrate 
James' 3 meaning , against the belief that there -is a God, one may 
place the belief that there is no God. If we hav9 here a "living 
option", a case of genuine doubt, ana of that case alone James was 
speaking, then nothing in the universe up to date would support 
either creed, and within themselves the creeds would contain no 
suggestions which could be "checked up" in any "intellectual" way. 
It is as if a child stood before another child saying "Which hand 
will you take?" In one hand is an apple, while the other is 
empty, but the child to choose has no evidence which is which.
All he knows is that in one case he will be sorry, in the other 
glad. He may, if he is a normal, healthy child and not too 
scrupulous of the game, resort to a "passional decision" of getting 
the apple at all costs. This is what James did, and he called it, 
not snatching the apple, but arriving at the truth.
*
For James held that if the truth of rival creeds cannot 
be decided intellectually, a man has the right to throw the weight
of his action on the side which he would like to see prevail.
Who will deny this moral right which James defended so ably?
Surely no courageous heart. But the question remains whether we 
can accept James's statement of the case as a fair description of 
a "living option," and in the second place whether, if a "living 
option" is what he claimed we can accept his definition of truth 
as the attainment of emotionally satisfactory results. Taking 
the second question, first, I have already indicated why pragma­
tism cannot use truth as coextensive with utility. It i3 under 
the misapprehension that pragmatism sanctions such an unstandardized 
idea of truth that many pious welcomes have Tieen extended to it 
frarn those who are anxious to prove that wishes are horses and that 
beggars shall ride. That pragmatism has Veen slow to accept these 
tokens of fellowship is due doubtless to a belief, that, when it 
has been seen how dispassionate and incisive its definition of truth 
is, the proffered friendship may be withdrawn.
In regard to the first problem, the question of the 
"living option"itself, offers a striking parallel to the situation 
proposed for solution in "The Dilemma of Determinism". There too, 
James assumed a "living option." He said that he might equally 
well choose to go home by either of two streets,and since in 
attractiveness the streets were equal, a "free" act of volition 
could alone start him homeward by way of either street. In "Ih9 
Will to Believe" the bifurcations were creeds, instead of streets. 
But "The Merchant of Venice" offers us, a more accurate description 
of a situation of choice than is to be found in James's description
of these featurless alternatives
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Shakespeare did not find it necessary to represent a 
scene of "living option" by having Portia’s suitors brought 
■blindfolded before the caskets, knowing only that the choice 
of the casket with Portia's portrait would bring untold happiness. 
Desirable as that prize was, it could have given the suitors no 
clue as to which one of the three caskets would bring its fulfil­
ment. The actual scene is very different. The suitors use 
their eyes. The caskets have their legends. They are of different 
metals, of gold, of silver of lead. Each suitor speaks of the 
promise or the threat which he sees in the objects between which 
he must choose. Portia, in jest, suggests that if an ill-favored 
suitor should be about to choose the casket with her portrait, a 
deep glass of wine upon some other casket would turn his choice 
to that. She would increase the promises and suggestions made 
by the gold and silver caskets to this hapless man. When, too, 
Bassanio comes to the trial, Portia has no need to tell him that 
it would be useful, or desirable, or agreeable even, for him to 
choose the casket with her portrait. He is fully aware of that, 
and his anxious concern is with the truth of the pretension of the 
rival caskets to further that end. Portia has sweet music sung 
which suggests to him the falseness of apparent worth, and in so 
doing she helps him to the truth by adding to the suggestions 
made by the situation.
In this familiar scene there is a more accurate pre­
sentation of a truth-situation, than in the "living option" James 
proposed. To the question,"What shall I believe?" there is but
one answer, "That depends upon the nature of the alternatives."
If, for instance, the idea of immortality bears a promise which 
experience fulfils, then we may rightly call it true. If the 
other alternative is the one which becomes verified by all 
the tests of truth within experience, then it is worthy of be­
lief. For just as it is a thoroughly artificial problem to 
erect as a symbal of choice two streets which are rivals only 
in their strict neutrality before the free agent, so it is 
equally artificial to consider two contrary beliefs as equally 
possible from the standpoint of truth. When such a situation of 
doubt does occur freedom comes not in maintaining the deadlock 
of equal stimuli but in finding in the object a new stimulus to 
end the inactivity, and truth enters not with keeping the alterna­
tives meaningless, out on the contrary, in discovering other and 
more adequate meanings which shall explain more and more simply 
the data in hand. Whether or not a belief is true and is worthy of 
credence, depends therefore not upon any emotional satisfaction 
which accompanies the belief, but solely upon whether or not the 
promises of the object of belief are, or may be, fulfilled within 
experience.
But, some one may object, that this is to forget, as 
James did not, that "faith is the substance of things hoped for, 
the evidence of things not seen" and that precisely because the 
promises of the object of faith cannot be fulfilled within ex­
perience, we have the right to believe as true, what ever will 
produce the best results. This objection, it is to be feared, 
rests still upon a misunderstanding. Faith and belief are not
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mysterious faculties which enter where knowledge ends. They are 
simply affirmations, generally with emotional coloring, of the 
truth or falsity of propositions. But when the propositions which* 
they affirm cannot be "checked up" within experience, as truth 
must be, they have not on that account the right to go beyond ex­
perience, to find another test of truth, nor yet to apply the 
wider test of utility within experience.
Beyond doubt this raises grave questions, since the 
search for truth is entangled here with emotional demands. If the 
belief in question is faith in immortality, tradition and affection 
and habit must often first be answered before one can come to the 
questions of truth at all. But when we do come to the question 
of truth we must ask first of all what the belief in immortality 
means, and then whether that meaning is consonant with experience. 
There is also the question of whether it is true that such a be­
lief does bring certain desirable results. And if it does bring 
these results, i3 it true that they are the best results? For the 
pragmatic definition of truth is a corollary to the pragmatic 
definition of consciousness. As consciousness is behavior guided 
by the anticipation of consequences, so truth signifies that the 
activity so guided does, or may reach the end intended.
A pragmatist, then, cannot accept James's definition of 
truth as it appears in the thesis of "The Will to Believe." James, 
it will be remembered, said: "Our passional nature not only law­
fully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, when­
ever, it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided 
on inte 11 ectual ¿roun_dsj___for_ to say, under such circumstances, "Do
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not decide, but leave the question open," is itaelf a passional 
decision , just like deciding, yes or no - and is attended with the 
sane risk of losing the truth. " 1jThe Will to Believe?p.11) He must 
object in the first place to James's use of "living option" as an 
inaccurate description of the situation of choice, for he holds 
that instead of blank alternatives to be taken, not for their in­
trinsic worth, but because of a prize which is to be added to one 
of them, without changing its character of blankness, - a curious 
contradiction - that a "living option"means that there is a genuine 
problem for investigation. Each alternative is worthy of examina­
tion, for each is full of hints and promises cf fulfilment. Either 
may be true. As a scientist tests his hypothesis so must every 
seeker after religious truths, fearlessly, honestly test his alter­
natives. If neither can be fully verified within a life time, or 
within centuries, or within human experience, yet so long as they 
are "living options" just so long the honest man who wishes truth 
is under an obligation to be open-minded. It may be he will never 
know, it may be that 'the gulfs will wash him down' but in the 
meantime there are the countless vital truths of week days, which 
challenge that equal temper of heroic hearts, "To do, to strive,to 
dare, and not to yield."
James said: "The 'scientific proof' that you are right 
may not be clear before the day of judgment (or some stage of being 
which that expression may serve to symbolize), is reached. But the 
faithful fighters of this hour, or the beings that then and there 
will represent them, may then turn to the faint-hearied, who here 
declined to go on, with words like those with which Henry IV
greeted the tardy Crillon, after a great victory had been gained: 
"Hang yourself, brave CrillonJ We fought at Arques and you were 
not there.'" (Ibid. p. 62)
Exactly! Lack of definite and final knowledge does not 
benumb moral endeavor, as too many moralists have insisted. Too 
many have told us that the nerve of moral effort i3 cut, unless 
we know before hand that, in the end, the good will win. James 
saw more clearly that the very doubtfulness of the issue spurs the 
strenuous man to his best achievement, and that to be out of the 
conflict, and to take no share in the danger, is to be truly ig­
noble. But James lost this insight when he made obscure the dis­
tinction between the good and the true. A very bad thing may be 
true, many very bad things are true. Sickness, vice, "Brocton" 
murders, defeats are facts to be reckoned with in our world. Sci­
ence, disdaining to define the future congruously with our desires, 
does nevertheless strive to ascertain the truth about the present, 
asking what sickness, vice, murders and defeats mean, with the 
purpose to direct the slow and painful and heroic process of mak­
ing the future congruous with our desires. Philosophy, like sci­
ence, must disdain to define the future congruously with our de­
sires and must instead dispassionately discover the truth about 
the actual relation of man to his world. What does life mean? What 
does consciousness mean? What further light does our knowledge of 
the nature of consciousness throw upon the problems of the will, 
of instinct, of immortality? And finally in what manner and to 
what extent are these meanings verified by fulfilment within ex-
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perience? - such are the outlines of some of the broad questions 
of truth with which philosophy must deal.
I have, so far, hardly touched upon James's service to 
philosophical thought in exposing the error of "Truth" with a 
capital "T," by consistently maintaining that there is no such 
‘ Truth, but that there exists instead a pluralism of truths, which 
are particular and relative to definite situations, Abstract "Trutl* 
pictured as the agreement of the mind with reality, received at 
his hands a thrust of inimitable satire (v.Pragmatism,pp.234-235) 
yet, it cannot be denied, that James never quite cleared his skirts 
of a very similar copy-theory of knowledge with its corollary of 
truth as the agreement between an idea and a thing. One finds this 
in the dialogue with which James closed the volume on "The Meaning 
of Truth." He said that while the absolutist sees three distinct 
entities, 'the reality, the knowing and the truth,' he as a prag­
matist could see but two, namely, the reality and what it is known- 
as, and truth is only another name for the knowing of reality, or 
as he repeatedly said (v."The Meaning of Truth," Preface,p.V) truth 
is the agreement of our ideas with reality.
This dualism was most explicit in the answer which James 
made to Professor Pratt: "Experience leads us ever on and on and
objects and our ideas of objects may both lead to the same goal.
The ideas being in that case shorter cuts, we substitute them more 
and more for their objects; and we habitually waive direct verifi­
cation of each one of them, as their train passes through our mind, 
because if an idea leads a_s the object would lead, we can say, in
- 1 5 7 -
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Kr. Pratt’s words, that in 30 far forth the object is as we think 
it, and that the idea, verified thus, in so far forth is true 
enough." (ibid, p.167)
Then, once having made the mistake of separating the idea 
from the object, which as a pragmatist, he should not have done, 
James was unable to show even by his many essays (1) how an object 
would "lead" apart from an idea,(2) how an idea can lead apart 
from an object and (3 $ how,on this assumption, verification can 
mean anything other than static copying of a meaningless object by 
an idea which (a) is meaningful and so fails to copy the object 
faithfully^or (b) is exactly like the object and so meaningless.
(v. especially ibid.p.166 and preface p.XI.)
Moreover this separation of the idea from the object is 
but another aspect of the separation of the future from the present, 
with a criticism of which error, this study of James's doctrine of 
truth was begun. There I showed that for lack of the criterion of 
specific meaning James identified truth with the larger category 
of utility. Approaching truth from the side of the separation of 
idea from object the result is the same. For James spoke of true 
ideas as those which have the practical value of terminating in 
objects which are "worth while." For failing to use the particular 
standard of truth supplied by the object, because he held the idea 
apart from the object, he supposed that the particular standard 
must be given in terms of consequences to the agent. Accordingly 
he wrote:
"If I am lost in the woods, and starved, and find what looks
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like a cow-path, it is of the utmost importance that I should think 
of a human habitation at the end of it, for if I do so, and follow 
it, I save myself. The true thought is useful here because the 
house, which is its object is useful." On the following pages this 
concrete example is generalized. "From this simple cue (that true
ideas are useful) pragmatism gets her general notion of truth as*
something essentially bound up with the way in which one moment in 
our experience may lead us toward other moments which it will be 
worth while to have been led to. Primarily, and on the common- 
sense level, the truth of a state of mind means this function of 
a leading that is worth while."(Pragmatism,pp.203,204,205)
Again contrast with this what the pragmatist means, if 
he is consistent, when he says the truth is what works; namely, 
that the anticipations aroused in him by the object are fulfilled. 
Truth means for him, that, when questioned, some experience-has 
made a promise and that the promise has been kept. Truth is prac­
tical in the sense that an object permits one to "bank" on its 
promises. Truth again is satisfaction, not because an object ful­
fils emotional demands, but because it fulfils the letter of its 
c ontract.
Is it true that it will rain? That cloud looks threaten­
ing. The rain comes. The truth of the rain-promising aspect of 
the cloud is proved. That a picnic is spoiled and that crops are 
saved are facts irrelevant to the truth or falsehood of the origi­
nal meaning. It was because James lost sight of the function of 
the object in the truth situation that he failed to keep to this
V
pragmatic interpretation. Furthermore by merging truth in the con­
ception of utility in its widest sense, he lost the distinction be­
tween truth and goodness. Yet it was not strange that his under­
standing of truth was imperfect, for he worked it out consistently 
with his theory of consciousness, and so shows, but in one case the 
more, how far reaching are the errors attendant upon a false defi­
nition of knowledge.
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APPENDIX: A STUDY OF ARTICLES BY DEWEY AND BODE
CONTAINING THE ESSENTIALS OF PRAGMATISM
A suggestion may be useful to direct the reader to 
representative articles in which the pragmatic theory of conscious­
ness has been most fully developed. In "Studies in Logical Theory" 
Dewey shows the need of a new theory of consciousness to solve the 
difficulties raised by the current dualistic explanation by which 
object and idea are forever sundered, as is north from south, and 
still must be the same. His "Experimental Theory of Knowledge" 
describes a simple case of knowledge in a way which overcomes this 
difficulty. An article of his on "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psych­
ology" gives the psychological basis for the new explanation of 
consciousness. Finally, in a criticism of Bergson in an article 
called "Perception and Organic Action" he states the most radically 
new and significant aspect of the definition which pragmatism gives 
to consciousness. It has been customary in dualistic theories of 
many kinds, to speak of consciousness as in some way "mirroring" 
the present qualities of objects. But according to the position 
taken by Dewey, the object in the conscious situation shows the 
future as its present quality. This identification of consciousness 
with "behavior guided by anticipation of consequences" is made also 
by Professor B. H. Bode of the University of Illinois in an article 
on "The Psychological Doctrine of Focus and Margin". Since the 
pragmatic definition of consciousness is pivotal for thi3 thesis I 
must consider each of the above articles more in detail.
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In the "Studies in Logical Theory" Dewey establishes his 
position by means of a criticism of Lotze's Logic. He says that 
because it separates existence from meaning, there is a rock against 
which every dualistic logic such as Lotze’s splits, "either reality 
already has the statement which thought is endeavoring to give it, 
or else it has not. In the former case thought is futilely reiter­
ative; in the latter, it is falsificatory". (p. 47). Accordingly, 
Dewey studies the conditions and cues of the thought-function and
finds that thought arises whenever there is need of reorganizing
#
experience. He describes this problematic situation as a conflict 
in the object. The object is in need of reintegration; thought is 
the process of that reintegration. "To reach this unification is 
thought’s objective or goal", (p. 70). Thus he describes the 
origin, the process, and the end of thought as follows:
"All the distinctions of the thought-function, of 
conception as over against sense-perception, of judgment in its 
various modes and forms, of inference in its va3t diversity of 
operation - all these distinctions come within the thought-situation 
as growing out of a characteristic antecedent typical formation of 
experience; and have for their purpose the solution of the peculiar 
problem with respect to which the thought-function is generated or 
evolved: the restoration of a deliberately integrated experience 
from the inherent conflict into which it has fallen", (p. 47).
But left so, the statement is insufficient; the unification 
effected by thought is not a goal in itself. Dewey says that think­
ing is not a merely formal activity, but that the reorganization of 
experience is controlled always by reference to an end, which is an
-163-
end for conduct, (cf. pp. 80,81). Therefore, hie final definition o 
the purpose of thought is that it is to reach a unification of exper­
ience for the sake of using experience as a tool. This opens up an 
infinite progress for consciousness, but to that, who would object, 
so long as it offers satisfaction by the way? But the conclusions 
reached in these "Studies in Logical Theory" can be regarded only 
as a preliminary statement of the pragmatic position. The statement 
is valuable as an indication of the break with dualism, the emphasis 
on the part taken by the object, and the correlation-hinted at but 
not fully established - between the reorganization of the object 
and conduct. The lines are more sharply drawn in the next essay to 
be considered, "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge", published in 
the Volume called "The Influence of Darwin and Other Essays",
Dewey coined a curious phrase in this essay in his effort 
to define the peculiar quality possessed by an object in a conscious 
situation. He says that the distinctive quality of such a situation 
is that something is "presentr-as--absent". In his own words:
"Both the thing meaning and the thing meant are elements in the same 
situation. Both are present, but both are not present in the same 
way. In fact, one is present as-not-present-in-the-same-way-in-whici 
the-other-is. It is present as something to be rendered present in 
the same way through the intervention of an operation. We must not 
balk at a purely verbal difficulty. It suggests a verbal inconsis­
tency to speak of a thing present-as-absent. But all ideal contents, 
all aims (that is, things aimed at) are present in just such fashion 
Things can be presented as absent, just as they can be presented as
hard or soft, black or white, six inches or fifty rods away from 
the body”, (pp. 88, 89). This description Dewey crystallizes into 
the following definition: "An experience is a knowledge if in its 
quale there is an experienced distinction and connection of two 
elements of the following sort: one means or intends the presence of
the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present, 
while the other is that which, while not present in the_ same fashion 
must become so present if the meaning or intention of its companion
or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the operation it s e t up 
(p. 90).
This seems a formidable definition but it may, I believe, 
be made simple if illustrated by the concrete example of knowing 
which Dewey selects. Then it appears that it is only a philosopher' 
way of defining so common a pair of terms as fact and meaning which 
we have used familiarly all our days. Dewey takes as his concrete 
example of knowing the floating odor of a rose. He then offers 
three different explanations of how this floating odor may be termed 
a case of knowing, finally rejecting the first two.
The first explanation, made only to be rejected, starts 
from the level of the ordinary sensationalistic compounding of con­
sciousness. It reminds one of Condillac's famous example of the 
perfectly organized statue first awakened to conscious life by the 
application of the fragrance of a rose. Dewey states this descrip­
tion of consciousness with the brevity of algebraic symbols. He 
supposes that the smell of the rose starts changes which end in 
picking and enjoying a rose. "The smell, S, is replaced (and dis­
placed) by a felt movement, K, this is replaced by the gratification,
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G. Viewed from without, as we are now regarding it, there is 
S-K-G. But from within, for itself, it is now S, now K, now G, and 
so on to the end of the chapter". Then follows Dewey’s comment upon 
the error of taking this as a description of knowledge and his 
reasons for rejecting it. "Nowhere is there looking before and 
after; memory and anticipation are not born. Such an experience 
neither is, in whole or in part, a knowledge, nor does it exercise 
a cognitive function", (p, 79).
Our knowledge, in other words, cannot be exhaustively des­
cribed by calling it a series of sensations. Knowing-a-rose cannot 
be described as the numerical sum of a sensation of fragrance, plus 
a sensation of reaching, plus a third sensation of "gratification". 
This is not merely inadequate statement, it is mis-statement, for it 
assumes that we can have facts apart from all meanings. It repeats 
Hume’s attempt to make ideas out of bundles of sensations. This 
assumes that the elements of knowledge are what Dewey calls in a 
later article "self-enclosed particulars", and that by adding to­
gether these same "self-enclosed particulars" somehow an organic 
whole results. But one of the important services of pragmatism is 
to show that a pure sensation, a "that" with no possible "whatness^ 
is a fiction. I must quote Dewey's statements a little further on 
this subject of the denial of bare sensations, or what is often 
called mere acquaintance and show how emphatically he denies that 
there can be apprehension without some context, which is neither 
recognition or expectation. "To be acquainted with a thing or with
a person has a definite empirical meaning; we have only to call to 
mind what it is to be genuinely and empirically acquainted, .
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to have done forever with this uncanny presence, which though bare 
and simple presence, is yet known, and thus is clothed upon and 
complicated, to be acquainted with a thing is to be assured (from 
the standpoint of the experience itself) that it is of such and such 
a character; and that it will behave, if given an opportunity, in 
such and such a way; that the obviously and flagrantly present trait
i 8 associated with fellow traits that will show themselves, if the
-
leadings of the present trait are followed out. To be acquainted 
is to anticipate to some extent, on the basis of prior experience.
I am, say, barely acquainted with Mr..Smith: then I have no extended 
body of associated qualities along with those palpably present, but 
at least some one suggested trait occurs; his nose, his tone of voice 
the place where I saw him, his calling in life, an interesting anec­
dote about him, etc. To be acquainted is to know what a thing is 
like in some particular. If one is acquainted with the smell of a
flower it means that the smell is not just smell, but reminds one of
■
some other experienced thing which stands in continuity with the 
smell. There is thus supplied a condition of control over or pur­
chase tup on what is present, the possibility of translating it into 
terms of some other trait not now sensibly present". (Ibid, p. 83).
And in this way the first suggested interpretation of the
concrete situation of knowing as a series of bare acquaintances -
,? >#
without future reference - i3 dismissed as unintelligible.To arrange 
selected sensations on a temporal thread and call the whole knowledge 
is impossible, for one reason, because sensations cannot be isolated 
from their context like pearls.
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There is a second explanation of knowledge which Dewey 
also rejects. This position is that knowledge is not a mere series 
of experiences, but is a process, which though occupying time, is 
still a unit of such a nature that the end of it, the gratification, 
G, reaches back and gives meaning to the smell, S, making it 21 , 
or smell-which-meant-rose, instead of the bare mechanical stimulus i 
was until the process was completed.
Dewey says in commenting upon this position that while it 
is possible to regard this as a cognitive experience, yet it cannot 
be called cognitional. In itself, in other words, the experience is 
not knowledge at all, but from another experience we may look back 
upon it and call it a smel1-which-led-to-a-rose. What was purely 
mechanical in process assumes in retrospect teleological function.
jt should be noted,moreover, that this explanation of 
knowing no less than the first assumes discrete sensations in mech­
anical sequence, but that here there is in addition the further com­
plication of a miracle. One of the "self-enclosed particulars", 
the G, which is separated from it in time but is never-the-less able 
to reach back to the S, now perished, and say "This S was not S at 
all, it wasl One might object, as Dewey refrains from doing, 
that by transforming the S into iL the G itself suffers change into 
something quite other than enj oyment-of^-a-rose.
But Dewey deserves direct quotation upon a point as 
critical for his theory as is this. He writes : " Here we have a 
cognitive but not a cognitional thing. In saying that the smell is 
finally experienced as meaning gratification (through intervening 
handling, seeing, etc.) and meaning it not in a hapless way, but in
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a fashion which operates to effect what is meant, we retrospectively 
attribute intellectual force and function to the smell - and that is 
what is signified by "cognitive". Yet the smell is not cognitional, 
because it did not knowingly intend to mean this: but is found after 
the event, to have meant it. Nor again is the final experience, the 
Si. , or transformed S, a knowledge.
"Here again the statement may be challenged. Those who 
agree with the denial that bare presence of a quale in "conscious­
ness" constitutes acquaintance and simple apprehension may now turn 
against us, saying that experience of fulfillment of meaning is just 
what we mean by knowledge, and this is just what the £ of our 
illustration is. The point is fundamental. &s the smell at first 
was presence or being, less than knowing, so the fulfilment is an
experience that is more than knowing...............  Considerable
justification in the common use of language, in common sense, may 
be found in defining knowledge as complete assurance. But even upon 
this definition the fulfilling experience, is not, as such, complete 
assurance, and hence not a knowledge. Assurance, cognitive valida­
tion, and guaranteeship, follow from it, but are coincident with 
i18 occurrence. It gives but is. not assurance..........The ful­
filling experience is not of itself knowledge, then,even if we 
identify knowledge with fulness of assurance or guarantee. Moreover 
it gives, affords assurance only in reference to a situation which 
we have not yet considered.
"Before the category of confirmation or refutation can be 
introduced, there must be something which means to mean something 
and which, therefore, can be guaranteed or nullified by the issue
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and this is precisely what we have not as yet found", (pp. 85, 86,
87) .
The criticism of this second theory of knowledge turns, 
then, upon the point that meaning is not something which is added to 
fact as a gift in the process of living, but that it must be con­
sidered as inseparable from fact. Put succinctly, the future refer­
ence is a present quality of the object. And this is the third 
explanation of knowledge which Dewey mentions and the one which he 
personally accepts. And so we now come to closer terms with the 
criterion for which we are looking. The following is Dewey’s 
description of consciousness as experienced in a concrete case:
"Let us suppose that the smell quale recurs at a later date, and 
that it recurs neither as the original S nor yet as the final 
but as an S’ which is fated or charged with the sense of the pos­
sibility of a fulfilment like Unto £. . The S* that recurs is aware 
of something else which it means, which it intends to effect through 
an operation incited by it and without which its own presence is 
abortive, and so to say, unjustified, senseless. How we have an 
experience which is cognitional. not merely cognitive, which is 
contemporaneously aware of meaning something beyond itself, instead 
of having this meaning ascribed by another at a later period. The
odor knows the rosej_the__roae is known by the odor; and the import
Of each term is constituted by the re Nations hi j> in which i t _ stands to 
the other. That is, the import of the sm9ll is the indicating and 
demanding relation which it sustains to the enjoyment of the rose as 
its fulfilling experience; while the enjoyment is just the content or 
definition of what the smell consciously meant, i. e., meant to mean.
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Both the thing meaning and the thing meant are elements in the 
same situation", (pp. 87, 88).
It is very significant that Dewey does not reduce this 
description, as he did the other two, to algebraic formulation. This 
description of knowledge defies such treatment for the reason that 
it does not represent knowledge as constituted by a series of 
" self-endosed particulars". Although Dewey speaks of an S’ where 
before he spoke of S, he does so only to say that it is not a 
sensation, for it has meaning, not mere acquaintance, for it involves 
recognition and anticipation. In short, it is knowledge bearing 
within itself the promise of the enjoyment of the rose, much as the 
bud, through growth, bears the promise of full-blown perfection.
Before one can accept this position in regard to conscious­
ness, or even fully understand it, it is necessary, I believe, to 
consider it more closely from the standpoint of the body. Dewey 
makes this psychological approach to the problem in an article callec 
"The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology". It is an article of the 
utmost importance for establishing his position.
He says in introduction that the old dualism of body and 
soul still finds distinct expression in current psychology under 
the no less dualistic conception of stimulus and response. We 
still make rigid distinctions between sensations, thoughts, and 
acts. ¥e make an analysis of conscious processes into things 
as different from each other as sensory stimulus, central activity 
which corresponds to thought, and motor activity which stands for 
the act itself. Again, notice the attempt to explain consciousness, 
this time psychologically, by a series of "self-enclosed particulars’.
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"As a result", he writes, "the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or 
organic unity, hut a patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical 
conjunction of unallied processes. What is needed is that the 
principle underlying the idea of the reflex arc as the fundamental 
psychical unity shall react into and determine the value of its 
constitutive factors. More specifically, what is wanted is that 
sensory stimulus, central connections, and motor responses shall 
he viewed, not as separate and complete entities in themselves, hut 
as divisions of labor, functioning factory within the single concrete 
whole, now designated the reflex arc". (Psychological Review, Vol. 
Ill, pp. 355-356).
According to Dewey, the more or less tacit assumption of 
the ordinary reflex arc theory is that there are three sharply 
defined stages in consciousness, the first, sensory, a stimulus, is 
displaced hy the second, which is idea, and that again is displaced 
hy the third, which is activity in physiological terms. He does not 
believe that knowing progresses thus hy jerks. He believes that the 
process is more accurately defined hy saying that an earlier exper­
ience is not displaced hy a later experience, hut is transformed int 
it and that the motor phase serves to mediate in the process of tran 
formation. Therefore, he says "The fact is that stimulus and respon 
are not distinctions of existence hut teleogical distinctions,that 
is distinctions of function, or part played, with reference to 
reaching or maintaining an end". (Ibid, p. 365). And he also says 
that "Heither mere sensation, nor mere movement, can ever he either 
stimulus or response; only an act can he that; the sensation as 
stimulus means the lack of and search for such an objective stim-
36
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ulus, or orderly placing of an act, just as mere movement as 
response means the lack of and search for the right act to complete 
a given coordination". (Ibid, p. 367).
The argument for this radical position Dewey developed 
slowly and carefully and it deserves the attention of any one who 
wishes to understand the consistent pragmatic attitude on the prob­
lem of consciousness. It is idle to repeat the argument in this 
connection except in so far as it is necessary to illuminate his 
conclusion that consciousness is a certain kind of activity. The 
nature of this activity which distinguishes it from mechanical 
behavior, is that it is not a series of events. On the contrary, it 
is organic to such an extent that stimulus and response are not 
merely correlative but contemporaneous. Could one make a cross 
section of conscious- behavior he would discover not "stimulus" and 
not "response" in their simon-pure simplicity but "activity" which.» 
with regard to a future end is stimulus^and with regard to a present 
end is,at the same time,response. To try to separate within the 
conscious act the element of stimulus from the element of response, in 
like trying to separate within the opening bud the strictly old from 
the strictly new. For in both cases growth means not alone addition 
but also reconstruction. In the case of consciousness the recon­
struction takes place in the object which 1b controlling behavior, 
and it is effected by the responses made.
Dewey insists emphatically that in any case of knowing, 
take, for sake of illustration, the smell of the rose in the former 
example, there is no activity of the body which may in itself be 
labelled either stimulus or response. These are terms added to the
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activity showing the point of view from which the activity is judged 
The smell is itself a "response" to previous "stimuli" and is no less 
a "stimulus" to further "responses". More than that, just in so far 
as the activity is uncertain as stimulus, just in so far is it 
uncertain as response. Dewey says that in the problematic situation 
the "real problem may be equally well stated as either to discover 
the right stimulus, to constitute the stimulus, or to discover,to 
constitute the response". (Ibid, p. 369).
Functionally, then, the terms "stimulus" and "response" 
are full of meaning. But functionally they only interpret from the 
side of the organism, the description of consciousness already given 
in "fhe Experimental Theory of Knowledge", from the side of the 
object. There the S' was present fact with future meaning; a smell 
(present) which-means-a-rose (future). In the psychological terms 
of this essay S' in its present aspect means that a definite response 
is taking place. "It is that smell", we say. But at the same time 
in its future aspect the S' is a stimulus for activity for which it 
is preparing the way, such, for instance, as "enjoying the rose".
It is because this article on the "Reflex Arc Concept in 
Psychology" describes so clearly the process of consciousness from 
the side of the body that it is needed to supplement "The Experimen­
tal Theory of Knowledge" which considers primarily the changes in 
the object which controls conduct. I find the two aspects happily 
welded together in a later article written by Dewey in criticism 
of Bergson. The significant advance of statement in this article 
is that consciousness is anticipatory - a position implied, of 
course, in the other discussions, but here roundly stated.
•-T T ? "
-For instance, he says: "If we allow our Kinds to play free­
ly with the conception that percfiived objects present our eventual 
action upon the world, or designate our possible actions upon the 
environment, we are brought to a notion of complication or qualitative 
alteration. For the only way in which objects could conceivably 
designate our future actions would be by holding up to view the 
objective effects of those actions; that is to say, presenting the 
rior environment as it will be, when modified by our reactions upon 
it. Perception will then be anticipatory, prognostic: it would 
exhibit to us in advance the consequences of our possible actions.
It would thereby facilitate a choice as respects, since the «.ct of 
appreciating in advance the consequences that are to accrue from 
incipient activities would surely affect our final action". (Percep­
tion and Organic Action, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and 
Scientific Methods, Vol. IX, pp. 653-654).
Dewey develops this thesis throughout the paper in strict 
iccordance with his position in regard to the Reflex Arc Concept, 
le maintains that perception cannot be fully described from the side 
>f the organism alone. The functional transformation of the environ- 
ent i3 as much a part of perception as is the corresponding organic 
’esponse. These terms have meaning only in relation to one another.
He says that according to Bergson "perception ia a stimulus",
(Ibid, p. 659), but that his own account is that perception"con- 
stitutes" a stimulus. According to Bergson's account perceiving an 
object means merely that a problem is given and that the solution of 
the problem lies wholly with the organism. According to Dewey 
responses of the organism make the problem by their own indetermini-
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aten9S3, and the solution of the problem comes as much from the 
object as from the organism, for just as the object grows in 
clearness, (which is functional transformation), just 30 the response 
gains definiteness and precision. Not only does he conceive of the 
change in the object as a process of transformation and growth, and 
the responses of the organism as development of the same kind, but 
the relation also between object and organism, stimulus and response, 
is organic rather than mechanical. The stimulus does not cause the 
response, the response does not cause the stimulus, if we think of 
cause as serial connection, but just as the pushing of the wind 
against the sail can be explained only in terms of the resistance of 
the sail to the wind, Just so stimulus and response are related, not 
temporally, for they are not apart in time, but functionally. The 
meaning of stimulus under the pushing of response is that new avenues 
are opened for further responses.
For this meaning of stimulus we have Dewey’s statement that 
"the perceived 3ubject-matter is not simply a manifestation of con­
ditions antecedent to the organic responses, but is their trans­
formation in the direction of further action". (Ibid, p. 663). And 
the following statement again insists upon the prognostic quality of 
Iperception. "The quality of the movement, or action supplied by the 
sensory aspect, is, in effect, an anticipation of the act when overtly 
performed". (Ibid, p. 667).
A fresh approach to a problem as difficult of exposition as 
i3 this problem of consciousness helps sometimes to clarify the con­
ception. In his presidential address, delivered before the meeting 
of the Western Philosophical Association in April, 1914, Professor
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Bod© approaches the problem from a new angle, although over a field 
on which lie the relics of many an ancient battle. His subject is 
"The Psychological Doctrine of Focus and Margin", (Philosophical 
Review, 1914), and he reinterprets this in functional terms. His 
concern is, like Dewey’s, to 3how that perception is anticipatory.
To this end he interprets the old, static metaphor of the focus and 
margin of consciousness, which arose out of the desire to account 
for such facts as the ticking of a clock in the room where I am at 
work, the noises from the street, the resistance of the paper to 
my hand as I wrote, the temperature of the room, the weight of my 
clothing, in short, all those things which as I work with attention 
concentrated on my argument are of, yet not in my consciousness.
The old explanation is to say that they are subconsciously present, 
or that they are present as confused and vague facts. In other words 
they constitute a margin or fringe of dim consciousness. The new 
functional explanation is very different. It says that I am adjusted 
to all these things and adjusted in a satisfactory way which leaves 
no problem. Each and every one of these neglected aspects of the 
total situation comes as "something-to-be-neglected". Instead of 
vagueness these aspects present the maximum of organization. The 
responses to them are so definite as to be mechanical. The vagueness 
dwells forever in the focus of consciousness, for it is precisely the 
unformed meanings which absorb us and direct our energies. To 
quote directly: "They inform us of a .¡margin, not by refusing to com­
pete for our attention with more important or more interesting facts, 
but by bodying forth the unfinished character of the situation.
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Hence, this beckoning, this tingling with the sense of closeness, 
this sinking back when our efforts mest with defeat. Focus and 
margin, in short, have to do with movement, with transition, and 
not with a static field. These situations are felt as inherently 
unstable and in process of reconstruction. There is a peculiar 
sense of activity, of ‘something doing', of a future knocking on 
the door of the present. What is thus on its way to the present 
we can designate only in terms of the object as it is after it ha3 
arrived". (Philosophical Review, Vol. XXIII, p. 398).
The issue of this long discussion of the pragmatic meaning 
of consciousness as anticipation, I find summarized in a descriptive 
paragraph in this same article. In a footnote which accompanies
it Bode expressly points to Dewey's accounts of consciousness in 
"The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" and "Perception and Organic 
Action". It will be useful to review this description of conscious­
ness once more, since it is hsre put very concisely and yet fully 
enough to bo more than a mere formula. For a formula can be self- 
luminous to the forraulator and yet dark with confusion to the novice. 
Bode writes : " In a reflex act, so it was stated, the stimulus that 
evokes the first response is like the spark that seta off a fuse.
Each stage in the process becomes a stimulus to the next. In our
'temporary reflexes] on the other hand, a certain organization must 
take place before the act can proceed. The first response is delayec 
until the last is provided for. Or we may say that until the organi­
zation is effected, it remains to be seen what the first act is
to be. In response to an optical stimulation, for example, the eyes
may be focused for the act of looking or they may be closed as a
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protection against danger. There is, to begin with, no adequate 
stimulus at all. The process of organization is as much a process
of securing a stimulus as it is a process of securing response.
What is needed is a stimulus that will give direction to all the 
partial responses and not merely to the first of a series. And yet 
the responses that enter into the total act come in a serial order. 
To be adequate, therefore, the stimulus must take account of both 
the earlier and later stages of the response by evoking the first 
stage aj3 a preliminary to the second. The 3 timulus is evidence that 
a response has been attained, but attained with reference to the 
response of the next moment. Such a stimulus is evidently unique 
in kind. It is called into being to suit the needs of the moment, 
and it controls the progress of the response by reflecting or 
prefiguring in its present constitution the responses that are yet 
to follow. And this is precisely what is meant by consciousness 
or a conscious stimulus". (Ibid, p. 403).*
*See also A. W. Moore, "Pragmatism and It3 Critics", especially 
Chapter V, "How Ideas Work".
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